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Abstract 
This thesis is an ethnography of the phenomenon of self-help. It begins by noting a problematic 
at the centre of the topic: the term self-help connotes, on the one hand, an autonomous agent 
("self'), and on the other, a reliance on other agents ("help"). More substantively, the term 
attaches itself to two opposing ideological positions, individualism and collectivism. This strange 
splitting of the term is reproduced in a contemporary context, where we see the genre of self-help 
books, which is built around the highly individualistic activity of reading as a quest for self-help, 
and self-help groups, which are built around the collective, co-presence of members as they 
mutually help one another. But the phenomenon is engaged by separate, non-overlapping 
literatures that treat self-help books as having a status independent of self-help groups; one 
attends to self-help books, but disregards self-help groups, while the other attends to self-help 
groups, but disregards self-help books. Thus self-help books and self-help groups get polarized. 
This effectively makes the original problematic around the term itself disappear, because it' 
simply ignores it. 
This research turns this character of self-help into a topic for study. It looks at what holds the 
term together, that is to say, self-help books and self-help groups, when they appear to be 
entirely independent phenomena, and yet still share the term self-help. It is interested in the 
significance of the term, why it gets invoked as a description of particular activities and what that 
entails as a practical matter. It wants to see how self-help is performed. It identifies a hybrid of 
self-help books and self-help groups - a self-help workshop. This third site of self-help brings 
individual readers of self-help books into a context of collective, social activity. It uses this as a 
strategy with which to examine the relationships between self-help books and self-help groups, 
self and help. It undertakes a detailed empirical analysis of a corpus of self-help books, a self-
help workshop and a range of self-help groups, drawing on textual, discursive and ethnographic 
modes of inquiry. It then uses this empirical work to map self-help and engage it as a wider, 
cultural phenomenon in the modem period. 
Keywords: self-help groups, self-help books, life coaching, ethnography, epistemology, 
conversation analysis, practice theory. 
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Chapter 1 
Self-help as "selr', "-" and "help" 
Self-help: "The action or faculty of providing for oneself without assistance from others" 
Oxford English Dictionary 
1.1 Introduction 
It is a funny term. There it is, just two little words: "self-help". What makes it funny is 
that it seems to point in different directions, at different things. Look at the OED 
definition, at the top of the page. Self-help implies some inner faculty, an ability to 
perform some action on one's own, without external assistance. But where does the 
"help" fit in? Look again: self-help. Help is different from self. It implies the requirement 
of some outside agency, assistance from others. So self-help is an internal capacity and 
an external capacity; sufficiency and insufficiency; independence and dependence; 
autonomy and sociality. What does that mean? Surely there is a tension. But the two 
words fit together happily enough; they appear in the dictionary like that. See: self-help. 
Or do they? You see the hyphen 1 - the small line, almost unnoticed, between self and 
help. What is its function? [s self-help one phenomenon, or two phenomena being 
brought together, with a hyphen? What is happening, in the name of self-help? What is 
embodied in the term? And what does it mean to practice self-help? 
[ thought the term appeared noticeably strange. And it is. Engaging the topic of 
self-help plays out the classic conflicts in the culture wars (see Curran, Gaber & Petley, 
2005). There are two versions of culture here, conflicting views of moral authority on 
human existence. Like most wars, a tension exists; a paradox: 
I [s this hyphen part of a coupling of terms that rearticulates, or at least invokes, the classic 
individual/social divide? Look: we have two things, each one insufficient, in need of continual explanation 
in terms of the other; there are back and forth movements between self and help, across the hyphen, where 
focusing on the first leads us to the second, which in turn leads us back to the first ad infinitum. Latour 
(1999a) has challenged this use of a hyphen, in any case, as implying just this kind of relation between 
"actor" and "network", an analogue for self and help, in actor network theory. 
Like all living creatures, Homo sapiens initially seeks to satisfy his biological 
needs and to ensure his personal survival. But biological survival depends largely 
upon the cooperation and assistance of other human beings, and man, who is also 
a social being, is committed to living in a society through which he and his 
fellows attain individual and common goods (Katz & Bender, 1976: 14 original 
italics) 
So, man [sic] is at the centre of the culture wars. Does he derive his sense of self, that is 
to say survive in the world, as an individual or as a member of a collective? What is his 
identification? Is he autonomous or not? Self-help, then, embodies two predominant 
ideological currents in Western thought: individualism and collectivism (Williams, 
1989). History provides us with a picture of this tension. In primitive cultures, 
cooperation was readily practiced. It had to be; life was amazingly harsh, with only the 
strongest surviving. Tribes would group together, and engage in communal activities 
such as food gathering, child rearing, cultivation of land and resources, protection against 
"outsiders", rival tribes (Kropotkin, 1989). Then there were medieval guilds, early 
associations of craftsmen: masons, carpenters, glassworkers. They were enjoined by 
"conjurations", oaths obliging artisans to support one another in times of need or in 
business ventures. They organized funds, to support elderly or infirm members and their 
families, maintain tools and secure employment. Trades would be learnt, passed down 
from master craftsmen; apprentices would be required to produce evidence, a 
"masterpiece", to display their abilities to the guild, who would decide, collectively, their 
eligibility to practice. They did things together. 
The Industrial Revolution tells another story too. It brought about a huge rise in 
the population through industrialization, where people had to adjust to the demands of 
industrial economic life; things were competitive, and highly fickle. Friendly societies 
emerged - mutual associations of individuals who grouped together for financial and 
social services (Neave, 1991). A regular membership fee ensured that, if members 
became ill, or even died, they or their families would receive an allowance. Times were 
hard. But the societies were social occasions too: members would regularly meet for 
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ceremonial dances, engage in team activities and have annual feasts (Katz, 1993). [t 
might seem odd that, given the prevalence of unemployment, and the considerable 
domestic costs of living, especially among the working classes, people would carry the 
burden of ongoing costs for society membership. There was a good reason: membership 
in these collectives prevented the threat, never too distant, of having to go to the 
workhouses2• Nobody wanted that. 
The guilds and the friendly societies were related to another strategy of mutual 
aid: trade unions. Peoples' livelihoods in the heavily inhabited towns depended on the 
industrial economy; but employment was notoriously insecure, and working conditions 
highly unsatisfactory (Hopkins, 1995). There were no safeguards in place against 
unemployment, and employers were not about to change things. Workers were vulnerable 
to exploitation e.g., exhausting piecework, long working hours and threats to wages in 
times of depression in trade. With the inception of trade unions, workers began to 
participate in the decisions affecting their working conditions. Employers took notice; 
they did not want ongoing strikes, violence and disruption in the workplace. That was bad 
for business. Besides: happy workers meant more industry. But things did not improve 
immediately. There was a need for political change, to obtain trade union representation 
in parliament. Workers wanted to change policy on employment, and elected working 
class men to stand in parliament as independents, to break away from the current political 
parties. Workers sought public ownership and nationalization of the means of production, 
as well as equal partnership, with employers, in their contracts of employment. The 
capitalist system was insensitive to the needs of the ordinary, working man. Thus: it was 
through the socialist thinking of working class self-help, that is, trade unionism, that the 
Labour party was created, a political party for the working classes which promoted the 
interests of labour. So this is collective self-help: achieving social and cultural goals, or 
goals that impact and effect society and culture, through mutual aid. There is a strong 
social ethic. 
2 These were highly visible in England from the seventeenth century onwards, and set up to support those 
who were unable to support themselves. Food and accommodation were provided. in exchange for labour. 
Interestingly, the Poor Law of 1834 was brought in as a deterrent from the workhouses. Conditions were 
deliberately made as degrading as possible, to deter people from applying. The law stated that the work 
conditions in the workhouses had to be worse than the poorest job outside, before one was eligible to apply. 
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But self-help was not just about mutual aid. On the contrary, the notion of self-
help referred to an individually organized way of life, seen contemporaneously with 
mutual aid. It is mistaken, therefore - and leaves unexplored the visible tensions - to 
subsume these elements under a single "self-improving caste" (e.g., Rodrick, 200 I: 39). 
Self-help pointed somewhere else, away from the conditions of the domain of "the 
social", and away from associations with other people. History once again affords us 
many points of entry; the Renaissance and the Reformation, from the fourteenth century 
onwards, will give us plenty to work with. Up until this point, medieval Christianity was 
the orthodoxy, asserted through the Roman Catholic Church. But reliance upon faith and 
especially God were beginning to weaken. People began to question the unity of the 
Church; other theological categories were being introduced. Whereas the Christian 
orthodoxy had largely ignored man and nature, focusing instead on the supernatural and 
the eternal destiny of the soul, people were increasingly focusing on human experience, 
at a practical level, and in the present. There was a recovery of the secular and humane 
philosophy of Greece and Rome. Humanism returned, slowly at first. Martin Luther 
(1483-1546) suggested that salvation emerged, not by submitting to the authority of the 
priesthood or the Church, but from the unique presence of God in the conscience of 
individuals. This meant individual freedom to worship. Others - John Locke (1632-1704) 
is a good example - made it clear that one's religious confession is a matter of individual 
choice, not institutional obligation. Besides, the reason for existence had shifted, from an 
otherworldly quest, to an intimate and direct, personal appreciation for the good life, on 
earth. 
Something important happened. The Renaissance and the Reformation displayed 
a period of the increasing power and right of the individual. The individual possessed the 
ability, within himself, to determine greatness, to become a "holy being", which is to say, 
each individual decided on sources of truth and salvation, not the establishment. The 
individual had agency; and the individual was self-determining. It was no longer 
Catholicism as an establishment ruling the masses, but a collection of people empowered 
by their individual faith. This was the force of the Protestant revolt. Authority now came 
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from the Bible, or better: Protestants interpreted the Bible for themselves. They were on 
their own; salvation or damnation would be down to the individual. Later, the Industrial 
Revolution came along. And this is where the individual became the basic value of 
society. 
We know what things were like then: opportunities were great and many, but it 
was fiercely competitive. The Protestant work ethic emerged - this is where salvation 
was to be found, in the competitive context of work, labour. Industrial capitalism was 
contingent on one's freedom to act as an individual. New markets were rapidly 
expanding. People were working to compete in the interests of free trade. It was all about 
efficiency; profits would be sacrificed for an increasing stake in the market. Power was 
transferred to the individual, and their rights to compete against other individuals. But 
this: a way of understanding the world, and one's place in it, derived from this activity of 
competing. The more one could rise above the competition, that is to say, the more 
"individual" one could be, the better, economically and socially. Self-help - the work 
ethic as one's method of salvation - embodied the extreme application of individualism. 
Social conditions were reconfigured, and became the consequence of personal action. If 
things went wrong, specific kinds of questions were asked: What can I do better? Where 
did I go wrong? It was self-interest that achieved the welfare of the individual, to which 
success, like failure, was attributed. Samuel Smiles' Self Help would engage the 
converted, despite criticisms from the socialists, with his recommendations: "Daily 
experience shows that it is energetic individualism which produces the most powerful 
effects upon the life and actions of others, and really constitutes the best practical 
education" (1859: 4). This is individual self-help, the opposite of social- anti-social. 
1.2 Self-help as a contemporary phenomenon 
History tells its story of self-help. And that was a long time ago. We modems have come 
along since then; we do things differently now. But history has a habit of reminding us 
that things do not really change that much; that the past lives on, in the present. Self-help 
lives on too. Many consider Samuel Smiles to have published the "first" self-help book; 
as we all know, since his time, self-help books have become a hugely prevalent, 
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contemporary cultural phenomenon. There could not be a stronger cultural indicator of 
modem times. And recall, in the old friendly societies, we saw people working together, 
supporting one another - being social. These collectivities may be historical now, but we 
are still seeking the support of other people, when we cannot do things on our own; let us 
use the modern vernacular, and call them self-help groups. They are widely distributed, 
culturally. So: modern times play host to two versions of self-help - reading self-help 
books and membership in self-help groups, one individual, the other collective. However, 
self-help books and self-help groups are not culturally equivalent. Thus, what has also 
been carried forward, then, is the problematic status of self-help; this separation of self-
help is a way of managing this paradox. Self-help in the modern age is so puzzling, so 
awkward, and so problematic, that it deserves to be investigated. 
1.3 Self-help books: the "self' in self-help 
"You don't have any outstanding qualities. It's safe to say that you're pretty much just 
like everybody else". This is one of the more direct nuggets of wisdom that Pratt & 
Dikkers (1999: 4) offer in, You Are Worthless: Depressing Nuggets of Wisdom Sure to 
Ruin Your Life. They have plenty more: "When was the last time you did something you. 
were proud of? Keep thinking. [bet you're stumped" (p. 21). Oh, you laughed too? Good. 
But why did we both laugh? This is depressing, not amusing - a generation encouraged to 
settle for second best, being nothing special or outstanding. But, typical of satire, this at 
least takes us straight to the target: the self-help book. Pratt & Dikkers, satirists, know 
about it; and we know about it too, sharing in their joke. It is this. The self-help book 
rests on a model of success. Just look. [t thrives on it. Achievement. It attaches itself as 
part of the cultural prevalence of celebrity. Success is present, or expected, or sought, at 
all points. Fame, being famous; that is part of success. Look on the front covers of self-
help books: glitz and glamour, bright colours and elaborate detail. They perform, even 
here, just like celebrities in front of the camera's eye. They have something to say, and 
they want people to listen. Look at self-help book authors: they are so well known, 
looking out from the front covers of their books, grinning from ear to ear, so people can 
see. They celebrate their popularity, where popularity is a virtue, through their books. 
And look again: we see that these books are "bestsellers". The sales of these books, aside 
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from the topics they engage, are a celebration of success. Popularity - that is another 
word for success. Just look at this: in 2000 Americans spent nearly $600 million on self-
help books), while in 2008 the genre returned more than $2 billion4• And then: Dale 
Carnegie - granted, more popular than most self-help book authors - has sold over 50 
million books5. 
Success relates to something else, even more important. The self. The self-help 
book is a celebration of the self, or the self as success. We are important, special: we have 
outstanding qualities. We can do it, where "it" means anything and everything. We 
should be proud. And we need to embrace positivity - being successful. This is what 
happens when the self-help book is picked up: it gets read. This is critical. [t means that 
readers are taking control, or better, the very function of reading a self-help book is 
instantiating an importance of the self. Something very big is being pushed to one side, 
not made to matter: private practice, therapy, doctors, in short, professionals. The self-
help book is endorsing the self as an active agent; reading becomes self-initiated, self-
determining action. [t is self-help, a self-made self. Self-help books, then, appear to be 
anti-professional. It is power to the people, to the readers of self-help books. So: where 
the self goes, the self-help book follows. It helps manage your finances, brings you closer 
to God, enables you to be a responsive and satisfied lover, a snappier dresser, more 
competent at fly fishing, or just helps you to reach enlightenment. [t makes you a better 
self. Something important: it speaks from within the practicalities of readers' lay 
understandings. The self-help book is the vernacular, the everyday. [t celebrates the 
domain of the self, what it is and where it takes place. And, if the prevalence of the genre 
is anything to go by, we want the small things in life to matter. 
Pratt & Dikkers' book serves a more important purpose. This is not just a couple 
of satirists indulging themselves, and fulfilling a writing contract. Something far more 
remarkable is in play: their parody self-help book is indicative of a widely distributed, 
established critique of the self-help book genre. A whole industry is put in question. The 
3 See Paul (200 I). 
4 See Carpenter (2008). 
5 See O'Neil (2003). 
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character of this critique is just as remarkable. Tt forms around particular disciplinary 
allegiances, and gets embroiled within strong disciplinary-based rhetorics. There are 
namable barriers, separating the arguments, which might be glossed as, and converge 
around, sociology, on the one hand, and psychology, on the other. Of course, things are 
messier than that. Official terms are not always used. At times it spills into cultural 
studies, politics, journalism and the media; other times into psychiatry, clinical practice 
and medicine. Nonetheless, the quality of these evaluative formulations is informed by 
strongly sociologically- and psychologically-oriented arguments. That gives us a 
clearing, somewhere to see things, and place them. We can discuss the self-help book 
through these lenses. I will track three. 
A defense of Sociology: rejecting hyper-individualism 
Reading a self-help book is a quest for readers to develop themselves in variably 
specified ways. Fair enough: personal development is good. It sounds so simple too, just 
reading. Well, yes and no - but mostly no. There is a problem, a big problem, the critics 
cry. And their cries can be heard loudly, even from across the waters, when they all gang 
together. "We should worry about the willingness of so many to believe that the answers 
to existential questions can be encapsulated in the portentous pronouncements of bumper-
sticker books" (Kaminer, 1992: 7). Tiede is far less diplomatic, cutting straight to the 
quick: "It temps [sic] legal retaliation to mention the gop [sic] in these spineless 
publications" (200 I: 9). And, giving a history of his journalistic career, Salerno (2005: 2) 
goes on to say that, "[n]ever have I covered a phenomenon where American consumers 
invested so much capital in every sense of the word - financial, intellectual, spiritual, 
temporal - based on so little proof of efficacy. And where they got such spotty, if non 
existent, returns". This is from his latest book, SHAM· Self-Help & Actualization 
Movement. Salemo is surely grateful that words have more than one meaning, especially 
acronyms; sham may be a convenient way of abbreviating a hefty title, but it also means 
a counterfeit purporting to be genuine. A picture is forming. Suddenly, Pratt & Dikkers' 
parody seems to make more sense, among all these allies. Besides, we should not snigger, 
looking from the outside; we tell jokes to our friends, in jest, about self-help books. The 
self-help book is popUlar, but so its parody, that is to say, its critique. Even we know that. 
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What is all the fuss about? Where, exactly, do self-help book authors and their 
critics converge? What enables the conflict to take place? The self is a serious matter; 
self-help book authors and their critics agree on that. But this is also where they both part 
company. The self-help genre is a triumph of the self: it is all about the individual. This 
needs a little more focus. The concept of "codependency" will do the job. This is better. 
It neatly collects together the broad aims and contexts of the genre, crystallized in 
Melody Beattie's (1987) hugely popular (and criticized) Codependent No More, as well 
as capturing the central dissatisfactions of the critics. Before the 1980s, so the critics tell 
us, codependency did not exist. Its inception, and broad distribution through the self-help 
genre, recommended that we isolate ourselves from other people, and from society more 
generally, and concentrate on ourselves6• Being social, to whatever extent we are, is self-
destructive: any form of relation with others displays weakness, dependency. So we are 
"urged to develop a new form of social responsibility, one that is not socially oriented at 
all but, rather, is one that produces a hyper-individuality for which an inherent, 
responsible relationality with others is actively discouraged and pathologized" (Rimke, 
2000: 67). 
Salerno (2005) characterizes the genre as oscillating between victimization and 
empowerment. We have learnt, presumably through socialization, that things are beyond 
our control, that there is some higher, external power pulling the strings, making the 
world spin on its axis. Things just happen; and when bad things happen, particularly to 
us, it is not our fault. So the genre promotes a victim narrative. We are victims. But it 
proffers another: empowerment. It asks us to question external reality; society owes us 
for all that it has done. It has robbed us of the single most powerful agency, the self. It did 
not tell us that we are self-sufficient, self-determining creatures. We need to take care of 
ourselves; the self needs to learn to love itself (Hazleden, 2003) and to satisfy an 
6 The tenn has expanded from its origins in e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous, and the ways in which family 
members of alcoholics become dependant upon the alcoholic, and, in using their energy in trying to help 
them, deprive themselves of the care the require for themselves. 
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obligation to itself (Justman, 2005( We can determine our own destiny, and take control 
of our problems. We are responsible. But this realization of the "eternal" agency of the 
self in resolving its problems brings another burden of responsibility, hitherto unrealized, 
that "[we] must, to some extent, accept that [we] have played a part in creating them" 
(Simonds, 1992: 177). So problems are lifted from some mystical, unspecified agency, 
and external reality disappears, as the Self must take responsibility for itself as the single, 
transcendental ontology. It gets worse: because the self has inherited what "society" was 
previously responsible for, it is now responsible for the world's problems too. And it 
cannot deny responsibility, for "[t]here is no such thing as luck (positive thinkers don't 
generally believe in luck), which means that there are no hapless victims, only assholes 
who invite their own abuse" (Kaminer, 1992: 65). If a problem is unresolved, or better, if 
the world does not spin freely and smoothly, for whatever reason and of whatever 
magnitude, the selfis accountable. 
The self now has to carry a heavy burden. All our actions, whatever they might 
be, are symptoms, and they have their origins in the self, the diseased self (Peele, 1995). 
We may smoke, or drink, or live in a ghetto, or be unemployed, or be single, or whatever; 
they are all symptoms of personal deficiency. It is our disease. We become, Kaminer 
would surely agree, assholes. The cure: retreating further inward and embarking on a 
mission of the recovery of the self, from the self-imposed life circumstances that are 
obscuring our path to happiness. Fear has its part. "The more we fear a problem, the more 
we worry and warn people about it, the more instances of the problem we find and the 
greater our perception of the danger. The process is one of a progressive sense of loss of 
control; the greater the number of things we discover to be afraid of, each of which 
individually inspires progressively more fear, the more depressed and frightened we 
become" (Peele, 1995: 239). And now our problems, or rather our disease, justif.j; the 
presence of self-help books. They are just trying to help. 
7 This process has a naturally positive orientation to it, the self-help book authors tell us. Detaching oneself 
from society, and being an individual independently of others, is part of uncovering, and embracing, a 
"simple self' (Greenberg, 1994). It makes things easier for us all, that is to say, simple. 
\0 
The critics are now spitting blood. The self-help genre, they tell us, simply cannot 
be an innocent party, watching from the outside; it does not merely represent the self, but 
producei it. And now the genre commits the worst crime of all - by providing, and 
endorsing, a particular version, it asks readers to narrate their lives in its terms, to 
internalize its way of telling about the world (Brown, 1999; Whelan, 2004). It gives us a 
"master narrative" by which to live our lives (Rapping, 1996: 135). But the satirists are 
no longer laughing. Things become very serious. The self-help genre is now seen as a 
moral discourse; it envisions the good life, what is healthy, the right thing to do. It is: 
morality as absolute independence from the Other, all otherness, or that which is not self 
(Greenberg, 1994). Heads begin to roll - the critics consider this a wholly inappropriate 
narrative. The genre has made an elementary mistake; it is looking in the wrong place, in 
the psychology of the reader, the self. It treats the self as prior to, and in isolation of, all 
that shapes its existence. 
There is a word the genre tries hard to forget: society. All that contributes to the 
formation of the self, which is to say, enables it, restricts it, embraces it, supports it and 
otherwise performs it, gets concealed. Society is pushed aside. The genre only sees a 
celebration of the self, not its increasing problematization in modem bureaucracies and 
the unnecessary "psychologization,,9 of specifically "non-psychological" concerns: 
Instead, in this milieu, that crisis of subjecthood is not articulated but enacted -
demonstrated in ever expanding self-help book sales and, presumably, enacted in 
the lives of subjects who find that it is difficult or impossible to manage mastery 
of themselves and their life courses in the face of volatile social and economic 
forces. For these individuals, the self is belabored: caught in a cycle of seeking 
individual solutions to problems that are social, economic and political in origin 
(McGee, 2005: 177). 
'This certainly makes an impact. but it is too strong a word. Self·help books, like any other activity, do not 
have the power to construct something on their own. They are part of an assemblage of work, and as such, 
are able to determine the practices that move the self. Mol's (2002) proffered word for these micro·analytic 
activities, ~'enact", might better describe this. 
9 This is a term Rice (1996) uses to describe the way in which the discourse of self·help, which includes 
codependency, addiction, Inner Child, self, recovery, psychology etc., is used to explain (and inhibit) 
wider, social matters. 
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There is a high price to pay for reading self-help books. They cause readers to retreat 
from the politics of identity and selfhood, pacifying them from challenging political and 
social imperatives that determine who they are and what they can be (Hochschild, 1983; 
2003; Lasch, 1991; Rose, 1996)10. The self is inherently socially, collectively contingent, 
as "[o]ne can 'get one's life in order' as best one can, through therapy, self-help and so 
on. But that life will still be lived in a context of social reality which therapy, alone, does 
not address, except - and this is not insignificant of course - indirectly. More, and 
different, activities are needed" (Rapping, 1996: 165). These activities are where the self 
is to be found, and secured, and that means participation in the domain of the social. 
There are political struggles for the self. "Feminist groups were among the first to 
recognize that personal change was crystallized by group participation, while group 
participation could also forge larger social and political agendas. That these groups were 
able to wed a culture of collective self-help with political actions offered a model for 
other social movements" (McGee, 2005: 187-8). The self means a culture of collective 
action, doing things together, in the social. 
A defense of professional Psychology: rejecting anti-professionalism 
Self-help books get around. We see them in the bookstore, and later scattered in the 
home, where buyers read them. But they travel further than that. They go to other places. 
We know about psychiatrists; they work behind desks, seeing patients and writing 
reports. But what is that, beyond the desk, up on the shelves? It is a self-help book, lots of 
them, next to all that medical reference material. And they are there for a good reason: 
they have been heavily incorporated into (predominantly American) medical practice, 
10 McOee notes that the trouble with characterizing the self, and self-fulfillment, through work and 
economic activity, as in capitalism, is that it entirely ignores the economic, and not individual, 
inadequacies. ~'For the most part, self~improvernent culture continues to operate on a belief that wealth is a 
sign of industry, intelligence, competence, or attunement with the universe. Poverty, bred of economic 
injustice, remains a market of laziness, stupidity, immorality, or some sort of cosmic dissonance. As with 
much of American culture that finds its roots in Christian traditions, self-help culture suggests that 
inequitable distributions of wealth ought to be remedied through charity rather than through any process of 
distributive justice. Charitable foundations, rather than a progressive tax code or the elimination of untaxed 
wealth transfers through inheritance, are offered as the solution to the social problem of economic inequity" 
(2005: 183-4). 
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prescribed to patients, since at least the 1970s (Rosen, 1976). This trend has been widely 
reported among practitioners too (Starker, 1986, 1988). And this use of self-help books 
has crossed the waters, as many "Americanisms" do, and is now embedded in clinical 
applications within UK medical settings. The self-help book is a professional resource for 
general practitioners, just like a stethoscope or stretchy latex gloves. One pioneering 
initiative has been the development of the Cardiff Book Prescription Scheme (see 
Farrand, 2005; Frude, 2004). This has since been extended across the UK, and is now 
part of common practice in many doctors' surgeries. In many cases, self-help books are 
prescribed in preference to tablets or drugs. So: the self-help book has established itself at 
the centre of psychiatry, psychology and medicine. It has become an agent in medical 
practice. It has, then, received medical endorsement. 
But hold on. What is going on here? The critics have told us about self-help 
books, time and again. Have the psychologists not been paying attention? Yes: some do 
claim that self-help books have positive effects on their patients (e.g., Starker, 1988). 
However, this conceals a far greater concern among clinical practitioners. The critics are 
still very much present; and they have the same deeply felt skepticism of self-help books. 
Rosen (1981: 189) is perhaps one of the most vocal: 
Unfortunately, the involvement of psychologists in the development, assessment 
and marketing of do-it-yourself treatment programs has been less then 
responsible. Psychologists have published untested materials, advanced 
exaggerated claims, and accepted the use of misleading titles that encourage 
unrealistic expectations regarding outcome. 
Self-help books represent a potential threat to professional practice. As Rosen continues: 
"Evan more discouraging, the quality of do-it-yourself treatment books is decreasing 
while their number is on the rise" (Ibid.). We can guess what Rosen is pointing to, even 
more clearly nearly thirty years on: the mass-market, glitzy front covers, adorned with 
various extreme formulations of authenticity. It is all on the front cover, literally, for 
Rosen; there is nothing to substantiate it - just more bright, garish colors, and more 
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recycled claims. The empirical status of self-help books is undetermined. They are used 
when they are unaccredited; it is not known if they use established procedures and 
techniques, or simply the preferred methods of individual (unaccredited?) authors. 
Worse, their prescription by practitioners is driven by commercial factors at the expense 
of professional standards. So much can potentially go awry, critical therapists say: there 
is no provision to monitor if, or whether, readers are "correctly" following instructions; 
readers may incorrectly administer particular advice, or misapply techniques. Self-help 
books can have an unintended effect, and actually cause harm to readers. When claimed 
results are not forthcoming, after instructions have been followed, readers can see things 
negatively, and self-blame unfolds (Rosen, 1987, 1993). So: self-help books pose a threat 
to readers; reading can put them in harm's way. Judgments need to be made. Evaluations 
are required. And the public is not granted the expertise to be able to establish the quality 
of a sel f-help book: 
No other professional group combines the clinical and research experiences that 
form the educational background of a clinical psychologist. Unlike the typical 
author, clinical psychologists are in a position to assess do-it-yourself treatments 
systematically and to educate consumers in the proper use of these programs 
(Rosen, 1987: 46). 
This is powerful rhetoric, and very revealing. It is a defense narrative. Self-help books are 
dangerous, not just to their readers, but, perhaps most importantly, to the discipline of 
psychology. The foundation of the psychological professions is being undermined. Self-
help book authors, unlike clinical psychologists, are bypassing the "educational" process. 
They simply do not have the training to deal with their subject appropriately. There is an 
"elitist" fear that standards are at stake. Self-help books are generally an inadequate 
alternative to professional intervention in psychological matters; that is part of it. But this 
too: the very notion of leaving people to take control of their own lives in a domain 
whose knowledge and judgment has always been the privileged right and property of the 
psy disciplines (cf. Rose, 1985). There is more going on here. It is not only that the 
therapeutic value of self-help books is unspecified; it is, rather, questionable whether it 
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the self-help industry more generally (Peele, 1995). Some call this the Humpty Dumpty 
Syndrome, a tale that also gets told in many areas of professional health care: all was 
fine, until we fell into the hands of the self-help book authors, who break us into a 
thousand pieces but are unable to put us back together again. Other interests are being 
served and nurtured. Self-help book authors have one thing in mind, which is heavily 
shrouded, and thus overlooked, by their humanistic pretensions: they exploit the human 
condition. "We all want so badly to believe in miracles. That's what makes us vulnerable. 
And that's what makes them rich" (Salemo, 2005: 251). It is all a marketing strategy, and 
we are the bargaining chips. And the irony, just one of them, is that the self-help book 
promotes individual freedom, above all else, but imprisons us in its own highly 
conformist, conservative politics. 
This awareness of the "trashiness" of the self-help book can be seen elsewhere. 
The objection is not always explicit; it can emerge from within the genre itself. Look at 
Butler-Bowdon's (2003) 50 Self-Help Classics. What is going on? [s Butler-Bowdon 
celebrating the same genre that has been in battle with critics internationally since the 
1970s? The modern, mass-market paperback: huge sales figures, popularity, the 
exaggerated claims, the glitz - all qualities of "classics"? Butler-Bowdon includes in his 
selection of classics modem titles like Phi! McGraw's Life Strategies and John Gray's 
Men Are From Mars ... We know the sort. But he reveals hidden candidates from the 
genre, digging up The Bible and Boethius' The Consolation of Philosophy from the sixth 
century. Are these self-help books? Others have documented how the changing character 
of the genre - if it has managed to hold together at all as a "genre" - makes it difficult to 
trace a lineage (e.g., Salemo, 2005; Starker, 1988). But Butler-Bowdon is having none of 
it; he has other plans. He is aware of the critics. He knows about the glitz, the widely felt 
cultural skepticism of these "bumper-sticker" books, as Kaminer had earlier called 
them 11. He might even know that the genre is ashamed of itself, ongoingly reproducing 
the same dross, only with new colours and different faces. No Matter. He desperately 
11 This much is certainly true. Butler-Bowdon's book strongly resembles a self-help book, with its bright 
colours, elaborate front cover text, endorsement by other self-help book authors, shameless use of textual 
devices from other self-help books and the rest. One reviewer claims it will soon become the "51" self-help 
classic". 
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wants to rescue the genre, revive it. That is explained through his amazingly disjointed 
selection of self-help titles, mixing modem, bestselling and mass-market paperbacks with 
ancient works of philosophy and academic psychology. He attributes the status of classic 
to the genre, lifting it from the pits where it receives, for him, unjustified attention from 
the critics. Butler-Bowdon says "the self-help ethic has been with us through the ages" 
(2003: 3), and not, we might argue, a recent (fleeting, irrelevant) publishing phenomenon. 
He wants to give his readers "a sense of the huge diversity of the genre" (Ibid.), and not, 
we might argue further, the generic, familiar and recycled material at which the critics 
have targeted their attacks. The genre exceeds the critics, and as such, should not be seen 
in terms of them. The genre needs to be excused, and Butler-Bowdon kindly obliges. 
1.4 Self-help groups: the "help" in self-help 
"It was a beautiful morning. We walked around our neighborhood, passing the old church 
on Milton Street, and around the play area. She recognized David's house. When we got 
back to our house, and opened the gate to go inside, she got confused. [ have to tell her 
we are home". "Yeah, my wife forgets too". "My husband does that". This is part of a 
conversation from an Alzheimer's self-help group [ visited during the early part of my 
ethnographic fieldwork. But you are not laughing, like you did at the self-help books? 
And neither am l. The satirists do not have much to say either. We do get a good picture 
of things: people sitting together in a group, sharing stories and supporting one another. 
There is lots of talking. Bonding. Exchange. Relationships. And: it can be very serious. [t 
is not about big smiles, positivity and affirmations. Members engage in matters close to 
the heart - terminal illnesses, the death of spouses and family members, long-term 
emotional problems. There can be lots of tears. Things hurt. And that is nothing to joke 
about. Even so, self-help groups do not get reduced to a cheap laugh, simple lighthearted 
comic relief, like self-help books. Self-help groups are not promoted in the same way as 
self-help books; membership in a self-help group is not a function of popularity. We 
rarely see members of self-help groups on television, like we do self-help book authors, 
the gurus. [t is simply not done that way. They have to be sought, and you need to know 
where to find them, and who to ask, or you will probably miss them. Whereas self-help 
books are in plain view, everywhere, self-help groups are hidden away, below the 
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surface. But: they do share with self-help books a rejection of someone else - implicitly 
professionals - calling the shots. It is power to the people again; it is self-help. Only here 
it is the collective power of the self, a plural "we" and not a singular "I". Membership in a 
self-help group is the activity of agents taking control of their own lives. Similarly, they 
are embedded within the understandings of folk in their everyday lives. It is based in, as 
and for the vernacular. Professional knowledge is not needed; and nor is it required, not 
for what self-help groups wish to attend to. 
This indicates something important. There is a noticeable absence of any critique 
of self-help groups. To the contrary, we only see appraisals, endorsements, and 
accreditations. The critics have packed their bags and long since staked out their next 
assignment. And professional psychologists simply leave self-help groups for the 
sociologists to deal with, while they continue looking at "proper" psychological 
phenomena. At any rate, this is a serious, intellectual topic, of considerable cultural and 
sociological significance. Sociologists spend their professional careers investigating self-
help groups; academic funding continues to support this research. And although interest 
extends across disciplinary boundaries, there is a strong case that self-help groups are 
engaged because of their sociological character, or because of the need to locate them as 
sociologically relevant. They are important. So: the self-help group is everything that the 
self-help book is not. This makes things easier; to tell about self-help groups, we can 
simply reverse the arguments against the self-help book genre. We can track the same 
three arguments, but for different reasons, and with different commitments. 
A de/ense a/the sociological: endorsing collectivism 
We are an integral part of our surroundings. When we act, we monitor our behavior, 
reflecting on it, retrospectively looking at how it has been shaped by prior actions, and 
prospectively looking at how it will shape our future actions. This is the reflexivity of 
action; how the situated circumstances of action change and modify its course. Now, let 
us go back in time, before the modern era. A few centuries will do - to tradition. 
"Tradition is a mode of integrating the reflexive monitoring of action with the time-space 
organisation of the community. It is a means of handling time and space, which inserts 
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any particular activity or experience within the continuity of the past, present, and future, 
these in turn being structured by recurrent social practices". (Giddens, 1990: 37). 
Tradition ordered action. Not much thought was required, as it was tradition and custom 
that determined what actions were appropriate. Now go forward a few centuries, to 
modernity, the post-traditionalist period. The reflexivity of action takes on a new 
character. Action is no longer guided by the local circumstances of its production, that is, 
tradition, because time and space have been disembedded; there is "time-space 
distanciation" (p. 14). 
Activity gets removed from local contexts, where it was once ordered in the 
presence of tradition, and extends across large time and space distances. It gets 
reorganized and spread over new and increasing social relations, where there are gaps in 
the absence of tradition. Connections between contexts are stretched. Action means 
different things, in different temporal and geographical locations. This is globalization. 
Modernity has left its trace, everywhere, as social life moves away from tradition. There 
is the disappearance of the tightly knit, multigenerational bonds of family. The longevity 
of marriage is no longer prevalent. Then there is industrialization, the capitalist market, 
and the economy: this brings about the depersonalization of institutions and social life. 
There is no history: only the present. Giddens argues that modernity has brought great 
"ontological insecurity" (p. 92). With the passing of tradition, safety (as security) also 
disappears; it is difficult to know whom to trust. There is far greater risk in acting, in 
obtaining reliable knowledge about how to go on, as the trust relations built on tradition 
have dispersed, across time and space. The knowledge that once brought security is now 
contested. And as knowledge passes through and is taken up by so many agents, human 
and non-human, through abstract social systems, it is no longer fixed. It has no base. 
There is no certainty. 
The basic development of the self emerges out of personal trust, and the 
establishment of trust in others: "faith in the integrity of another is a prime source of a 
feeling of integrity and authenticity of the self' (p.114). Modernity has profoundly 
affected the self; it is has made it a focal ontology in its own right. We see a breakdown 
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in the communal character of tradition, and the rise of the impersonality of modem, 
bureaucratic life. Community has been eroded, at the expense of personal relations. 
Where does the self find security now? And trust? In the absence of others, of traditional, 
personal relations, it retreats inward. The self becomes preoccupied with itself, looking 
for security through self-improvement. This is individualism. Look: we see a cultural 
obsession with reading self-help books. Doing things on our own. The prevalence of 
reading self-help books, perhaps the modem archetype of individualism, is profound. 
Self-help book authors exploit our reliance on experts - who replace the collectivity of 
tradition, at any rate, those who know - to tell us how to live, to guide our actions, and 
give us narratives and social roles by which to live our lives. Now there is more to 
analyze, to consider; and now we have to be even more reflexive (Giddens, 1991)12. But: 
rather than satisfying our personal need for certainty, and reinstating ontological security, 
this simply adds fuel to the fire. It increases our sense of insecurity, makes us more 
uncertain. Rather than invoking control, it takes it away. It turns us away from those who 
used to be our family, our friends, and our fellows. Further still, it does not ask us to 
question the cultural mechanisms that support this ideology, but instead encourages us to 
passively follow. The critics of self-help books have already pointed to this. It marks the 
demise of civility, what it means to be human - social creatures. What we need is a sense 
that we are connected to other people in intimate and necessary ways, that we participate 
in and share a collective world (Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007; 
Sampson, 1993; Shotter, 1993, 1999). 
We see self-help groups. They can be considered as part of a process of "dialogic 
democracy" (Giddens, 1994: 112). They perform a crucial function: allowing the open 
discussion of things no longer discussed, or that were normatively settled by tradition. 
Things become personal again. Self-help groups contribute, in important ways, to 
reassembling social solidarity; they represent a reembedding mechanism. The Other is 
reintroduced to the self. Communication with others, in a collectivity, becomes a 
requirement for engaging the problems around which self-help groups form. To interact, 
12 This is Giddens' primary focus in his book Modernity and Self-identity - how the modern self is a 
"reflexive project" (1991: 32), that is, how, in the absence of a collectivity to provide our self-identities, we 
must make (or find) them ourselves. This self-fashioning is a function of the constant reflexivity of the self. 
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face-to-face: this is the revival of the fundamentally social and collective practices of 
tradition. It regenerates community. Self-help groups are about regaining the control of 
matters in which the self is intimately involved. It means confining how far things travel, 
not letting them escape personal relations, into the impersonal network of the 
beaurocracies and abstract systems. Expertise is developed, or reclaimed, by members of 
self-help groups - knowledge that is owned and controlled (see below). Self-help groups 
provide narratives that include members in a collective story; they attain a meaningful 
social role (Kurtz, 1997). Trust is present, the basis of security; we know that sharing 
ourselves with our fellows, our collectivity, carries little risk. In so doing, we learn to 
trust ourselves. We know where we stand, in self-help groups. This invites certainty. 
Here we see the return of what has been taken away by modernity. So, self-help groups: a 
celebration of collectivism. They produce what individualism never could: a stable, 
secure self. Self-help groups give what self-help books are incapable of giving. This is 
paradoxical - that we need others to be ourselves, before we can be a self and have 
selthood, at least in the modem age, as Giddens has charted. I will develop this later. 
Self-help group scholars like self-help groups. But then, they would. Still, like all 
good sociologists, they see the denegation of collectivism in the modern age. They do not 
like individualism, not even slightly. Self-help groups are special; at times, they get 
romanticized. But: they are fundamental. We have seen that modern times invoke in the 
self a profound sense of emptiness, of uncertainty. When this sense is heightened, then it 
only gets worse. The global, social systems and hyper-individualistic strategies of living 
seem to be incapable of meeting the basic needs of individuals. The universal and 
indiscriminate is no substitute for the local and the situated. What is needed is basic, 
primary, firsthand experience - the corporeal, the felt, and the embodiment of human 
relationship (Reed, 1996). Self-help groups provide for this human need for personal 
connection, for sociality (Katz & Bender, 1976; Borkman, 1984). They promote a caring 
society, and civility. Membership encourages the support of members from family; other 
people get involved, together. It widens participation, outside of group meetings; people 
pursue social friendships. Victimization is replaced with participation in decisions that 
impact a shared, collective life (Borkman & Parisi, 1995). Self-help groups are like 
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families: "these support networks substitute for the geographically based small town or 
neighborhood communities of the 1800s and early 1900s about which so many are 
nostalgic" (Borkman, 1999: 69). 
A defonse of everyday psychology: endorsing anti-professionalism 
Self-help books threaten the status of professional expertise. But more: they imply that 
such expertise is not required in the service of everyday problems. Psychologists want to 
preserve their discipline against insufficiently qualified self-help book authors. In the 
absence of professional training, informed by a whole body of technical, disciplinary-
driven knowledge, all we have are pseudoexperts. Or worse: charlatans. So a division of 
knowledge is erected, and defended: professional Psychology as against everyday 
psychologyll. People are seen to be incapable of helping themselves, without 
professional knowledge, and especially without professional training; that is why 
professionals provide their services. But self-help groups are different. Psychologists do 
not mention them, in their disciplinary attacks against self-help books. Self-help groups 
remain intact. To understand this we need to dismantle this division of knowledge -
professional vs. lay - and introduce a third category (Borkman, 1990). Members of self-
help groups are informed; they know about treatment strategies, pain alleviation, what 
makes things feel better, or worse, that is, in short, what it is like to live with a problem. 
The knowledge they have acquired, in living with a problem, is not some inferior version 
of "professional knowledge" (Kerr, Cunningham-Burley & Tutton, 2007). Its formulation 
is unable to be captured through formal contexts, in professional practice. So the 
hegemony of professional authority is questioned. It does not adequately engage how 
knowledge is co-produced and ongoingly distributed among those who live with 
problems. Self-help groups are about democratizing everyday life; they are anti-elitist 
(Archibald, 2008). Besides: the knowledge that members of self-help groups share serves 
13 Here I borrow Richards' (1996: I) capitalization of Psychology to refer to the discipline, and the lower 
case psychology to refer to its subject malter. 
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another function. It is used to do different things. It does not compete with professional 
knowledge, because it takes a different trajectory (Hart, 2001)14. 
It has a name. It is called "experiential knowledge". This is "truth learned from 
personal experience with a phenomenon rather than truth acquired by discursive 
reasoning, observation or reflection on information provided by others" (Borkman, 1976: 
446). This is expertise as knowing hOW I5 • It is not propositional, but practical. Things are 
engaged in practices: managing with things. It gets produced in the first person, in the 
here and now, as situated activity; and it develops through its "usability" (Caron-
Flinterman, Broerse & Bunders, 2005: 2577-2579). So experiential knowledge is another 
term for lay-constituted living - it is heavily embedded in everyday vocabularies, 
activities, and techniques. It is found in the small details, the subjective and personal. 
This is what gets celebrated in self-help groups, the power of the everyday. The domain 
of the lay is endorsed, embraced. Sociologists like self-help groups. They have developed 
a substantive body of academic work charting the phenomenon (Borkman, 1999; Denzin, 
1993; Katz, 1993; Katz & Bender, 1976; 1990; Reissman, & Carroll, 1995). Members of 
self-help groups own experiential knowledge, and have entitlement to speak about it as 
the producers of it l6• As Munn-Giddings & Borkman (2005: 142) make clear, 
14 This can be described in terms of the classic distinction, made by Feinstein (1967). between "disease". 
the pathology and the objective domain of professional expertise, and "illness", the subjective processes 
that occur as a result of pathology, from the perspective ofthe sufferer. 
15 Personal experience has been investigated as '4lay expertise" in a number of empirical sites. Arksey 
(1998) has explored the way in which lay groups with Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI) challenged the 
medical profession, and its domain of expertise, to eventually change its views about the status of RSI as an 
objective, medical disease. Epstein (1996) has shown how AIDS activists, through their own experience 
with the disease, have challenged the construction of knowledge and expertise and fought against 
biomedical hegemony in its professional management. Similarly, Wynne (1996) found that Cumbrian 
sheep farmers know a great deal, often just as much if not more than government agencies, about the 
ecology of sheep, and the environmental circumstances under which they are kept so as to reduce the 
impact of radioactive fallout. Drawing heavily on Polanyi's work on tacit knowledge, Harry Coli ins' (1990, 
1992, 200 I; Collins & Evans, 2008) extensive studies have shown that knowledge is acquired through 
sustained experience in a field of practices. It is a skill and, as such, is not transferable through formal 
instruction. To arrive at such understandings means to have lived within, and developed, the tacit modes of 
learning, which are not always available for explicit inspection, either by self or others. One substantive 
channel through which knowledge is to be found and transmitted is personal experience, which is not, and 
should not be, formalized, and displayed as propositional knowledge. And hence Polanyi's famous 
aphorism: we know more than we can tell. Although people cannot tell about it, they can show it; and this 
is where we find knowledge - in practices, habits, routines etc. 
16 Members of self-helps have a stake in the constitution of experiential knowledge to the extent that they 
can claim ownership for it. Thus the "name [of knowledge] is never intended to describe the persons 
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"[o]wnership for the self-helper arises from the sharing of personal experience and the 
experiential knowledge generated from such activity within a context where peers lead 
and control their own group". Experiential knowledge travels in self-help groups; 
members do not keep it to themselves. It travels through stories, where the "sociological 
process of several phases is started when individuals tell their stories to their peers in the 
first person, sharing their experiences, especially their pain, struggles, and feelings" 
(Borkman, 1990: 24). 
So self-help groups are about telling stories. Sharing selves. We see narratives -
about sel f, others, bodies, experience, life. This is from the perspectives of lives-in-their-
living, as experienced. Now the phenomenon travels even further. It is not just academics 
in health care settings (McCreight, 2004, 2007) or those whose careers are embedded in 
the development of self-help group research (Elsdon, Reynolds & Stewart, 2000; Munn-
Giddings, 2002; Munn-Giddings & McVicar, 2007) that are interested in these stories. 
Others want to know more; other disciplinary contexts get involved. Thus, self-help 
groups are increasingly prevalent among academics, as a topic of inquiry. They now 
appear across the social science literature, reaching those "outsiders" who engage the 
topic through their variable and interdisciplinary research interests. Discourse researchers 
have welcomed self-help groups into their research communities. They want to see what 
the stories are about, how they get assembled between members of self-help groups and 
what business they perform in meetings. Self-help groups may be sociologically relevant, 
but self-help groups are also discourse relevant; they become a discourse phenomenon, of 
interest discourse analytically. Researchers look at these narratives as a rich site in which 
members undertake identity work. For instance, they consider how members' narratives 
display entitlements to knowledge categories (Horton-Salway, 200 I, 2004, 2007), and 
how they provide interactional resources for building solidarity, affiliation and the mutual 
relevance of members in a group (Arminen, 1996, 1998, 2004). In short, they look at how 
self-help groups, and so the members of which they are comprised, are storied into being. 
amongst whom the corpus has currency but, instead, to specify the relationship which that corpus has to the 
constituency, a relationship which seems analogous to that of ownership" (Sharrock, 1974: 49). 
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Something remarkable is happening. Professionals are increasingly looking to the 
anti-professional sites of knowledge production found in self-help groups. This 
orientation has a noticeably medical focus; it surrounds the health and illness of the body. 
Still, it is instructive; and experiential knowledge is taking priority. Professionals have 
something to learn, as patients challenge the management of illness by health care 
systems. Patients are empowering themselves: their expertise extends to the identification 
of symptoms, the delivery of diagnoses, the functioning of medical consultations, effects 
from medication, arrangements of care, patient entitlements. It all happens in a self-help 
group, where people get together, and share stories. Here we see expert patients, telling 
about their everyday experiences. The government has now recognized that lay-derived 
expertise yields greater influence among patients than does professional expertise17• An 
Expert Patients Programme has now been implemented, and is making great strides. This 
is composed of lay-led groups that disseminate their expertise of living with problems 
among fellows, away from professionals. So: professionals embrace self-help groups, the 
power of the self as everyday psychology. 
A defense of Culture: endorsing the everyday as cultural production 
Self-help groups are about everyday life. Just living with problems, in everyday ways. 
And yet, professionals have endorsed them. Academics take them seriously as an 
intellectual topic of inquiry, and want to know more. The critics are not seen; they parted 
company earlier. How remarkable: a phenomenon based on the domain of the anti-
professional, the anti-elitist and the anti-intellectual, which has received endorsement 
from the professionals, the elites and the intellectuals. Self-help groups are about 
something important; they indicate a value of culture. Yes, they represent a history of 
self-help - self-sufficiency and self-reliance. But it is a particular kind of self-help: 
mutual self-help. This is about people - interacting and doing things together. This means 
sharing, dialogue, and collective practices. Their endorsement is an endorsement of a 
certain vision of culture, a certain cultural ideology. 
17 This has been identified in a number of papers and reports. See Department of Health (2001, 2004, 
2005). 
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They can be seen as a social movement (Archibald, 2008; Giddens, 1994; Katz, 
1993). Wages are not at issue, or even working conditions, like in the olden days of the 
trade unions. It is not about politics, at least not substantively. Self-help groups are 
protective of a version of culture, a way of understanding self, and of relating to others. Tt 
is about changing the status of the individual in cultural life. Identity: what it means to be 
a person. Members in self-help group are "persuading others that they are authentically 
expressing the identity of particular subgroups while at the same time successfully 
signaling membership in the larger group identity" (Armstrong, 2002: 372). Questioning 
professional authority redistributes power, giving more to individuals. This is 
empowerment, liberation. But it does not burden the self with the world's problems, so 
we become the centre of reality, totally inward looking and disregard our selves at a 
cultural level. On the contrary, it opposes the individualism that such a position entails, 
when taken to extremes. That would not protect culture, but erode it. It means, rather: 
promoting a sense of self that participates in culture, and is derived from, and embedded 
in, social practice. This version of self-identity is about engaging the domain of the 
Other: collective relationships with other people. Traditions now get preserved, practices 
that require sharing and mutuality. We come to understand ourselves by our membership 
in a group. This is self, but it is culture too - a mutually-constituted-cultural-self-
fashioning. 
1.5 Engaging the "poles" of self-help: investigating the hyphen 
There it is, just two little words: self-help. I have charted practices of self-help, first 
looking at its historical applications; there, the phenomenon broke apart, separating into 
two phenomena. Self-help meant helping yourself, on your own, without the assistance of 
others; but it also meant a requirement of assistance from others. There was a highly 
noticeable division of individualism and collectivism. I left history behind, and tracked 
the term in its contemporary contexts, looking at self-help books and self-help groups. 
Here, the polarization of self-help is reproduced: self-help books are highly 
individualistic, and self-help groups highly collective. But more: self-help is engaged in 
two separate, non-overlapping literatures. Self-help books do not get discussed alongside 
self-help groups. Also here, the polarization of self-help is intensified, as if the two 
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phenomena being discussed are entirely independent. We can state it more strongly. Self-
help books are the polar opposite of self-help groups; each one is positioned at either end 
of a spectrum. The polarization is noticeably transparent. Self-help books and self-help 
groups: one individual, the other collective; one bad, the other good; one ridiculed, the 
other valued. When we engage self-help, we engage two "poles" of self-help activity. 
One term splits into two objects. 
Self-help attaches itself to two opposing sites of practice. [f nothing appears to 
hold them together, as each pole has a status independent of the other, then why do they 
share the same term? Is this mere contingency? Has the term been arbitrarily applied? 
One thing is certain: the literature will not tell us. [t breaks into pieces, just like the term 
itself. The critics of self-help books walk one way, while the promoters of self-help 
groups walk the other. And they never look back. The separation of self-help is treated 
unproblematically, as if the polarization is natural; or better: the tension is made to 
disappear as each side ignores the other!8. [will have to confront it without the literature, 
then. Where to get purchase, if indeed purchase can be obtained? Maybe if [ look one 
more time. There: self-help. But no, not a chance. The ground is as slippery as it was 
when [ ventured into history, and looked at the Reformation and the workers' trade 
unions. [s it a term that is supposed to elude us? Surely not. This tension at the centre of 
the phenomenon does not appear to bring things to a grinding halt. Self-help still gets 
done. So: there must be something that is concealed, not made visible. How are the poles 
handled, out there in the world? But more: how is self-help done? Where does it go, and 
what does it connect to? Can there be something the critics and the promoters have 
missed, trodden over in the battleground? 
We do get a suggestion of overlap. There are places where self-help books and 
self-help groups display less resistance to one another. We see "hidden" similarities. Both 
self-help books and self-help groups fully embrace the extreme power of the self; they are 
18 Borkman (1999: 4), a leading self-help group scholar and advocate of the collective pole of self-help, 
uses this device, when she distinguishes self-help groups from "an individual's taking action to help him-
or herself, often drawing on latent internal resources and healing powers within the context of his or her 
lived experience with an issue or predicament". Thus, she is rejecting self-help books, the individual pole 
of self-help, and making it disappear, to leave only self-help groups. 
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both embedded in the do-it-yourself philosophy of self-help. The triumph of personal 
agency is in contradistinction to that which is not self. And: not self is another way of 
saying not professionals, and professional knowledge and expertise. Self-help books 
bypass professionals and let readers help themselves, while self-help groups "reject" 
professionals as legitimate producers of the required knowledge for self-help. Self-help 
books and self-help groups form a relationship; they are in agreement. The self must help 
itself by avoiding professionals. 
A self-help workshop: naming the hyphen 
This relationship between the self and professionals must be tacked down. This is a site 
that reproduces the tension between self-help books and self-help groups; that is, between 
self and Other. But here the tension has been relieved. It has given me some purchase on 
discussing self-help books in terms o/self-help groups. We have managed to get self-help 
books and self-help groups in the same room together, so to speak, without fighting. 
There is a connection, a bridge forming between the individual pole, self-help books, and 
the collectivist pole, self-help groups. Can we tease this relationship out? Does it have a 
name, anything substantive? I want to introduce an emergent phenomenon, a hybrid of 
self-help books and self-help groups. It is the sel f-help workshop. It is not the self in self-
help, because it is not entirely individual; but neither is it the help in self-help, because it 
is not entirely collective. It is something in the middle. There it is, that small object 
connecting self with help, the hyphen: self "-" help. Perhaps it is small, almost going 
unnoticed, but might it be doing critical work? A self-help workshop is a massively 
complex phenomenon, much more so than the appearance of a little hyphen implies. 
Now, my spatial metaphor for the two poles of self-help, where they meet and enjoin, is 
doubly handy. It describes the proximal character of a self-help workshop. A self-help 
book author is the "star" of the show; people come to see the artist, their idol. But look 
what happens, and how such an occasion is organized: readers of self-help books (the 
individual pole) share the experience of the workshop in terms of membership in a 
collectivity of readers (the collective pole). This is what a workshop does - fuses 
individual reading and social interaction. It looks like a site where we have self and help, 
together: self-help. 
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A self-help workshop is nothing new. Self-help seminars have been part of 
American culture, and a manifestation of the colossal self-help book genre, for years. We 
can recall some of the gurus - the ones we try to forget. John Grey, with his hugely 
popular Men are From Mars, Women are from Venus series of books - he conducts 
workshops. And Tony Robbins, the unforgettable giant, standing 6ft 7in tall, with 
chiseled jaw line and hypnotically white teeth - he does too. Most of them do. And it is 
not just an American phenomenon; these seminars are sweeping across the UK these 
days. We have our own self-help gurus now, as British self-help book authors are taking 
a slice of the pie. The name changes - where self-help seminar spills into things like 
"motivational seminar", and "strategist", and "spirituality", and "personal development", 
and "life coaching" - but it retains exactly the same character: readers of self-help books 
joined together in a group for the purposes of social interaction. So self-help lives as a 
multi-headed beast in modern culture; it has many tendrils. I have identified three. 
Whereas the critics of self-help books and promoters of self-help groups have 
unproblematically separated the term, treating it as two independent phenomena, I feel 
this is an oversight of profound significance. There is clearly a site ofrelationship, where 
each pole of self-help speaks to the other: it is the hyphen in self-help, a self-help 
workshop. We need to respect the hyphen, and tell about it, as it might inform us of the 
self and help. But: we must not romanticize the hyphen, and pay too much respect. For it 
is built on the idea that linking self and help is entirely unproblematic. We know the 
promise of self-help is undermined by this paradoxical tension, the polarization of self-
help - individual and collective, self and Other, good and bad, etc. Self-help is intact, 
used as a legitimate and meaningful word in everyday discourse; but it also crumbles, 
splits and breaks in practice. 
I have arrived at the purpose of this thesis. I must attend to a new phenomenon: 
those forces that are repelling and attracting the phenomena of self-help, that is to say, 
that empirical domain which has hitherto been concealed, or ignored, but is otherwise 
active and performative. This means going out into the world, and looking at the three 
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sites of self-help, seeing how they get enacted. We know that the self is victorious in self-
help, the agent doing the self-help. This suggests one thing: in the interests of 
authenticity, and proximity to my topic, I need to become a particular kind of person in 
relation to it. I am not looking at self-help entirely from the outside; I am relating to it as 
a consumer of it. [ must become a participantl9 in these sites of self-help, to understand 
how self-help is received through their activity. I have research questions. But questions 
are abstract, disconnected from the activity of answering them. Besides, they are an 
integral part of the person asking them, at least here. It will be clearer to formulate them 
in terms of what I must do - who I will become by engaging my research topic. Three 
identities: the reader of a self-help book; a member of an audience of a self-help 
workshop; and a member in a self-help group. And three related tasks. First, to undertake 
the activity of reading self-help books, to see how it performs self-help and what that 
performance consists in. Second, to participate in a self-help workshop and examine the 
role of the self-help book author/speaker and other readers, for the purposes of self-help. 
And third, and finally, to become a member in self-help groups, and see what the 
collective co-presence of members invokes, and how that relates to doing self-help. By 
entering these sites of self-help, one at a time, I want to look at relationships and 
connecting lines - where travel is undertaken, and things get brought together, or where 
things stand still, and do not move at all. I want to understand self-help. Next, then: to 
begin my own travelling, and conduct some empirical research. I will discuss what I find 
later. 
19 I use this term in the ethnomethodological sense; that we must understand the emergence of the 
phenomenon of self-help in and as the orientations to it by the people who are performing it, doing it as a 
practical matter. 
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Chapter 2 
The methods chapter 
2.1 Introduction 
I have been extraordinarily busy. My topic of investigation has been engaged, in detail 
and exhaustively. It began with the work of accessing my research sites. There were 
conversations, meetings and ongoing correspondence. Certain resources were used; 
others were developed as I went on. Choices were available. Decisions had to be made, 
ongoingly, so the research would proceed and not grind to a halt. There were quiet 
moments, when not much seemed to be happening. Other things needed to be tried, to 
move things on again. Some things were attended to, and unpacked; other things were 
ignored, or put to one side. Some things worked well, and were employed again; other 
things fell to the ground right at the start. Connections were established that allowed me 
to travel to other places, and enable me to explore different parts of my topic. Materials 
were collected, looked at and compared. Parts of the topic were brought into relation with 
one another; they were examined carefully. A trajectory emerged out of this pattern of 
activity, on which the development of the research travelled. ltwas out of this bundle of 
activity that the analysis of the thesis was produced, to follow in the chapters to come. So 
much happened, out there, doing the research. 
This does not really tell a story. It just points to something that still needs to be 
told. This activity, largely unspecified, provided for the analysis in the later chapters, 
itself part of the activity, and thus produced the "original contribution" this thesis is 
making to knowledge. But what is the status of this activity? What, exactly, did happen 
out there, and how is this bundle of activity to be characterized? What explains, in other 
words, the passage between setting out my research trajectory, and substantively and 
practically pursuing it through empirical, analytic work? This is the inevitable task faced 
by every social science researcher: the rational accountability of research activity. And 
this is the substantive function of a chapter like this one, the methods chapter. 
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2.2 Social science method 
This is a social science thesis, and my topic is clearly within the interests of social 
science analysis. But what happens when I describe the production of my thesis as an 
activity of social science? This becomes especially important, given the current task of 
accounting for my research activity. I am conducting qualitative research within the 
social sciences; there is no tiresome number crunching, or wavy graphs, or tables. But 
whether quantitative or qualitative, social science provides me with its most treasured 
possession: Method. [ must deal with my research activity as an application of social 
science method. Method is part of a normative, standardised practice of doing social 
science research. If there is one place where method is most appropriate, then it is here. 
This is, after all, the methods chapter; the title says so. Suppose I adopt the resources the 
social sciences make available to me, and tell about the emergence and development of 
my research that way. 
It goes like this. Method is a specific commentary on action; it endorses a 
mechanistic and rationally traceable account of what it means to act. Purposeful action is 
ultimately the result or effect of some prior, underlying plan (Suchman, 2007io. Action 
derives from, and is rational to the extent that is functions according to, a plan-of-action. 
The plan exists prior to, and independently of, the action that it determines. The 
significance of action is to be located in its cause: the plan. This has devastatingly strong 
implications, both for what it means to "act", and to act "intelligently" and 
"purposefully". Take the bundle of activities out of which my analysis emerged, the one I 
am deciding how to account for at the moment. What does it mean to say that it occurred 
as a plan, a method? It means that things get put into an order. The messiness of the 
activity is replaced with pattern, coherence. It gets rationalised. It makes those activities 
accountable as particular kinds of activities; they become specifically methodological 
activities. There is a script that method embodies: how it organises and specifies the 
character of that activity, out there. Because it has a temporal, sequentially prior 
relationship to action, it projects what action will be like, as some future instance of 
20 The following account draws heavily on Suchman's (2007) effective challenge to the orthodox view, 
derived mostly from a philosophical, and later cognitive science, perspective, that intelligent and 
purposeful human action can be sufficiently explained by a wholly rational. computational model of action. 
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activity, in terms of the script. Action is retrospectively accounted for, not in terms of 
what happened, but in terms of what happened according to the script. Method deals 
exclusively with what has been pre-specified in the plan; action can only be accounted for 
as a telling of method. It does not recognise any action that exceeds the action-as-
accounted-for in its prescriptive representation. 
When we write about research activity as social science practice, as I am, it 
undergoes transformation (cf. Berg, 1998). The method that determines it now replaces 
it. The context of the activity becomes the context of methodological formulation. In 
other words, the particulars of research practice belong to a more general species of 
method. Those practices of research activity are to be named by and as a method account. 
Method is heavily packaged within a theory of action. This is where it gets complicated 
for the researcher, as other things need to be understood. Method gets attached to 
epistemological and ontological concerns; and now it is philosophical. What might be 
seen as a situated occasion of research activity is the result of a dense, theoretical lineage 
of work. We need to know about these things, before we can go on. Now method is 
totally separated from its situated occasions of practice. It displays a level of generality 
such that it can be discussed in the abstract, to account for all points of its application. It 
is a topic of social science, not just a resource. Dedicated journals and international 
conferences, and many other sites besides, provide a surrogate home for method, as it 
now occupies specialised, theoretical discussion. Debates take place, and endure; 
sometimes more theoretical resources are added, as method is placed deeper into the 
literature. Where it starts and where it ends is unclear; it gets nestled between so many 
argumentative contexts, so many debates, that one just cannot say. 
One thing is certain. The researcher needs to know how to act before action is 
undertaken. Social science provides just the tool: the "canon" of social science, the 
methods textbook. It is surely not the same as being apprenticed to an accomplished 
researcher for an extended period, but nevertheless a hugely popular and legitimate 
surrogate. [ noticed this in the library. It is overwhelming: one textbook next to the other, 
row upon row, some slim but most bulky, constantly updated, and many new editions of 
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old classics with perhaps only an updated foreword and a new cover. So my task, as a 
first priority, is to learn about method. I need to know how to act. This is a civilizing 
process (cf. Elias, 1994). The methods textbook is intended to produce order, to tell about 
the "do's" and "don'ts", the acceptable and unacceptable ways of acting. Method tells me 
how to go on; it tells me what to do. It performs its function through the form: "if ... then" 
(Berg, 1998: 232). So, in the case of A, then method instructs me to do B. That is the 
principle on which it is based, to induce from the particular to the general, from specific 
activity to methodical practice. It turns one thing into another: something specific into 
something general. Part of the civilising process is to develop "competent" researchers, 
and then "good" research; produce the first, and the second will follow. Social science 
method is there to take away disorder and mess. It makes things simple, so we can look at 
what is important. It has a naturally positive quality to it; the vitality of method as a label 
or description of specific activities is drawn on. Practicing social science method reflects 
a healthy research life. Everything is in order. Method just needs to be understood. Then I 
can proceed. And then I will know what to do. This means reading the methods 
textbook(s), and internalising a set of representations of action. 
So social science method endorses my development as a "knowing" researcher, 
equipped with knowledge of method and ready to set about my topic. My research will 
proceed along a methodological path; the questions it raises, the objects it studies, the 
various phenomena it priorities and those it conceals, will be engaged as an occasion of 
method. There I am: my methodological "toolkit" swinging confidently in hand, ready to 
deal with my topic as I begin my investigation. This presupposes that, now I have 
knowledge of how to act, I follow a script of what it means to act. I respond to 
environmental conditions with the appropriate (and pre-defined) sequences of actions. I 
will know how to identify typical situations in which a given script will be applied. The 
extent of this "background knowledge" is supposed to explain the action it determines. 
Every action is accomplished because the actor has a whole stock of background 
knowledge of similar situations of action that gets selected from to fit single occasions of 
action. I am supposed to know more than I can tell in anyone situation because of my 
background knowledge. There is a remainder, an excess of knowledge, not applied but 
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nevertheless relevant to the action that is undertaken. This background knowledge (which 
can be left totally unspecified, assumed) explains how one course of action is taken and 
not another (Suchman, 2007: 64·68). Every action is the deliberate effect of the plan, or, 
in this case, the script or the knowledge. 
2.3 Practice theory 
This is one story, the official story. But it is a tale told by social science, handed down 
from one generation of researchers to another. Like all tales, it sketches a romanticised 
image; things are almost too perfect. There is a problem. I did read one of the leading 
methods textbooks, more than once; I even carried out the exercises at the end of each 
chapter. But my research activity did not proceed as it was meant to, like social science 
intends it to. I kept returning to the now troublesome relation between formal instruction 
and practical action; there was a bottleneck, something preventing the flow of traffic. I 
simply needed to apply method. Fine. But this is what was in question: getting method 
from the pages of the textbook to the activities of my research. What counts as doing 
method? Let us call it x. How do [ know [ am doing x? How do [ know (when) [ am 
performing a class of activities known as x·ing? Well, it should consist of this or that. But 
then what does that mean? 
Perhaps another methods textbook might make a clearing, I thought, and show me 
how to go on and distinguish this from that. Another trip to the library, another methods 
textbook borrowed. That did answer some questions; but it raised new ones too, or 
perhaps modified the old ones. I read some of the sections repeatedly, to try to get a grip 
on things. It helped, but only slightly. I was still unsure how to go on. So another trip to 
the library... This cycle of reading was now becoming compulsive2l. The research 
methods textbook, taken as a canon of social science, was supposed to prepare me for 
conducting research, but it was simply preventing me from doing so. Reading became a 
matter of task avoidance. While [ was reading, [ was not doing my research; and that was 
bad. I had to stop reading, or my thesis would fail to develop. I realised this. No amount 
21 This cycle endured for sometime; suffice it to say, with hindsight, it interfered with the development of 
my research. 
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of instruction, however specified, made things any clearer, at least not clear enough for 
me to feel comfortable to leave the site of instruction, and venture into the site of research 
activity. Any new or modified instruction took me back to where I was before: asking 
what that now consisted in. Then there was my topic. How did I know where that began 
and ended? To reiterate the "if...then" form of method, what might the world look like, 
and how might it be recognised as such, so that I apply "8" to its study, and in this way? 
There is a story not being told here. My research could not be described in terms 
of the application of method, not by a long way. I did not know how to apply method, nor 
what I would be applying it to. These things did not present themselves to me, with 
names, and as self-evident. And so I abandoned the activity of reading the methods 
textbooks. The problem is the formalisation of social science method into abstract, 
representational plans of action. Method deals with research activity theoretically, and 
has no regard for what happens outside of theoretical accounts of action. Method and 
research activity are at variance; one does not reflect the other. But social science tends to 
gloss over this, mostly with calls for greater rigour, and adjusting theory. Wittgenstein 
made it perfectly clear in his later writings (e.g., 2001), that a rule (or instruction, or plan, 
or method) could not provide the rules of its own application. So: what ifthe meaning of 
action does not derive from a theory of action, but from the context in which that action is 
performed? This is the principal argument of Wittgensteinian language philosophy: to 
override generality with specificity. This changes things. If we do not perform an action 
because we know what it means to act, where the action has some prior and determinate 
meaning for action, but instead arrive at a meaning in context and in situ, then we need to 
change how we talk about action. 
Wittgenstein was not alone. Ethnomethodology soon followed. Garfinkel made it 
abundantly clear, right on the first page of Studies in Ethnomethodology, that the 
invocation of rules is not the solution to the problem of the meaning of action. Thus: "the 
activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organised everyday affairs 
are identical with members' procedures for making those settings "account-able" " (1967: 
I). A much cited extract from Studies, and for good reason: it provides the clearest 
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argument that any formulation of a practice (esp. Epistemology) is inseparable from the 
order of activities it forrnulates22• Suppose we take method to mean the practical activity 
that produces an emergent course of action. In this sense, it deals with and engages "what 
happened". The practicaf3 adequacy of method is very specific. For ethnomethodology, 
method is not an inadequate representation of practice, as though there were some 
adequate alternative representation; but neither it is the case that activity remains 
meaningless until it receives a representation. On the contrary; method is an expression 
in, as and of the activity in which it occurs. It depends heavily for its sense on the 
organisational occasions of its use. It is an indexical expression; and there is another 
celebrated term from Studies. 
The indexicality of the meaning of action has generated a paradigmatic shift in 
contemporary theoretical discussion. We have now undergone, and are working within, a 
"practice turn" (e.g., Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, & Von Savigny, 2001). Wittgenstein gets 
heavily drawn on, and the ethnomethodologists too. But it is far broader than that. The 
emergence of a "praxeological" understanding of the world has been heavily deployed in 
the philosophy of science, social theory and social sciences for sometime now. The 
sociology of scientific knowledge, and later, social studies of science have been 
particularly visible areas of work. They have adopted the idea that the best way to look at 
science is as practice24• Look to other, long-standing traditions of inquiry too; 
22 Garfinkel does retum to this point (as ifhe ever departed from it), with an equally lucid exposition, in his 
recent Ethnomethodology' s Program. As he says: " ... in descriptions of order in ordinary society that 
respecify the concreteness of social facts of ordinary activities so that local actual concretely detailed 
circumstantial workings of immortal ordinary society are absent of orderliness until and only in case 
concreteness is respecified by the social sciences: displayed in details of orderliness of formal analytic 
methods and generic representational theories" (2002: 65). 
23 Ethnomethodologists make heavy use of the words "practice" and "practical" to show that the nature of 
any phenomenon is produced for practical purposes. out of local, located, actual, concrete lived-work (cf. 
Livingston, 1987: 57-8). 
24The sociology of scientific knowledge has shown that science, the "hardest" case for a social 
constructionist argument, is socially constituted through and through. However, to say that science is 
socially constructed does not get close enough to what scientists actually do in the laboratory; it leaves too 
much room for social theory. "The social", that is to say, the so-called descriptive and explanatory 
framework for understanding science. becomes another topic in need of description and explanation; how 
does the social get there in the first place? What makes it social? To view science as specifically a practical 
enterprise allows us look at what happens at every step ~ in experiments, in the use of instruments and 
technical equipment, in scientific reportage, in protocols and so forth. This specifically '"practice turn", 
succeeding "the social turn", allows us to view all of this, all those things that make up scientific activity, 
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anthropology is a good example, and cultural sociology and cultural studies. The 
foundation here is based on the idea that culture is practice. It is localised within 
practices. A recent manifestation of "the praxeological" has been explored as 
"performative social science" (e.g., Denzin, 2001; Gergen, 2001; lones, 2006)25. So many 
topics, then, and so many objects, spanning various temporal, geographical and 
ontological sites: some relate, but many do not; many do not share anything in common. 
Or do they? This is only one way of looking at heterogeneity; there is another. A 
preferred way of dealing with heterogeneity is by the use of a single repertoire for its 
elucidation: something that collects all the pieces together, however messy the collection 
might be26• One candidate repertoire to emerge has been "practice theory" (Schatzki, 
1996, 1997,2002,2007; Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, & Von Savigny, 2001). As Schatzki 
(2001: 2 original italics) explains: 
'" practice accounts are joined in the belief that such phenomena as knowledge, 
meaning, human activity, science, power, language, social institutions, and 
historical transformation occur within and are aspects or components of the field 
of practices. The field of practices is the total nexus of interconnected human 
practices. This 'practice approach' can thus be demarcated as all analyses that (I) 
develop an account of practices, either the field of practices or some subdomain 
thereof (e.g., science), or (2) treat the field of practices as the place to study the 
nature and transformation of their subject matter. 
so to speak, on the ground (see esp. Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Latour, 1987; Pickering, 1991, 1995; 
Pickering & Guzik, 2008). 
25 A recent Special Issue of Forum Qualitative Social Research On-Line on Performative Social Science 
(http;llwww.gualitative-research.net/index.php/fgs/issue/viewlI 0) has explored the possibilities of 
performativity for social science. I contributed to the Special Issue, outlining the importance of showing 
how the world is performative, beyond our representations of it (see Cherry, 2008a). The thrust of my 
contribution, and the Special Issue more generally. was to challenge the restrictions that traditional social 
science methodology places upon its practitioners, and the ways in which social science topics 
subsequently get framed within such restrictive frameworks. 
26 Call on calls this a "generalized symmetry" (1986; 200). This concept indicated the emergence of actor 
network theory and suggested that all elements in a network, that is, humans and non-humans, should be 
described in the same terms. The difference between them is to found in the relations in the network, and 
not presupposed. 
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Something very profound is happening. Practice theory is the result of a respecification of 
topics normatively seen in terms of those listed by Schatzki: knowledge, meaning and so 
forth. Epistemology is another topic; we can add that to Schatzki's list. Think of some 
more: discourse, interaction, objects, subjects, things, and all the others - they are each 
"re-ontologized". The shift is from being to doing, from product to process. And practice 
becomes the "core" ontological phenomenon, the basic unit of analysis. I do not want to 
get embroiled in the debates within practice theory (see Lynch, 1997; Pickering, 1997; 
Rouse, 2002, 2007; Turner, 1994,2002,2007). The importance of practice theory for me 
is that it is instructive. Now, it is true that practice-talk is not particularly novel, as we 
have seen. But all this talk has not been articulated in the same manner, that is to say, 
made the identifiable "move" of the emergence of "practice theory" as such. Concern is 
no longer restricted to philosophy and its topics, or culture or science and their topics. It 
is not only these that are praxeologized. This is what practice theory allows: it extends 
beyond discipline, and beyond topic, and opens the world for inspection as a practical 
phenomenon. What does that mean? One thing at a time. The world: that just means that 
everything (another usefully vague term) is available for inquiry. And practice: that just 
means that something will happen, or has happened, or might happen; an event, no more 
and no less. This is vague, but it is precisely the appeal of the practice approach. Look: 
... the bounds of a practice are identified by the ways in which its constitutive 
performances bear on one another, rather than by any regularities of behavior or 
meaning that they encompass. One performance responds to another, for example, 
by correcting it, drawing inferences from it, translating it, rewarding or punishing 
its performer, trying to do the same thing in different circumstances, mimicking it, 
circumventing its effects and so on (Rouse, 2007: 49). 
Things are left open. What counts as constituting a practice is to be arrived at through its 
actual circumstances. Things certainly multiply, and become displaced. Different things 
are brought into relation with one another, in the plane of practices. As a practice unfolds, 
more things can be added, others can be left behind; maybe discourse and materiality co-
participate, or perhaps institutions and subjectivity (Reckwitz, 2002). Material 
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arrangements can get modified, through contingency, and in turn effect other things; 
human agents can modify, and in turn be modified by, these performances too. We do not 
look in one place, but many places. And when many things are involved, changing hands 
and moving around, things are always subject to change and respecification. Something 
happens to action, when we see it as practice. Theory will no longer do. Grand narratives 
are simply ruled out of court. This shift in perspective meets a shift in the phenomenon: 
attending to practices means moving from epistemology to ontology. It is not devoted to 
finding a single object; this would be a question of knowing as the only way of relating to 
the world. This simply asks to what extent, and whether, representation is accurate. Here, 
we just need the right method, the appropriate way of knowing. To clarify, then: 
ontology, not as a preexisting object, as preceding everything else and which 
epistemology looks at from a distance, but rather as located in practice (Mol, 2002; 
Woolgar, 2005, 2008). This deflates ontology as an abstract concept, and makes it visible 
as activity, as emerging out of doing. 
The only robust and enduring feature of practice is its "internal" accountability. 
The moves it produces, the directions it takes and the elements of its production are all 
accountable to each other (Rouse, 2002, 2007). They are locally negotiated, in siti7• This 
is messy. But it is where action gets meaning, and has its life, which has been so nicely 
characterized as "the mangle" of practice (Pickering, 1995; Pickering & Guzik, 2008i8• 
A practice becomes adequate to itself. The stakes involved, and the issues it raises, 
become part of the mangle; they feature as its unfolding relational dynamics. So: practice, 
as a mangle, is an emergent phenomenon. It is an unfolding ontology. 
This changes how we see research activity. It respecifies the priority given to plan 
over action, method over research practice. We have seen what happens when social 
science method gets involved: its devotion to orderliness and rigor is passed on to its 
practitioners, so they ignore most of what happens in the actual experience of research 
27 This points to the importance of Such man 's (2007: 70) wonderful term "situated action" for beginning to 
unpack the situated, locally produced and contingent character of action. 
28 [t makes much more sense to consider the local and emergent conditions of practice, and not the "behind-
the-scenes" explanations of classical social theory, as setting the terms under which it is to be described. 
This intersects with central debates within social theory, and practice theory itself. 
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practice. They just tell of a "clean" story of research - of method. Most of "what 
happened" gets "tuned out". Practice theory, in contrast, respects the importance of 
everything that happens as part of the practical business of doing research. Research as 
practice cannot be subsumed under the auspices of social science method. Adopting 
practice theory means that you only engage with specifics, with detail. Practice can only 
ever deal with specifics, those circumstances which are fixed to the various forms of 
relation that emerge through contingency and their connecting forces. Without the detail, 
the emergence of the ontology of research in and as practice disappears. It abandons the 
general, the representation of action as plan. So practice, then: substantiated by emergent 
activity. Mess gets embraced; that is where the detail is to be found, in the connections, 
the displacements. 
2.4 From epistemology to epistemics 
I am unhappy with the function of social science method, as it is officially applied to 
research activity. [ have sketched out the contours of an alternative view of research 
activity, which has been identified as practice theory. This is much more encouraging; 
but I am not completely happy with this, either. Let me explain. The place to study the 
nature of our (or: all?) subject matter is in the field of practices. The world is supposed to 
stand or fall on its strength as a practice. Our domain of phenomena gets located in 
"actual" occasions and "concrete" circumstances. Its features and qualities are 
"recognisable" and "observable". Those sites of practice are assumed to perform a 
substantive duty of self-presentation; they unproblematically display their status to us, so 
we can say what they are, charting their characteristics as they are shown. Practices, 
because they are practices and are therefore recognisable and observable, take on a 
transparent form. They are "internally" stable. And more: practices are self-actualising, 
self-contained, self-sufficient, self-supporting, and self-evident. Because a practice is 
something done, performed, it is assumed that the work of its production has already 
taken place. All that is required to understand the practice is the practice "itself" -
everything that makes it concrete, and observable as a practice, is enclosed within it. 
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The argument gets stronger too. A practice-approach is certainly about ontologies, 
not as things but as doings. But in replacing products with processes, it nonetheless 
retains a strange sense of ontology. It privileges practice as a value of invariable 
presence29• There is something we name as practice that is present to itself, in and of 
itself. There is a centre: an essence. Despite its commitment to detach ontology from its 
philosophical past, is preserves a ghostly residue. A realist ontology, in its traditional, 
philosophical sense, is what can be drawn out, when we look close. Practice is a name 
given to a set of investigatable, nameable phenomena, something performed which gets 
enacted as the thing that it is. It does not reside in anything a priori to, or preceding, its 
own performance. It has boundaries. This is the "swan song" of practice theory; nothing 
else is required to provide for its articulation. Anything that might conventionally be 
understood to describe, formulate, unpack or speak on behalf of the practice can be 
discarded. The practice is supposed to do that itself; it is self-descriptive, as part of its 
practice-constituting activity. We simply need to join the dots. 
So the practice-approach parts ways with any theoretical, explanatory discourse 
that accounts for it on its behalf. But more than that: because a practice does not require 
methodological means to describe or otherwise elucidate it, the practice-approach is anti-
epistemological too. The gap between word (theory, description, representation, method) 
and world (practice, object, reality) is made to effectively disappear when we discard one 
of the poles upholding the binarism. Take away words, and we are left with the world. 
Practice is purity, the real thing; words, descriptions, are just contrived. They create 
distance where proximity is preferred. The work that is carried out to render this world-
as-practice visible is itself transparent. Description is made to have two functions. For a 
practice itself, description is productive; it makes the practice what it is. But for someone 
describing a practice, such as an analyst, description is representational; it simply 
conveys the practice, and takes no part in its production. There is asymmetry, and I am 
finding it very puzzling. It is as if, as part of this work of revealing a site of practice, we 
can avoid any form of productive activity: words, descriptions or formulations get robbed 
" This understanding can be attributed to Derrida (e.g., 1976, (978), and his critiques of structuralist 
thought which was committed to a realist ontology - a centre which is self-evident, and serves as the origin 
of meaning, such as consciousness, the subject, God or whatever. 
42 
of their constitutive rolelO • The world exists independently of our efforts to know it. 
There it is, out there, being practised. We have no problem seeing it. A practice-approach 
wants a world without description. So: it is all in a practice. 
But what if we do have a problem seeing the world? How do we see one kind of 
practice and not another? What makes a practice this kind of practice, and not that kind 
of practice? Practice theory suddenly becomes silent, unable to help us with specification. 
"But for all its merits the relevant literature remains unsatisfactory, even in the most 
elementary aspects. It fails to make clear just what social practices are. And its vision of 
the scope and power of 'theories of practice' is nowhere adequately justified" (Barnes, 
2001: 18)1 I. If a practice is a constitutive process, producing one practice and not another, 
and there is nothing but practice, then our analysis of practice is itself a practice. It too is 
a constitutive process (Livingston, 1987; Pollner, 1991). The world does not exist out 
there, left untouched and preserved, as our descriptions of it, however transparent they 
claim to be, merely reflect it. There: one practice, a description of the world, but then 
another practice, a description of that description, and then another ... ad infinitum. I am 
asking this form of "radical" reflexivity to display two critical points, each related. 
Words, descriptions, and any kind of formulation cannot be avoided when delineating a 
practice; that is my first point. And any practice is contingent on this work of "wording" 
that takes place, so we see one thing and not another; and that is my second. There can be 
no practice in and of itself, without description, and without words. To see the world as 
practice and not as, say, linguistic, textual, narrative, or any of the other paradigmatic 
"turns", is to create a certain type of world. Practice is a particular description of worldly 
activities. To discard those kinds of descriptions is to discard that kind of world. 
30 Garfinkel (2002: 170-1 original emphasis) makes this point rather strongly. when he recommends 
discarding words in favor of practices: "It is a procedure of not needing to consult the corpus of classic 
methods and findings with which to carry out the tasks of EM research. For this time being we'll carry out 
the tasks of our research while abstaining from the use of the classic corpus of findings, policies, methods 
and the rest". 
31 Although I agree with Bames, and his effort to interrogate the notion of practice, I see its lack specificity 
as precisely its value. It is unspecified, and largely unexamined, but certainly specifiable as part of its 
involvement in particular circumstances of action. Something so flexible and applicable to situaled activity 
is what must be of value for those embracing a practice-approach. I thus take Barnes to be referring, in part, 
to the over~theorization of practice in practice accounts, at the expense of specification of particular 
practices. This is a valid point, and I will return to it shortly. 
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Look at it like this. Sheep farming is one practice; fire fighting is another. But 
they are profoundly different kinds of practices. Take description away, and the sheep 
farmer might have difficulty telling you what he does. Take the range of descriptive 
resources that the fire fighter uses, to describe his work, and he too will have problems. 
The practice itself, however concrete and actualised it might be, whatever that might 
mean, fails to compel. It does not tell a story. And things simply become unacceptable 
when we say that the world really is practice, or practice-based, beyond our descriptions 
of "it" as "that" kind of world. Like our sheep farmer and fire fighter, deprive us of the 
descriptive work, and all of the resources on which it draws to produce its accounts, and 
we lose a practice. One thing becomes another, or perhaps nothing at all, or remains 
unspecified: that is what description does. 
There is another problem. Practice theory promises so much; it moves us away 
from the rational reasoning and prescriptive framework of Epistemology, towards the 
knowledge-productive, constitutive activities that contribute to sites of everyday life. 
Performativity is embraced. Doings, enactments, and processes: all of that too. But there 
is something missing; and there will always be something missing. What is promised is 
the detailed exposition of particular, practical actions, a rich unfolding of currently tacit, 
only vaguely understood, areas of practice. But what is given is only the abstract 
character of situated, practical actions. [n attending to the specifics of a set of practices, 
we must make do with a generic set of terms, such as "actual", "concrete", "practice", 
"practical", "actual activity" and the more specialized, jargon-laden "practical 
objectivity", "indexical expression", "demonstrable achievement" and the rest. Those 
terms are inadequate when used as a description of activities of a particular practice. [ 
want to say something about what [ am doing, here and now, in situ, that makes whatever 
it is that [ am doing this kind of practice and not that kind of practice; but the resources of 
a practice-approach only conceal that specificity with its generic set of account-giving 
termsJ2. 
32 This looks very similar to the great "craving for generality" which Wittgenstein (1965: 18) so adamantly 
condemned in his later writings. 
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It can be stated clearly enough. Adopting a practice-approach retains the same set 
of problematics from which it is attempting to depart, when it separates itself from 
Epistemology. Situated, particular occasions of activity get recognised not in and as 
situated, particular occasions of whatever they might be, but in the discourses in which 
those activities get embedded. Practice theory does not tell about particular practices, or 
of the particulars of a practice, or what produces a practice and its situated features. It just 
tells of all practices - practices in general. It becomes the theorising of practice, and 
encourages abundant citation of many practice theorists, and, because it is doing theory, 
avoids the specifics of "practical" practice. And because its mode of engagement is 
theoretical, it has a very limited vocabulary for those wishing to pursue description. It 
cannot give a rich description of the specifics it wishes to point to in theoryll. And so I 
am returned hastily to where I started, seeking a way of accounting for the particular, and 
the local practices of my research, but with nothing making itself available. 
I still need some way of describing my research activity. Otherwise you will not 
know what happened, and I will have no methods chapter. I need to do formulation; that 
cannot be avoided. It is part of being a social science researcher. Besides, social science 
method offers perhaps the richest resource available for accounting for social science 
research activity. Social science manages to survive with it. To reject it because of my 
current dissatisfaction with it, which is certainly not irresolvable, would be like throwing 
the baby out with the bath water. If we could just domesticate social science method, 
remove it from the methods textbook as a rational, ordered plan of action, and utilise it as 
a practical way of account-giving of research activity. How to go about this? Research is 
a deeply practical activity; we do not need a theory of practice to tell us that. What we do 
need is a set of resources that will allow us to tell about the detailed, situated occasions of 
33 Lynch makes this point, when he discusses the work of Turner, a leading social practices commentator. 
Lynch (1997: 343 original italics): "But, by focusing on such lapses and failures of nerve, he [Turner) never 
fully comes to tenns with the possibility that a "practice" might be described as something other than "a 
fact in a causal world" or a moment in a theoretical explanation. Although Turner presents a strong 
challenge to contemporary efforts to theorize practices. in the end he provides few, if any, suggestions 
about how we might investigate them". 
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that activity. A vocabulary. A voice. This means abandoning the devotion that social 
science method has for order and stability: otherwise it disregards those circumstances 
that are messy, fluid, ephemeral, that do not hold together securely (Law, 2004). We are 
not pointing to a single object in research, but many. We are not telling of one story, but 
several. So social science method needs to be broadened, stretched, added to, mixed 
together. It needs to be modified. 
I want to retain Epistemology, not with a big e but a small one: epistemology. 
Epistemology (big e) proffers propositional forms of knowing, "knowing that", while 
disregarding the more local, situated forms of "knowing how". I want to unpack 
knowledge-production, but not as Epistemology. Another term would be useful. 
"Epistemics" will have to do for now. I want to put to one side the idea of action as 
knowledge identification, simply retrieving what is already there, and prior to action. 
Instead I shall be interested in knowledge production, something that arises from and 
emerges out of circumstances of action. The stuff we can point to, and say has played a 
part in producing some practical situation; that is what I want. Social science method 
claims this of itself, but conceals the knowing-how with the knowing-that. Method covers 
up the practices it claims to describe. 
2.5 From multi-method to method assemblage 
Is what happens in one place, as one part of a practice, the same as what happens in 
another? Is it just one object we are tracing all along? What happens when things splinter 
off, and spread into lots of bits? Which parts do we attend to? What do we call them? 
And what about the bits that are left? This is multiplicity (Law & Mol, 2002; Mol, 2002). 
Social science method sets limits on what it can find; anything that falls outside gets 
missed. Multiplicity is sacrificed for order: singularity. Mol (2002) takes us to a hospital 
in the Netherlands, as she traces the diagnosis and treatment of atherosclerosis, a disease 
of the lower-limb, in daily practices. She does not find it in one place in the hospital, but 
in many; and she does not find one atherosclerosis, but several. Each is enacted in 
different parts of the hospital, and in different parts of the diagnosis and treatment 
process. In the consultation room, on the operating theatre table, in instruments, in legs, 
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in documents, in patients' reports: different atheroscleroses are everywhere to be seen. A 
change is required, to see this, from singularity to multiplicity: 
For somewhere along the way the meaning of the word 'is' has changed. 
Dramatically. This is what the change implies: the new 'is' is one that is situated. 
It doesn't say what atherosclerosis is by nature, everywhere. It doesn't say what it 
is in and of itself, for nothing ever 'is' alone. To be is to be related. The new talk 
about what is, does not bracket the particularities involved in enacting reality. It 
keeps them present (2002: 53-54) 
An "is" might have a name, but it does not refer to a single object, or a single site of 
practice. It gets produced as part of a bundle of activities. There are arrangements, 
associations, and relations. My research activity can be seen as an "is"; but to name it 
with the official descriptions that social science method provides retains singularity. 
Perhaps a new way of telling is needed. I have introduced one new term without stepping 
on too many toes; I am going to risk a second. I shall be careful. It is clear that actions 
come into relation with one another, both temporally and spatially. Research involves 
interaction between people, objects, processes, knowledge and artifacts, all through their 
co-production; there has to be, for it to move forward. How to deal with these collections 
of actions? The idea of methodological pluralismJ4 is certainly welcome (Morse & 
Chung, 2003). But I must confess my ambivalence. At least in current discussions of 
social science method, this means little more than adopting a mixed-method or multi-
method approach, even if the focus is on qualitatively driven or oriented multi-method 
(e.g., Greene, 2007, 2008; Johnson, 2008; Woolley, 2009). Granted, this means more to 
play with, more ways of seeing and knowing; and more is always better. But method, 
albeit multi-method, is now advanced as a "third paradigm" of research (Denscombe, 
2008). This implies that it has a stable, established status; it is known as an( other) 
"approach" to doing research. There is more. A multi-method approach now replaces a 
single-method approach, and yet, it retains the same function: it is still placed at the 
l4 This term can be traced back to the "anarchic" recommendations of Feyerabend (1975) for an open 
approach that embraces and utilizes whatever is available to shed light on a given phenomenon. 
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beginning of research activity, used to account for what happened before it happened. 
"The research topic is multi-layered, so a multi-method approach was used", a multi-
methodologist might say, justifying its use. My concern: method is still privileged over 
the practical activity of research. Only now there are more (abstract, theoretical) terms to 
use. And now there are even more methodological discussions in which to get embroiled. 
There: even more to add to a plan of action. 
It is not all bad. I welcome the richness and variety of methodological pluralism, 
any pluralism; just not the rationality in which it gets framed. I want looseness, fluidity, 
flexibility, and overlap, without having to subscribe to, or endorse, the heavily saturated 
"all or nothing", "either/or" basis on which method gets handled in social science. I am 
drawn to the idea of "method assemblage" (Law, 2004)35. This is a nice term. It is 
sensitive to the local contingencies of situated actions in research. It is Ha process of 
bundling, of assembling, or better of recursive self-assembling in which the elements put 
together are not fixed in shape, do not belong to a larger pre-given list but are constructed 
at least in part as they are entangled together. This means that there can be no fixed 
formula or general rules for determining good and bad bundles" (p. 42). This is 
promising: it offers the spatial (the where) and temporal (the when) flexibility of multi-
method, without the limits it sets on having to follow methodic practice, step-by-step, as a 
rational course of action according to a plan36• It asks us instead to point to, and describe, 
what happens in practice. Things can be loose. They can be fixed together only for the 
purposes at hand, without having to reflect a determinate set of laws or orders of 
meaning, or be placed in a wider, fully interpreted "program" (Turnbull, 2000). 
We can develop this. Method assemblage is about crafting certain realities in 
research; it is productive. Part of its value is its economy. It cannot deal with the world in 
one go, so as it engages some things, condensing them into manageable forms, it leaves 
l5 Law draws on Turnbull's (2000) use of the term "assemblage", who in turn adopts it from Deleuze & 
Guattari (1987). Turnbull says of assemblage: "It implies a constructed robustness without a fully 
interpreted and agreed upon theoretical framework, while capturing the inherently spatial nature of its 
practice and their relations" (2000: 44). 
36 This resembles what Billig (1988) calls "traditional scholarship": following hunches, using tacit 
knowledge. drawing on individual, specialist forms of knowing etc. 
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other things aside. Or rather, as it is dealing with certain things, making them present and 
available, it is also forcing other things out, making them disappear. It is partial. It too 
deals with singularity; it must in order to say anything. It places some things "out there", 
as prior to the things it deals with "in here", the things it makes present. The very act of 
attending to something, making it present through descriptions, representations, 
conversations and so forth, is also making other parts of it, and things related to it, absent 
as contexts and other phenomena not present. This is the function of method assemblage: 
it tunes in and out of different realities, or parts of a reality, as it develops through 
practice. But I am asking method assemblage to carry out an additional task: to relate 
itself to social science method, and to use that as part of its accounting procedure. This 
allows us to dip in and out of social science method, to take from it what we need to help 
articulate what happens in practice (Henriksen, 2003). 
I want to tell more. The potential of method assemblage, and what I see as the 
substantive contribution of multi-method to current discussions of social science method 
more generally, is its resourcefulness in the practical task of method account-giving. I do 
not take social science method to be an inadequate version of what "actually" happened 
in research practice. Or: at least not entirely. This would mean discarding it, because of 
its inadequacies; and that would be needlessly unhelpful. We would then be back to 
practice, and we would still have problems. Rather, social science method becomes a 
critical part of the practical reasoning of research activity. This is important. For "as 
projective and retrospective accounts of action, plans [or: methods] are themselves 
located in the larger context of some ongoing practical activity" (Such man, 2007: 69 my 
italics). 
That is it: social science method as retrospective accounts of action. I am 
inverting the normative and temporal direction of method in social science research. 
Research activity is no longer represented as the unfolding of a rational plan of action, 
normatively accounted for by method as an abstraction, before any research activity has 
taken place. On the contrary, social science method becomes part of the post hoc 
reconstruction of what actually happened. And what happened does not sit out there, able 
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to speak for itself all along, perhaps with a language of its own; its status as a practice is 
currently unarticulated. That is the function of this chapter - to articulate it. It does not 
have a name, especially not any official name. I drew on various modes of tacit 
knowledge when I was researching. I could not articulate much of what was done, as a 
rational plan before its performance; and I did not articulate what I was doing as I was 
doing it. Its passage was "occurrent" to me, happening without much conscious attention 
to it, or of it (Dreyfus, 1991 )37. But: my research activity did take place within practical 
circumstances. Actions were involved, lots of moving about. Social science method 
becomes part of the rendering of these circumstances, currently vague and unfinished. It 
is a retelling of some prior activity, part of action's interpretation. Thus, that activity was 
not determined by method, out there in the research field, but is rather being brought into 
relation with it, in here as its account (Sharrock & Button, 2003). The task I have set 
myself, in trying to engage social science method as a practical part of doing research, is 
to modify its function. It is a resource for social science research, but I want to "defuse" it 
so that it can be materialized, distributed, stretched and variably brought into positive 
interaction with the research process. 
2.6 Ethnography 
This is a nice word. I like it because it is unbelievably flexible, like a piece of elastic. 
You can do so many things with it, without it falling to pieces and losing its shape. And 
yet, it seems to get produced without any general form; it is in the absence of an essence, 
a modus operandi38• Even nowadays, it looks like there is no consensus, no "real" 
ethnography (Agar, 2006) .. Some ethnographers travel to the depths of non-western 
cultures, far afield and on their own; in a small village in Samoa, like Margaret Mead, or 
to southern Sudan, like E. E. Evans-Pritchard. Others go to laboratories, talk to scientists, 
J7 My research activity points to a whole body of activities that are enacted tacitly, invisible because it both 
happens without needing to know how it happens as a formalized set of actions and because it does not 
have a precise descriptive vocabulary with which to describe it (e.g., Collins, 1992, Polanyi, 1958, 1967). 
38 That said, ethnography does have the qualities Wittgenstein alluded to in his aphorism about games: 
"What is common to them all? - Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be 
called 'games'" • but look and see whether there is anything common to all. - For if you look at them you 
will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships. and a whole series of them at 
that To repeat: don't think, but look!" (1953: § 66 original italics). Thus, ethnographic studies share a 
family resemblance. 
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and meddle with the equipment (e.g., Coli ins, 1992; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Lynch, 
1985). Still others stay in their offices, with their computers to hand and their telephones 
ringing, and go home at the end of the day. Some ethnographers are interested in tripods 
and microscopes; all sorts of technical instruments used in laboratory work or medical 
procedures in hospitals. Others interview tribal members about their daily rituals. Some 
even like to examine those canonical literary works and dip into areas of poetry, and look 
at the activity of reading. We see different locations, topics, activities, people, and 
objects: so many differences. But that does not matter. Ethnography is flexible; but it is 
robust enough to point to all of these things. We understand what is going on. Besides, 
ethnographers are not that remarkable; they are just like anyone else. As Garfinkel (1967: 
9-10) himself pointed out, members, in using everyday methods for their accomplishment 
of practical action and practical reasoning, make heavy use of ethnographies. This is just 
what members do, and it is done with familiarity and goes without notice. And I am a 
member, just like other members. 
Ethnography does have a language, a set of descriptive terms, and that situates it 
within social science method. There are methods textbooks on ethnography, and plenty of 
them. But ethnography is an unusual beast; like Garfinkel alluded to, it does not require a 
technical, formal and rational repertoire to perform it. And it does not require that you 
know how to do it before you do it39• It is emergent. Then there is its vocabulary. That 
39 Unlike many other "methods" which have prescriptive and rule-based routines for practice, knowing how 
to do ethnography is vastly contingent on what happens in the field. Much of it emerges out of vernacular 
understandings, and not technical ones. Polanyi made a compelling case for riding a bike. He said you do 
not need to know how to do it, as a rational, rule~ordered action, to successfully ride a bike. Polanyi: ~'The 
rule observed by the cyclist is this. When he starts falling to the right he turns the handlebars to the right, so 
that the course of the bicycle is dellected along a curve towards the right. This results in a centrifugal force 
pushing the cyclist to the right. This manoeuvre presently throws the cyclist out of balance to the left, 
which he counteracts by turning the handlebars to the left; and so he continues to keep himself in balance 
by winding along a series of appropriate curvatures. A simple analysis shows that for a given angle of 
unbalance the curvature of each winding is inversely proportional to the square of the speed at which the 
cyclist is proceeding. But does this tell us exactly how to ride a bicycle? No. You obviously cannot adjust 
the curvature of your bicycle's path in proportion to the ratio of your unbalance over the square of your 
speed; and if you could you would fall off the machine, for there are a number of other factors to be taken 
into account in practice which are left out in the formulation of this rule. Rules of art can be useful, but they 
do not determine the practice of an art; they are maxims, which can serve as a guide to an art onJy jf they 
can be integrated into the practical knowledge of the art. They cannot replace this knowledge" (1958; 49· 
50). Much of "knowing" in ethnography is embodied knowledge, picked up as you go on, and certainly 
never formalized; it is also about using embodied skills, sometimes not doing much more than deploying 
the "practical knowledge" found in everyday interaction. 
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largely gets deployed and decided as part of fieldwork activity, and not before, in pre-
formulated plans of action. Even then, its terms will mean different things, depending on 
the topic and the nature of the ethnography. This is why ethnography's relevance is not 
restricted to specific topics or discipline-bounded concerns. It is interdisciplinary. This is 
a good thing. It means you have friends in many disciplines; some colleagues might be 
sociologists or anthropologists, and they usually are, but others might be geographers or 
philosophers. This means more resources, to add to a voice, a way of doing formulation. 
But ethnography does more than that. It is a way organizing my activities, making them 
recognizable to others as familiar kinds of activities. Recall how Mol approached a 
lower-limb disease, atheroscleroses, in the hospital: she says it is an "is", but does not 
have a single referent. It is multiple, found in and as different sites of hospital practice, 
and yet it hangs together as if it were a single disease. It is "more than one - but less than 
many" (2002: 55). Just as atheroscleroses is a stable phenomenon in the hospital, so my 
activities become stable when I catch them with ethnography. A name does a lot, a term 
of engagement; it is a coordinating mechanism. It ties together the various contexts over 
which my actions get distributed. 
My research is not composed of lots of individual activities, producing separate 
things, all in need of names; it produces them as part of the same thing. Differences and 
anomalies get pacified. I no longer need to worry about how to describe an action, and 
then another action, as they will get interpreted in terms of the rest of the actions. It is all 
in a name: ethnography. My activities can be seen as ethnographic activities. All my 
actions become related; they remain situated, and seen in local sites of practice, but cross 
over and correspond to become part of an assemblage. Citation of other ethnographers 
and their work is part of the work of this coordinating mechanism; it displays the 
distribution of the phenomenon, its community-wide legitimacy (Latour, 1987). It turns it 
into something stable, singular, pointable to and uncontestable. And because it is "out 
there", beyond my practice of it, who can argue with that? With ethnography I fit in, can 
talk to colleagues without fear of rejection; they will understand me. So it provides a way 
of telling a story that is composed of many elements, that travels across multiple sites of 
activity, that draws on many resources, and that works within heterogeneous spaces 
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(Hine, 2007; Marcus, \998; Mol, 2002). But it never falls apart, into lots of indiscernible 
pieces. It is manageable. Yes, I do like ethnography. And then there is one of its more 
endearing features. It points away, or can be made to point away without too much 
trouble, from the rational, representational plan-of-action found in the methods textbook 
and the methodological debates in the journals, to the world where its work gets enacted 
(cf. Cherry, 2008a). It is not endorsing multiplicity for its own sake, then; it is pursuing it 
because it best allows us to engage, negotiate and account for the messy, hybridized 
character and forms of our own research and its topics (e.g., Atkinson, 2005; Holloway & 
Todres, 2003). 
Ethnography might be about method, and it probably is. Certainly, it is a model of 
action, of taking specific kinds of actions. We call these actions doing ethnography. But it 
is also about being a particular kind of person; there is someone behind the ethnography, 
doing the actions and undertaking the work. I did not read a collection of self-help books 
in a personal quest for self-help. I did not attend a workshop of life coaching to receive 
coaching in my own life. And I did not spend a large part of my research visiting self-
help groups because of a personal problem. My presence in each of these settings had an 
ethnographic function, and nothing else. I was a "professional stranger" (Agar, 1996). I 
was present as an ethnographer. This is difficult to define in the abstract, and can quickly 
return us to general, methodological accountings. Another direction is needed. Geertz 
(1973) indeed reminded us, all those years ago, that we should judge a discipline by what 
its practitioners do in the field. So I must not get bogged down in jargon, and instead 
remain faithful to my time in the field, the lived experience, and draw from that (Murphy, 
2002; Sharman, 2007). In the Goffmanian sense I was enacting a role; my relationship to 
my topic was such that I needed to fulfil various role-accomplishing activities. I could 
talk ethnographically, and tell about my research through ethnography. That would be 
method description. But that is not enough. It leaves out important details. I undertook a 
role, and adopted a specific persona in my relationship to my research sites: the duty of 
this methods chapter is to do role description. What is required is a description of selto. 
40 The status of self must be demarcated from other, similar notions such as "the ethnographic self' (e.g., 
Coffey, 1999), and the recent ethnographic debates that embrace autoethnography, which introduce any 
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This is the contribution of social science method; using the resources that one of its 
domains of practice, ethnography, provides to tell about a narrative of self in research 
activity. Method and practice overlap and get hybridized, out of which arises a narrative 
retelling. Part of the adequacy of this ethnographic retelling is how I want to retell. I want 
to draw on "thick" description41 to engage and deal with my research activity. The target 
is detail and empirical fruitfulness (cf. Callon & Latour, 1992). So: let us get down to 
specifics, and let me tell my story from the field. 
Site one: self-help books 
I spent time browsing the bookshops, negotiating the small pockets of people usually 
dotted about the popular psychology and self-help sections. Most books were easily 
viewable, and conveniently to hand, but a firm push was the only way to clear the more 
engaged browsers and get to the best stuff. There are thousands of self-help books: so 
many titles, so many authors, so many topics and so many editions of titles. Not all of 
them identify themselves as "self-help books", either. Self-development books, self-
improvement books, spirituality books and life coaching books: just so many books. Does 
each book perform the same job, in its respective topic, I wondered? What is the 
difference? I did not know, not just by looking. If only I had some form of expertise to 
guide me, and help with the selection process. Then I saw something glistening, up there, 
number of identity categories or descriptions of self as being important to, if not determining, the research 
setting. This is a common enough argument: there is no reality, no world out there, beyond my 
representation of it in and as my text, my interpretation, or, here, my identity and ethnographic self. This 
strong claim comes with all sorts of unnecessary problems if it is not appropriately justified. In what sense 
does a particular ethnographic self contribute to accomplishing, or determining, the setting in which the 
ethnographer is located? Potter (1996: 135) made it clear: 'The test is whether the interaction [or setting, or 
topic, or phenomenon] would have taken place, and would have taken place in the form that it did, had the 
researcher [or ethnographer] not been born'. If the ethnographer were run over by a bus, for instance, on the 
way to the setting, would the setting still have taken place as it did? (e.g., Potter, 2003; see also Potter, 
2002; Potter & Hepburn, 2007). [fa given identity or description of self is to be introduced as a non-trivial 
matter, that shapes the emergence of the topic, then it must be shown to be demonstrably relevant and 
consequential (Schegloff, 1991). This would be the function of reflexivity, and it would be fully justified. 
My description of self is not making a claim for the way I determined the shape of my topic. Rather, it is a 
pragmatic device for describing what happened, based on my situated actions in fulfilling my professional 
role, and not relying on abstract, disengaged discourse about method. It just distinguishes me, based on my 
role, from the members of my settings. I become somebody, with a particular role to fulfil, who is not a 
"self-help book reader", or a "life coaching workshop member" or "self·help group member". The 
distinction arises out of my role·fuIfilling activities, not how such activities shape the settings. 
41 This term derives from Ryle (1968), later to be famously popularized by Geertz. See Cromdal, 
Osvaldsson & Persson-Thunqvist (2008) for a recent exposition. 
54 
wedged between the latest edition of Dale Carnegie's How to Make Friends and 
Influence People and Gloria Arenson's Five Simple Steps to Emotional Healing. There: 
Tom Butler-Bowdon's (2003) 50 Self-Help Classics. It was quite a hefty book, and a little 
more expensive than the others, but that did not matter; I was too busy looking at my 
reflection in the shiny, mirror-like gold italics on its cover. 50 Self-Help Classics collects 
together the self-help "classics", the books that most represent the self-help book genre 
and define its boundaries. It is even endorsed by several self-help book authors for its 
range and depth of coverage. Sold: I would draw on Butler-Bowdon's expertise of the 
genre and use his 50 Self-Help Classics as a selection device. 
Self-help books are used in a professional context, I recalled. We have already 
seen in the opening chapter how they have received medical endorsement, as doctors 
prescribe them to patients. The Cardiff Book Prescription Scheme, which I also pointed 
to earlier, provides practitioners with a list of thirty-five "high quality" self-help books 
which address a range of psychological problems e.g., stress, depression and panic 
attacks. In compiling the list, therapists and counsellors were asked to recommend 
specific self-help books from their professional experience; the ones that work in 
practice. So the scheme has chosen those canonical self-help books from the genre. 
There: another selection device. 
Two forms of expertise of the genre of self-help books, one at the core of the 
genre itself and the other at the core of professional health care, united in their 
commitment to what a self-help book is supposed to be like. There is a model here, and 
each title conforms to it, or is an instance of it. The genre has been reduced to a 
manageable form, conveniently awaiting my selection from it. Any of the titles would do, 
but I chose ten titles for analysis, six from 50 Self-Help Classics, four from The Cardiff 
Book Prescription Scheme (see appendix I). This selection would represent the basic 
source of my analysis of self-help books. It would provide for the analytic work ahead, 
but remain "open" so that other titles could be added as analysis developed, either to 
further unpack, or better explore, specific analytic phenomena of interest. 
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A self-help book is an object: it travels with other self-help books in large boxes 
from the publisher; it gets displayed in bookshops, one stacked on top of the other, or 
sometimes stood upright. And it gets picked up and moved around while it is there. That 
is one object, the text. But the object I am dealing with is not the sort of object that can 
fall on your toe. It is not really an object at all. Readers do not just look at self-help 
books: they read them. Reading is part of the process undertaken by every reader of a 
self-help book, and yet, because it happens so intuitively, its significance is overlooked 
and the object read is all that remains: 
Reading [ ... ] is construed as an operation performed on such objects, the 
"processing of information" found in the text. Yet, whatever a text's ultimate 
properties, it takes on its observed properties from within the work of reading. 
Reading consists of work that is always done in conjunction with a particular text. 
Rather than having two separate things - texts and reading - the two together 
constitute one object - a "text/reading" pair (Livingston, 1995: 14). 
A self-help book does not exist before and independently of the situated activity of 
reading. Self-help books are read; that is an activity, and work is involved. Livingston 
suggests that any text, just like any stretch of talk, has a "natural analysability" (p.32), 
that is, analysis is already embedded within it by the way it is produced through reading's 
actual work. A text draws readers in through reading - the activity needing to be pursued 
if the text is to be instantiated as a phenomenon. Arriving at the meaning of a text is an 
achievement. But it is not achieved by the text, a combination of tightly compacted fibres 
of wood and liberal quantities of printed black ink. And neither does the reader determine 
this achievement, by something taking place inside their skulls; as an experience and 
activity available to any reader, the achievement derives from reading. The text is an 
effect of reading and a conclusion drawn from reading's work. 
My task was set. I undertook a detailed reading of my corpus of self-help books. I 
became a reader of these texts, placing them in the situated occasions of reading in (and 
as) which they are produced. Whereas a lay reader would have read quite happily, 
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ploughing through the whole corpus perhaps even faster than I had earlier collected it 
using my handy selection devices, I did not. I pursued an analytic reading, which is 
another way of saying additional work was required. From the start of my reading 
experience I paid close attention to how the very process of reading emerged, what 
features of the text/reading pair contributed to its achievement. I looked at the work 
involved in constituting the identity of the reader of a self-help book, and what it meant 
to have or assume such an identity. I charted what commitments were required in 
attaching oneself to this identity, either to maintaining or developing it: what things were 
prioritised or negated. These commitments also related to the status of the self-help book; 
to be a certain reader was to take a certain stance towards the self-help book. That was 
examined too. There was a trajectory - from becoming a specific kind of reader to the 
work that this kind of reader does as part of reading's work. This connected with an 
understanding of self-help. I unpacked the situated details of the practical work 
undertaken by the reader, to explore what counted as fulfilling the work of self-help. A 
process had been completed: reading a self-help book. A journey had been made, from 
one point to another. I inquired what this process had represented, and amounted to, for 
the reader. 
I drew on various theoretical resources in my reading work. Genette's (1997) 
insights into the role of paratext42 in reading practices were critical. He saw those textual 
features that were added to a text during the distribution process by editors, after the 
author has completed the writing of the main text, such as front covers, titles, imagery, 
font, colours, etc., to be performative of the reading process. This provided for analytic 
attention being paid to how those elaborate paratextual details on the front covers of the 
self-help book institute or, as it were, get reading underway. 
Barthes' (1974) notion of "connotation", taken from his analysis of a short story 
in his book S/Z, demonstrated the codified nature of reading activity and its dependence 
of one type of codification upon another. It describes how readers build associative 
42 One could just as easily say "hypertext": the prefix, hyper, is derived from the Greek "above" or 
"beyond". It is any text that appears in addition to, or outside of, the main text. 
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(secondary) meanings out of the text, by moving across it, between the codes. 
Connotations are not, then, relationships between the text and experience separate from 
it, located in the mind of readers say, for "connotation is a correlation immanent in the 
text, or texts; or again, one may say that it is an association made by the text-as-subject 
within its own system" (Barthes, 1974: 8). Connotation is related to an 
ethnomethodological understanding of reading practice: the documentary method of 
interpretation. To enable text comprehensibility, readers employ readerly sense-making 
procedures; what the text is about, its underlying pattern of meaning, is constituted out of 
individual textual evidences, while such evidences in turn receive their sense through 
their relation to an overall pattern (McHoul, 1982)43. The meaning of a text is made to fit 
each to-be-read line or evidence as it is engaged and is thus ongoingly modified or 
extended, and in turn each new evidence receives meaning from a general pattern 
produced thus far44. Connotation was of such general importance to my analysis that, 
although it was not always made explicit or pointed to, it nevertheless acted to produce a 
sensible and rational reading of the self-help book. The normative procedure for finding 
meaning, by establishing it as the result of reading and connecting specific evidences to a 
general pattern, enabled me to see that the process of reading was also a product of the 
very order of events that it helped to produce, which is to say, the self-help book. 
Eco (1979; \992) has shown how the experience of the reader, as a reflexive 
agent of the work of reading, and someone coming to the text and produced by it, is made 
available for inspection in textual material. His concept of the Model Reader is a way of 
characterising how a text anticipates its own reading, and its readers, by encoding certain 
pathways on which reading should proceed, delimiting the range of interpretation 
required for readers to render intelligible its narrative. Like connotation and its regulation 
by the system of signification in which it is invoked, Eco was underscoring how a reader, 
43 McHoul's breaching experiments have provided important empirical evidence of the reliance on the 
documentary method of interpretation for normatively produced reading practices. He interfered with or 
"troubled" these normative practices, by taking lines from a poem and reconfiguring them randomly to 
produce a new "poem", which had no author and was neither intended as sensible nor rationally produced. 
It was, rather, irrational, where its narrative had no coherence or pattern. And yet, readers, after being 
requested to read it, still attempted to make sense of it, by reading it as an orderly, authored and legitimate 
piece of writing: a poem. Readers found meaning by producing it through reading. 
44 This is what gives a text a "gestalt texture" for reading's work (Livingston, 1995: 12). 
58 
so as to control the plurality of meanings slhe makes when reading, is constrained by the 
work they are asked to perform when reading. Eco was interested in how a text constructs 
its readers. This concept of the reader, in and as reading, again held such importance for 
how reading a self-help book unfolds, and the positioning work it instantiates, that it was 
drawn on largely and substantively in my reading. Finally, Adorno's (1994) analysis of 
an astrology column in a Los Angeles newspaper provided valuable insights into how 
certain ideologies operate across mass culture. This analysis was particularly relevant for 
the way in which it unpacked how notions of individualism were invoked, managed and 
endorsed as part of "the good life" for the reader of the self-help book. Understanding 
how this ideology pervaded the self-help book proved critical. 
Site two: a life-coaching workshop 
Something to emerge from the detailed reading of these self-help books was the 
appearance of an alternative site of self-help. There was a shift away from reading self-
help books as a method for doing self-help, but this was not a turn to self-help groups. 
One of the self-help book authors from my corpus does not just write self-help books; she 
hosts and "stars in" self-help workshops too. This is important: these workshops are a 
hybrid of self-help books and self-help groups. This author is recommending the readers 
of her self-help books to take out membership in a workshop with other people, other 
readers. Whether simply invoked, or strongly embraced, this looks like a meeting point of 
the individual and collective dimensions of self-help, that is, my main ethnographic sites 
of inquiry. What might this tell us about the relationship between individual and 
collective modes of self-help? What connections might be established, maintained, or 
even broken, when this site of self-help is enacted? I needed to attend one of these 
workshops, to see what happens. It is obviously a different context from reading; other 
people were present. What is the purpose of attendance? What role does the author 
perform in a group setting? And why are others present, the audience? A polite telephone 
conversation with the author and host, Fiona Harrold, secured a place at the workshop as 
a guest. There: a coach trip to London for the day; and I would get to meet Fiona Harrold 
too. 
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I sat at the front of the workshop, where I could see Fiona Harrold. [ entrusted my 
audio recorder45 to evidence the spoken interaction in the workshop, while I focused on 
making additional notes and speaking with other members of the audience. I just sat 
there, listening and recording. So: a workshop largely composed of spoken interaction, all 
conveniently recorded; later, it was all transcribed, ready for analysis46• Talk was 
important in the workshop; now, transcribed, it was important for analysis. It made things 
happen in the workshop, and everyone was doing it. I drew largely on conversation and 
discursive analytic techniques to engage the material. The theoretical underpinnings of 
these analytic approaches take seriously the importance of context as locally produced in 
talk47• This enabled me to get some purchase on how the patterns of interaction in the 
workshop were producing and sustaining this site of self-help. So much was considered; 
so much interested me from my earlier reading of the self-help books, especially Fiona 
Harrold's books. I examined the addressing functions of Fiona Harrold's talk, the way 
she engaged the audience. I looked at the ways in which "the reason for attendance" was 
variably formulated and dealt with. I examined other things, as well: those heavily 
featured moments when Fiona Harrold interacted with individual members of the 
audience. The character of the prescriptions produced and offered for satisfying these 
45 Fiona Harrold gave her consent for me to record the workshop (see appendix 2). 
46 I include a copy of the workshop transcript on a CD, which accompanies this thesis. I followed a basic 
version of leffersonian transcription conventions (see appendix 3). 
47 A few words are in order. Context is a highly problematic and contested term. It has been the topic of 
substantial, even colossal, debate among those using a range of analytic techniques for the analysis of 
discourse (e.g., Billig, 1999a, 1999b; Duranti & Goodwin, 1992; Hammersley, 2003; Griffin, 2007; 
Moerman, 1988; Lynch, 2002; Potter, 2002; Potter & Hepburn, 2007; Schegloff, 1997, 1998, 1999a, 
1999b; Speer, 2002; Stokoe & Smithson, 2002; Wetherell, 1998). (You will forgive my extensive use of 
citation here; it is deployed simply to point to the "substantiality" of the debate). There are two arguments. 
The first, largely coming from conversation analysts, is this: speakers produce the relevant context by their 
orientations in and as talk. Context is made "demonstrably relevant" and "consequential" as a function of 
talk. Anything not oriented or attended to by speakers is to be considered "irrelevant". The second, drawn 
mostly from critical discourse analysts, ethnographers, multi~methodologists, and some discursive 
psychologists, is this: that talk is always embedded within a "wider" argumentative context, which provides 
resources, both for speakers and analysts of speakers' talk. Analysts have to rely on extra-textual details to 
say anything; talk has to necessarily be analyzed as part of this. Additionally, especially for ethnographers, 
other things besides talk must be made to say something, through ethnographic description, that have a 
bearing on what is being said by speakers. I really do not want to engage the debate here. I will say this. 
The substantive material I have in front of me in the life-coaching workshop is talk. I take seriously, purely 
for pragmatic purposes, the idea that speakers help analysts to restrict and manage what "context" might 
mean. It removes so much of what might otherwise be explored by attending to (more) "extra-textual" 
material. Ifwe were to pursue such material to its logical limits. we would eventually lose the phenomenon 
and slip back into social theory. The "situatedness" would be lost. My current exploration, in this chapter, 
of method and practice might better account for my position on talk; it reflects, conveniently and quite by 
coincidence, the terms ofthis debate well. 
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reasons for attendance; I looked at that. And then there was the co-produced evaluative 
work of these prescriptions; that needed to be examined too. 
Site three: self-help groups 
Things were busy. I was completing the final phases of analytic work on the self-help 
books. I was still heavily involved in the analysis of the workshop too. And now, after 
several months of preliminary searching, I was still trying to enter the other main site of 
self-help: self-help groups. I had been struggling to establish a point of entry, a trace, 
anything. My earlier strategy of regularly searching notice boards in shops, hospitals, 
doctors' surgeries, and then later, contacting social services, had proved to be amazingly 
unsuccessful. Nothing had been revealed, not a single thing. I had self-help books piled 
all over my desk, some concealing other work I thought I had lost, others now supporting 
my elbow as I wrote on my laptop, but my diary was totally absent of appointments to 
visit with self-help groups. I had to do something differently or I my thesis would have 
no chapter on self-help groups. 
I recalled someone, perhaps a social worker, suggesting I contact my local 
community and voluntary services. I did not pay much attention at the time; I was sure 
something would turn up on one of those notice boards. I decided to contact them. "I'd 
like to find self-help groups in the area", I asked one volunteer, the chairman of a local 
volunteer bureau. "What do you mean by self-help groups?" he replied. "[ am not 
concerned about specific problems", I said, "I just want to meet self-help groups, to try to 
understand how they work". The chairman looked slightly puzzled, exhaling loudly, 
reaching down to the bottom draw of his desk, and retrieving a raggedy old directory. 
"There you go", he said, "look through that". The label on the front cover said, "local 
groups" but many of the groups listed did not specify what kind of group they were: 
"self-help group" or "support group". I contacted many groups by letter, maybe fifty or 
sixty, but received fewer than ten replies. Some groups had disbanded, they told me, and 
were unable to help; others simply felt that my presence would be inappropriate. 
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[ did receive invitations to meet with an arthritis group and a visual impairment 
group, however; both were based in the north of England. [ visited as regularly as my 
schedule would allow - usually once every meeting, or every second meeting. [ began 
just sitting quietly in meetings, not saying anything unless asked, although happily spoke 
to anybody who was brave enough to approach a stranger who kept scribbling things 
down and looking around everywhere48• Members came over to ask questions, mostly 
during tea break. We got talking. We drank tea and ate homemade biscuits brought in by 
one of the members. Eventually, after a few meetings, I elected to push the tea trolley and 
serve drinks - [ now wanted to meet the members. I joined in with group activities, 
played games and even went on trips. Before long, I could recall members' names, all of 
them. [ continued with my visits. [ continued to scribble down notes too, documenting 
whatever caught my attention. As well as receiving regular group newsletters, [ collected 
a large corpus of archived newsletters from each group. After a while, after seeing the 
same patterns of activity and interaction beginning to be repeated during meetings and 
across meetings, [ had new questions to ask. [ wanted to know about other things that 
were not told during meetings, at least not to me. [ arranged to talk with each group 
during meeting time, rather than speak with individual members outside of meetings. [ 
wanted to preserve, and engage, the main quality of this site of self-help: the co-presence 
of members, the "groupness". [ wished to ask them about things that seemed to be 
disregarded during meetings - the purpose of group membership seemed to be missing, 
no mater how carefully I observed meeting activities (see appendix 5 for my basic 
interview schedule). [ got answers; members told me all sorts of things. [ began looking 
at the groups differently, reflecting on, and trying to consolidate, what they had told me. [ 
continued to observe, sometimes asking more questions; [ continued to document my 
findings in my tattered old notebook. And [ continued to join in. 
I was visiting two groups, each as friendly as the other; but still only two groups 
nonetheless. [ wanted to know if other groups were conducting themselves in this 
48 I ensured that all members of these groups read and signed a consent form, allowing me to visit, observe 
and record group meetings (see appendix 4). Consent forms would be issued to any further groups [ visited. 
I include all recorded material from these self· help groups, that is, interviews and naturally occurring 
meeting talk, on the accompanying CD. 
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fashion. Could I be identifying a substantive phenomenon here, I wondered, with my 
scribbles, observations and increasing fondness for homemade biscuits? I contacted the 
community and voluntary services in a county in the Midlands. Another directory oflocal 
groups was examined; another twenty or so letters were dispatched. An even less 
impressive response this time: only a single reply from an established Parkinson's disease 
group. I gladly accepted the invitation to visit their group. I began making notes in the 
corner of the meeting venue - my usual activity - but at least now I had something with 
which to compare my observations. Meetings were very busy, starting promptly and often 
running past the designated finish time. It was more challenging to make my presence 
felt, to get people interested in my work. I was determined to get involved. 
The Parkinson's group had a large tea trolley, with a mobile water boiler on top 
and separate shelves for cups, saucers, spoons, biscuits and even the raffle ticket box. 
Sally took care of vending refreshments. I became her apprentice; I was slow, but 
determined. Hold the cup at an angle, twist the release switch down hard and let go just 
before the water covers the tea bag: check, check and check. I was learning fast. Tea 
quenches thirst, but it has another endearing quality; it makes people talk to you. I left my 
field notes behind and engaged as many people as I could on my rounds. One member 
seemed interested in my research: "I go to another group too, just around the corner from 
here", he said. He comes to this group because ofthe muscle rigidity and tremor from his 
Parkinson's illness, and goes to a lymphoma group because of problems in his lymphatic 
system. He offered to take me to the next lymphoma group meeting. I followed. And so I 
began visiting another, fourth group. This meant more tea. And more names to remember 
too. It was after a few visits to the lymphoma group that I began speaking with an 
occupational therapist. Being attached to the hospital, of which the venue for these 
meetings, a day care center, is a part, she attends most meetings and provides treatment 
advice and information about services. "There are support groups listed in a newsletter 
given out by local voluntary services", she told me. "Over there", she said, pointing to a 
display of leaflets hung above a workstation for the staff of the day care center during the 
day. I grabbed a copy of the newsletter. I contacted the chairperson of a stroke group, 
which met locally. Good: another group to visit. 
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My visits to each group represented a different phase of fieldwork activity. Some 
visits were in the early stages, where detailed observations and notes were still being 
made; others were coming to an end, with little left to document. [ felt [ had attained a 
level of familiarity with the first two groups, the arthritis group and the visual impairment 
group. [ had collected an abundance of fieldwork material, followed up specific analytic 
phenomena of interest with questions, discussion and further observation. [ was 
beginning to reach, if I had not already reached, a point of diminishing retums; my visits 
were no longer adding anything to what [ already knew about the activities of the groups. 
I was achieving saturation, as the grounded theorists would say (e.g., Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). So I parted company with my northem friends, to focus on the remaining groups. 
The knowledge I had generated from conducting fieldwork with these first two groups 
became a template, to be used and modified where necessary, for the fieldwork ahead. 
I had been with the Parkinson's group, the lymphoma group and the stroke group 
for a while, and begun to see a familiar pattem emerging, during meetings and across 
meetings. A similar structure, a similar method of organization and similar activities: all 
present and there to be documented. Like before, I arranged for discussion during group 
meetings, to talk about membership. Group meetings are a valuable time for members; I 
had to fit in where I could, sometimes booking space months in advance just to address 
them in the group setting. [ adapted my fieldwork to the situations that came to hand. 
Sometimes I spoke with members as we washed teacups together at the end of meetings. 
And sometimes I simply greeted members as they arrived at meetings. Standing at the 
entrance to the venue of a meeting is a rich site for hearing people talk. They tell of all 
sorts of things, all relevant. Arranging chairs at the beginning of meetings is another site: 
members always talk when they sit together. I learnt a lot, just being around and fitting 
in. Still, although I heard different stories, and in different places, [ began to see the same 
function being performed. Activities were getting repeated. Meetings were being 
reenacted each time, so it seemed. It was time for me to say farewell to these last groups, 
one by one, as I had done with the first two groups. 
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Now I had even more on my desk, scattered about: transcripts of meetings and 
focused discussions, newsletters, field notes, pictures, quickly scribbled anecdotes, 
leaflets. It all had to be analyzed. I would draw on the activity of remembering my visits, 
bringing them back to visibility and uncovering the details of the things that did not get 
jotted down or recorded. Recollecting the phenomenon from my firsthand experience in 
the field became a "primordial" resource, felt so deeply but quickly forgotten unless 
effort was made to retrieve it from memory. Just because it was not written down, and 
inscribed, did not mean that detailed features of the meetings were irretrievable. This 
acted as a first source of analysis, being substantiated by, and in turn substantiating, field 
notes written in situ. Then the corpus of newsletters; they required a close, detailed 
reading. I would draw once again on conversation analytic techniques, as and when 
required, to look at the transcripts, some of meetings as they naturally unfolded, others of 
organized discussion between members and l. 
I looked at what could be identified as contributing to the organization of group 
meetings. There were situated instances of activity, within and across meetings, and 
across groups, but what was being performed that was of thematic importance? These 
groups had a purpose, which the literature had described already: the common problem. 
How did arthritic joints become the relevant thing in an arthritis group? What about 
bodily tremors in a Parkinson's disease group, or poor speech in a stroke group? What 
was the function of illness and disease, for the practical instantiation of a meeting? I 
looked at how, and when, these features were performed. Contexts were being produced; 
all done by talk, text and activity. So much became interesting: how membership was 
invoked; what it entailed; what was shared in membership; how, and if, connections were 
made with self-help books and their relationship. My visits were the occasions of group 
meetings. A temporal order unfolded in front of me, every time: from receiving members 
at the start, when jackets were hung up, to bidding them farewell, when jackets were 
returned at the end. I borrowed this temporal order as a strategy for analysis, arranging 
my analytic work around the performance of a group meeting, just as I had followed the 
self-help book through its reading, from start to finish. I saw patterns across my visits; 
but a particular pattern was emerging in my analytic work. By juxtaposing occasions in 
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meetings, and across groups, into a single, unfolding narrative, [ was able to tell about 
this pattern, to reveal its performative functions. 
Five groups, each one with a different common problem: arthritis, lymphoma, 
visual impairment, Parkinson's disease and stroke. They did share one thing - the reason 
for membership in each group has its origins in the body. There were many problems: 
involuntary shaking, immobile limbs, blood transfusions and regular physical exhaustion, 
joints that will not move freely, trouble formulating speech and residual vision. [ have 
already discussed in the introductory chapter the ways in which self-help groups can be 
seen as dealing with de-politicized problems. These groups are a case in point. The 
common problem is not available outside of the medical context in which it is handled by 
doctors and professionals. Long-term illness and disease has been located in the body, 
having physiological origins. It is medicalized. More: it is not available outside of the 
body, the individual. This "collective" self-help is in the service of individual problems, 
not social and especially not political ones, and should not be seen as such (Archibald, 
2008; Duyvendak, I 995at9, as [ have discussed too. The only reason why these members 
are together is to deal with their individual problems: poor vision or weak and trembling 
limbs. And more: no amount of "membership" in these groups will make these common 
problems go away. Membership in these groups, then, differed from membership in other 
groups, where the reason for membership is the increasing "removal" of the common 
problem, to the point where membership in the group is terminated'o. Members must 
move on from the groupS I. 
49 These self-help groups are depoliticized to the extent that they operate in contrast e.g., to the old trade 
union mutual aid groups of the 19i1i century, which emerged exclusively to deal with political issues. These 
self-help groups, then, meet for another purpose: it is identity focused, based around identity formation 
(Duyvendak, 1995b). As such, it might be more appropriate to say they are part of an "identity movement" 
as against a political movement (Duyvendak & Nederland, 2007). 
50 What I am referring to is the classic pattern of membership to non-membership as part of the process of 
attendance in a self-help group. Alcoholics Anonymous is prototypical: the reason for membership is 
increasing abstinence from alcohol, to the point where drinking is controlled, at which point attendance has 
served its purpose and members are encouraged to leave. Leaving is important; it displays the success of 
group attendance. Gamblers Anonymous is another case in point; there are plenty of others. 
51 This must be at least be pointed out, simply because of the physical character of the common problem in 
my selected groups; ,it will shape what I will come to find in the groups, which may be different in other 
groups. 
66 
I have told my story. It is a reconstruction of my research activity in the frame of 
ethnography. I have managed to complete the methods chapter, giving a sense of the 
situated character of the emergence and development of my research, without it falling to 
pieces or slipping back into disembodied method discourse. We should move on now, 
and proceed to the analysis. But: one final comment. There will be no intermission 
between analytic chapters, no accompanying narrative, and no further introductions. One 
analytic chapter will blend seamlessly into the other: from self-help books, to the life-
coaching workshop, to self-help groups. This is deliberate. It is a device to allow you, my 
reader, to experience the phenomenon as a whole, and to see the relationships being 
pointed to, and engaged, as a thematic and integral part of the analysis. You can develop 
a sense of self-help from the first chapter, and retain it, carry it along with you as you 
proceed, without losing the rhythm. Maybe you can think of it as one long journey 
through self-help, passing different sites as you go along. We had better start, then. 
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Chapter 3 
Self-help books and the activity of reading 
3.1 Introduction 
Self-help books are a rare treat for the ethnographer. They provide an abundance of 
material, all readily available. They are inexpensive. And you can fit them neatly inside 
your pocket, away from prying eyes. But even here, before a single page has been 
opened, we have confronted the very qualities that form their critique, which [ have 
discussed at length in the introduction (e.g., Peele, 1995; Salerno, 2005; Tiede, 2001). [t 
is simple: self-help books are fraudulent. They are bogus. Something is promised, but not 
delivered. [n short, then, self-help books are "inauthentic". This does not relieve us of the 
duty of asking how this is so. [f self-help books do represent the excesses of capitalism, 
as many suggest, and articulate all that is wrong with the world, then why do they attract 
such an immense readership? Why are they so extraordinarily popular? How, exactly, 
does this whole publishing phenomenon manage to hold together? This is where it gets 
cloudy. The critique, so quick to speak, now falls silent; it does not provide any 
substantive detail of this inauthenticity. The self-help book, as a publishing phenomenon 
and as a textual form, simply gets crystallised. [t just is. [t becomes an object where all 
signs of its performance disappear. So we are deprived of seeing how the self-help book 
manages to do what it is. This is unfortunate. However, we do know this: the self-help 
book makes arguments and proffers certain versions as part of its task. It is, then, a site of 
rhetoric. [t makes assumptions; it engages different actors; it deals with locations and 
origins, causes and effects. What is the function of such arguments? And what is their 
import for readers? 
This chapter takes up and develops earlier work that began to unpack the self-help 
book as a performative context of textual practice (Cherry, 2008b). My analytical task 
here is to approach the self-help book as functional, which is to say, through its activity 
of production. This requires shifting our considerations of the self-help book as an object, 
which is located in the bookshop, to the process in which it is demonstrated, which is 
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located in its readings2. Following Barthes (1977: 157), who proposes this move as one 
from "work" to "Text", this respecifies the self-help book as constituted through an 
operation that "only exists in the movement of a discourse". Activity is involved. This 
activity is what needs to be described. The preferred strategy is to "slow down" the 
activity of reading so as to make visible those movements of the discourse of self-help 
books, bringing them to analytic attention (Fish, 1972: 389 original italics). Put simply, 
this means specifying those methods by which a self-help book is instantiated as part of 
its normative - recognisable, showable, reportable - practice. One must, as a result, 
elucidate the processes undertaken and the constitutive work performed along the course 
of its movement. This involves tracing the textual strategies used for the inscription of a 
readership, how this inscribed readership contributes to its readability and the process 
undertaken to "transform" a readership through the process of reading (cf. Suleiman, 
1980: (2). This means, put plainly, identifying those features through which a genre is 
produced. So: does each self-help book, as a particular instance, conform to a general 
model? And, if identified, what does this model consist in? These questions require to be 
answered in an empirically sensitive and expansive manner. Such is the task of this 
chapter. 
3.2 The peritext 
Jackson (1998) suggests that we have become habituated in our reading practices. We 
focus on certain textual conventions assumed to comprise "the work", while brushing 
over, not endowing with any particular significance, those various productions thought to 
be "external" to it. He calls these external productions "invisible forms" - those "minor 
elements and dressings which help serve up the principle content of a book to its 
readership" (p. xv). Although these productions may not contribute to the work as a 
whole, they certainly guide reading behaviour and arrange reading experience. They 
make that work available; literally, they render it present. Thus, these paratextual 
elements not only provide a transition to the work, but a transaction, that is, "a privileged 
place of a pragmatics and a strategy, of an influence on the public, an influence that is 
" Fish (1972: 386 original italics) makes a similar case in his seminal article Literature in the Reader, 
conceiving the meaning of a text "no longer as an object, a thing-in-itself, but an event, something that 
happens to, and with the participation of, the reader". 
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[ ... ] at the service of a better reception of the text and a more pertinent reading of it" 
(Genette, 1997: 2). 
Although the contexts in which a self-help book will be selected for consideration 
may vary from reader to reader, empirically they share that first critical point at which it 
is made available, or "received". The bookshop is a good example; that is where we find 
people browsing self-help books on the bookshelves. They pick them up, and engage the 
"blurb" scattered across the outer dust jacket. This is part of the dressing of the text to 
which Genette gives the name the ''publisher's peritext" (p. 16 original italics) - the 
responsibility of the publisher to advertise that the text is published and "on offer" to the 
public. Already we have available a rich site of textual practice. We can consider how 
these features "serve" the self-help book. Thus, we can inquire, at this peritextual level, 
how a self-help book relates to other self-help books - whether it is constituted by 
recognisable "codes" which might indicate membership in a "genre". By genre I mean: 
... a class of communicative events, the members of which share some set of 
communicative purposes. These purposes are recognised by the expert members 
of the discourse community, and thereby constitute the rationale for the genre. 
This rationale shapes the schematic structure of the discourse and constrains 
choice of content and style. Communicative purpose is both a privileged criterion 
and one that operates to keep the scope of a genre as here conceived focused on 
comparable rhetorical action. In addition to purpose, exemplars of a genre exhibit 
various patterns of similarity in terms of structure, style, content and intended 
audience (Swales, 1990: 58). 
I had better show the peritextual productions on a range of examples from my corpus of 
self-help books53 : 
53 Although not part of my original selection of self·help books, [ will be analyzing a number of titles from 
the author Fiona Harrold. She is a professional life coach, and a life coach book author, but given that her 
books are located in the same sections in the bookshops as are self·help books, and given that the covers of 
her books display a striking resemblance to the other self·help books in my selection, at the peritextual 
level, [ will include them for further analysis. Her membership to a possible genre of self·help books is 
strongly invoked, seen here as she comments on the remarkable influence of her father. ~'My father was in 
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Swales' defi ni tion of genre can be app lied at the leve l of pe ritextua I deta il of the se lf- help 
book, as we can po int to a "schematic structure" and develop ana lys is of the "comparab le 
rhetorical action" of the features presented. Comparison of the different front covers is 
poss ib le due to the highl y generic style of each examp le. Important ly, however, ·'generic" 
does not mean each examp le is identica l. Rather, they exh ibit an overa ll similarity; they 
share a fam il y resemb lance (cl'. Wittgenste in, 1953). There is an adornment of textual 
materia l, lav ishl y arranged across each ri·ont cover; the bu lk of thi s space is occupied by 
text. We see the co ncurrence of standard and itali cised type face . There is lower and upper 
his element and he became fascinated by the psychology of selling and ofhurnan potent ial and success. He 
began reading everything he could fi nd about th ese subj ects and attended Dale Carnegie workshops. Dal e 
was trained by Norman Vincent Peate, the founding father of A merican 'can-do' phi losophy whose book 
The POlller of Positive Thinking has sold over thirty mil lion copies. He believed that anyone can be 
anything, regardless of circumstance. From the age of eleven onward s, I was introduced to earl y self· 
improvement pioneers sllch as Napoleon Hill , Clement Ston e and tit les like Stop Wonying and Start 
Living, How To Win Friends and Inf luence People , and Grow Rich While YOII Sleep (Harrold, 2001: 2 
original italics) . This is a noticeable gesture to a distinctl y self-help book genre. 
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case, bold and non-bold type and protrudi ng, three-dimensional type design. On each 
cover the text incl udes conventional features, such as titl e, sub-title and author name, as 
we ll as detail s of previous work by the author. Then there are sa les fi gures, rev iews and 
vari ous statements of its purpose and aim . These deta il s, particul arl y the latter deta il s, are 
not a representation of the se lf-help book as a di screte part of the world . They have a 
rhetorica l purpose. Consider sales fi gures : 
"Over 3 Mill ion Copies In Pr in t,,;4 
"Over One Million Copies Sold!";; 
Th is is not a straight fo rward announcement of the vo lume of sales achieved by each se lf-
help book: a mere statement of fact. The inclusion of strong sales fi gures invokes a sense 
of publi shing achievement. Recognition. Hi gh vo lume of sales becomes a cri te ri on of 
success of the se lf- help book, whi ch neatly forms a se lt~exemplify in g, recursive 
mechanism fo r its own justifi cation. The se lf-help book is of va lue because millions of 
copies have been purchased; millions of co pies have been purchased because the se lf-
help book is of va lue. Sales status is also fo rmulated as part of other, related modes of 
success whose rhetorical effect rema ins unchanged. Popul arity as mass appeal is the 
measure of eva luati on: 
"The Internati onal Bestse ll er,,;6 
Identi fy ing the internati onal success of a self-help book attributes to it a kind of 
transcendence fro m the boundaries of pl ace. It has a uni versal app lication. Its 
international appeal demonstrates that it continues to apply despi te the diffe rent (cultural) 
contexts of its appli cation. It retains its appl icabi lity, its demand. Furthermore, a measure 
of thi s success is " rank" in a competitive marketplace with other se lf-help books. That 
thi s sel f-help book "outsel ls" compet ing sel f-h elp books upgrades its status, as a 
S4 From Peale (1952) The power of Positive Thinking. 
" From MeOraw ( 1999) Life Mallers. 
" From Carlson ( 1997) Don 'I Sweal The SlIIall SI/ if.!. .. and /1 's All SlIIall SI/rf! 
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compet itor; its popu larity derives fl"Om a "discerning" readership. It is selected in 
preference to other self-help books. Here, bestseller is a quali ty conferred upon the self-
help book as a result of its market performance; it is not a feature an author or publisher 
can attribute to it in lieu of that performance. Membership in the category "bestseller" 
thus represents an impart ial criteri on of success. And its status, not be ing attached to 
anything specific , has an inherent value. Thus, the category "bestsell er" is beautifu ll y 
vague; it onl y needs to convey that it is success ful , not the circumstances under which it 
attained that success. A bestsell er of what, we might ask? Se l f~he l p books in general, 
perhaps? We wi ll not get an answer, as that does not matter. It is a bestsell er: that is 
enough. And look, the placement of "the" instead of "a" precedes the category bestsell er. 
The self-hel p book is not simply a bestseller, but the bestsell er. That prefix, "the", assigns 
thi s self-help book a singu lar character, as in the best, on ly or most remarkable. The 
reader has no di scernable reason to search for other, alternat ive self-help books. They 
alread y have the "best". 
A newly published self-help book does not have at its disposal sales figures as an 
indication of its success. We do not know if it wi ll be successful. This is where we see a 
shift, beyond sales fi gures. Authorship is important: 
"Bestselling author of Be Your own Life Coach,,;7 
Although the self-help book on whi ch thi s inscription appears is not a bestsell er, the 
previous book published by its author is. That work was a bestsel ler. The logic is made 
plain for everyone to see: if the author has done it prev iously, then the author can do it 
again. This book, the one in your hand, will li ke ly become a bestseller. It is a safe bet, if 
reputation is anything to go by. The overa ll rhetorical action being performed remains the 
same: popu larity is an ind icat ion of quality. That is how we sort the wheat from the chaff. 
So, there are "good" self-help books, and there are "bad" se lf~ h e l p books. 
" From Harrold (2004) Reinvent YOllrself 
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The notion of genre provides a framework within wh ich any given piece of work 
can be understood; it brings individual instances into a co ll ecti vi ty. When books have 
rev iews inscribed on them, we see a genre being in voked. In specific areas of published 
writing - academic research being an obvious, if broad, cand idate - those who share a 
profess ional interest in a fi eld typical ly review the wo rk of their peers, and whose 
reviews appear on that work. Look on the back cover; a trace of acti vity is left for us to 
fo ll ow. We see names of reviewers, academ ic institutions, profess ional identi ties and 
disc iplines of study. This peritextual production says : thi s work is not se lf-sufficient. It is 
info rmed by, re li es on and fits within a who le field of practice. Co ll eagues, peers, 
institutions, the development of areas of discip linary inquiry, careers - so much activity 
is undertaken and coordinated in the production of a work. And that work is a 
contri but ion to this wider network, th is genre. 
I do not see rev iews on my corpus of se lf~h e l p books, no matter how ca refu ll y I 
look on their back covers. In fact , I do not reca ll see ing reviews on the other se lf-help 
books I browsed on the shelves, back at the bookshop. A pattern: an absence of peer 
reviews on self~help books. This does not mean that a se lf-help book gen re cannot be 
identified; clearl y the shared absence of rev iews is fu lfillin g one of the criter ia of genre 
membersh ip. But the rhetorical work Ihis kind of genre membership is carrying out is 
quite di fferent from our example of academ ic writin g. The absence of peer reviews 
means col leagues disappear. Other, related wo rk is not relevant. No fi eld of inqui ry is 
acknowledged as shap ing the production of the se lf-help book, or to which it is a 
contri bution, or to which it is indebted. We onl y see the beginn ings of a self~he l p book 
genre, at the level of peritext, when we look at many se lf-he lp books; it is onl y then that 
we see the connections it has with those other se lf-help books, e.g. , the shared absence of 
reviews. Let us return to the bookshop, and see how thi s has its effect. We not ice a shiny 
cover on one book, and decide to pick it up. All we see is a self-help book. We turn it 
over, exam ine the back, but just see a si ngle piece of work. It does not gesture to anything 
beyond itself. It makes no connect ion with the se lf-help books next to it, nor does it 
acknowledge any influence from the body of work in wh ich it is located in the bookshop 
and from which it has been se lected. Even although it shares peritextual features, each 
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self- help book does not draw on its co-ex istence with other se lf-help books as part of its 
own (e)va luation. 
Without these reviews, so helpfu l in telling us how we ll a work has dea lt with a 
topic or fits with a body of inquiry, we have no immediate, here-and-now, way of judging 
the va lue ofa self-help book agai nst other self-he lp books. We must rely on sa les fi gures, 
which tell us that the indi vidual self-help book appeals to a greater number of people than 
do other self-help books. The argument is a fa mi li ar one. We can read the pub li sher's 
peritext, substituted fo r reviews, which briefl y cites extracts from the main text. It points 
us to the " internal" va lue of the sel f-help book. So long as we do not look beyond, to the 
shelves where the other self-help books await our gaze, there are no other self- help 
books. There is one proffered course of act ion. Select th is book. Purchase it. Read it. Fo r 
practical purposes, there is no genre, just thi s self-help book. Thi s is perform ing crit ica l 
work for the instantiat ion of read ing, of which more short ly. 
Se lt~he lp book authors do not just write self-help books, locked away in their 
studies and onl y appeari ng in the text. They featu re on their book covers, where we see 
the person behind the text. They look like thi s: 
CHANGE 
YOUR LIFE 
IN 7 DAYS 
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Now we know what se lf-help book authors look like. But the presence of a visua l image 
alongside the text, in a space that comes at a prem ium, is not merel y for readers to get a 
glimpse at se lf-he lp book authors, however endearing they might be. Let us dea l first with 
Paul McKcnna, Anthony Robbins and Phil McG raw. Like the text on the front covers of 
these se lf-help books, the visual image of the authors is say ing something. When I look, 
my attention is first clmwn to the images; I "ead the tex t later. Why divert attention ri'om 
the text, to the face? Each of these three authors regularl y appears on television; we 
recognise their face , not th ei r identi ties as authors, or perhaps even their name. 
Recognition is immed iate - like when our attention is arrested as we rush by the author's 
book in the bookshop. So these authors, identi fiab le by their television appearances, 
broadcast internationally to millions of viewers, and whose recognition, at thi s visual 
level alone, by viewers, confirms a popular interest. A telev ision viewing public /allows 
these authors. Thus, these self-help books are being offered, on the basis of the popularity 
and public image of their authors, to a mass audience of viewers. A connecti on is being 
in voked. Or: presupposed. The same viewing audience that fo llows these authors on 
television is likely to follow their published work. We begin to understand how popularity 
is instantiated as an embedded feature of these self-help books, as seen earli er with the 
device of sa les figures. Popularity informs how they se ll , how they relate to their 
readership, and in so do ing, gives us an image of that readership. 
Let us not forget Gael Lindenfield and Fiona Harrold , the other two self-he lp 
book authors. They do not host television programmes: no guest appearances on Oprah, 
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no te levised semin ars. We would not recognise them if they wa lked past us in the street; 
we would not recogni se them, and be incl ined to stop, if we saw their image on the front 
cover of their se lf-help books. Their identities do not work like those of Paul McKenna, 
Anthony Robbins and Phil McGraw. They do not have the public image. Nevertheless, 
th ey may be hidden away on the back covers of their books, but they are still smiling. All 
of the authors are smiling. The functi on of thi s endearing fac ial gesture is apparent the 
very second we see it; it happens immediately. Will these self-help books cause us to 
smile too? Will reading be fun ? We do not know, but it does say somethin g about the 
topic of the books, the way one approaches it. These authors are motivated, pass ionate 
about their craft ; you should be too. You may have problems, but that is no need to be 
glum . They are app roaching the topic posiliveiy. Thi s proffered approach to the self-help 
book is crucial for what happens later, when we unpack the acti vity of read ing. It is plain 
to see: were thi s same gesture to be conveyed in textual fo rm, it would not perfo rm the 
same function. For one thing, it would take too long to read , and likely be disregarded or 
overl ooked. It might even be treated as being too pompous, making unnecessaril y stri ct 
demands on readers. Strange ly, then, the visual image is ni ce ly ambi guous: it is 
suffi cientl y suggesti ve, without saying too much. It is just a smile, after a ll. 
The peritextual productions considered here are not excl usive to self-he lp books; 
a genre is not de fin ed in isolation of other genres. Other publi shing fi e lds share 
peritextual producti ons. Thus, in developing analysis of a sel f-help book genre, it is 
fruitful to consider how it might relate to, and contrast with , other genres. Consider the 
"mass-market" nove l: 
IAN I 1111 ~lEEL , 
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We see the heavy use of text across the front covers: the bright, protruding use of 
type face des ign and the familiar textual dev ices - "# I Bestse ller", "# I New York Times 
Bestse lling Author". Novels, we know, represent a hugely populat' genre of writing, with 
large numbers of copies so ld; they are sold in paperback, an inexpensive processing 
method for the high levels of product ion. They are recognised fo r being widely ava ilab le, 
perhaps more than any other genre, They are sold in airports, train stations, supermarkets 
and conve nience stores. Nove ls are appeal ing to a simil ar demographic as are se lf-help 
books: critica ll y, readers who want a text that is inexpensive and easi ly attained. Such is a 
pop ular readershi p. We see a commonality when we consider other genres of writing too. 
Some recent examples of the autobiograph y: 
Look at the person whose autob iography the book featlil'es. They are depicted, with the 
depiction occupying most of the space on the cover. The kind of image of each person 
here corresponds with the kind of "personality" fo r which they have become known or 
recognised. We recognise their faces, but also what they are recognised fo r in the 
express iveness of their image. Ri chard Hammond, shown in deep, re fl ecti ve thought, 
famously survived a high-speed motoring accident ; Sharon Osbourne, always spirited and 
fl amboyant, is renowned fo r appearing with her Pomeranian dog on "The Osbournes" and 
"The Sharon Osbourne Show"; and Jordan is fa mously known for "baring all" with her 
glamour modelling. The identity of these personalities - that feature by which they are 
most read il y (co mmonly, typica ll y) identified - is entrusted to their image, which 
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distinguishes them through a mode of visua l recogn ition. Here, the function of the image 
operates accord ing to the wider context in which they are known: the popular media. 
Each personal ity is reflect ive of the aud ience to which they are add ressing their 
autobiography. You wil l have seen Sharon Osborne on television, of course. Richard 
Hammo nd will be there too, but he will also have appea red in the Sunday supplement of 
your newspaper. And Jordan, we ll she will have appeared in any number of places. Thus 
they need no formal introduction ; thei r face wil l suffi ce. So each autobiography does not 
have to be searched for, located by readers in the same way as those books whose authors 
are not inscribed at the level of their image. Each title can be identified qui ck ly and with 
ease, almost in pass ing. Maybe you notice it in the supe rmarket, when paying fo r yo ur 
groceries; or perhaps at the airport, when you are rushing by the convenience area to 
catch your 8.30 morn ing flight. 
Finall y, let us consider the peritext on the front covers of another genre of writ in g. 
Selected at random, here is a group of unrelated "academic" texts on astro-had ron 
physics, phi losophy of science and hi story of psychology: 
We do not see any images of the authors. These authors are not known for appearing on 
te lev ision, or featu ring in your morning newspaper. Their faces are not important; they 
will be recognised as profess ional writers, with all of the recognit ion devices there in (see 
below). As compared with my se lect ion of se lf-help books and other books examined, 
these books are sparse ly decorated with peritextual product ions. They on ly present a tit le, 
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subtitle, author name and, with When Species Meet, a picture. The author of this latter 
book, Donna Haraway, was awarded the 1. D. Bemal Prize, a lifetime achievement award 
for her professional- that is, published - work and contribution to a genre. But that is not 
lavishly displayed across the front cover, where it would surely promote the value of her 
book. We have to venture to the back cover to find this information, and only the more 
interested browsers will do that. Each book is certainly invoking a message through its 
peritext, but I simply want to point to that fact that what it is invoking is quite different 
from that of self-help books. These academic books are not trying to "sell" themselves; 
they are not pointing to their value, above that of other books in their genre, in the 
peritext they use. We just get the essentials on the front cover. That is all. 
There is no "glitzy" typeface design. There is no mention of the sales success of 
each book, or author; and there are no appraisals on the front cover for the purposes of 
promotion. There are no other features that indicate what genre to which each book 
belongs. Together, they might be considered generic in the sense that they do not feature 
the peritextual productions present on self-help books, novels and autobiographies. Each 
book here does not offer itself in the same way as does a self-help book. The style of 
peritext that organises an academic book and a self-help book differs in terms of who is 
being addressed. Each style will include and exclude certain readers. The readership of 
one of these academic books would need to have some reason for browsing the sections 
in which they are located. Readers may well have specialist knowledge of the field: 
doctors, students, researchers etc. They will at least have an established interest in the 
area or topic, and may even know the author specifically from the literature and choose a 
book on that basis. Interest in the topic drives the job of book selection; the various 
"persuasion" devices are not called for, or not quite so explicitly. At least one of these 
titles, On Psychological Language, is only available in hardback; at any rate, it is no 
longer in print (in demand). The other two, although available in paperback, are more 
than double the cost of an average self-help book. These books do not sell large numbers 
of copies; they do not appeal to a popular (mass) readership. 
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By underscoring some of the peritextual productions across a selection of self-
help books, considering their situated presence and absence across a range of genres, I 
have begun to develop analysis of those defining features of a self-help book genre. What 
has been revealed is the highly generic use of peritextual devices that indicate certain 
genre markers with which each self-help book is inscribed. There is a "comparable 
rhetorical action" performed by each self-help book by its displayed use of a shared set of 
genre-defining practices. Two themes are noticeably transparent. The notion of popularity 
is a heavily relied upon value of a self-help book; more copies sold means more value. 
But the idea of genre membership is performed in a remarkable way. That every self-help 
book is a bestseller and/or the work of a bestselling author, and yet the only book that 
should be selected is the one you have in your hand, is a paradox that is never seen by our 
uninitiated browser. The self-help book treats itself as definitive of genre, as the genre 
itself, and entirely self-sufficient. It is the best at what it does, and the only single book of 
any substantive value. The rhetorical work being carried out is part of the development of 
a larger rhetoric of the self-help book. It is all about getting the activity of reading 
underway. As a purely pragmatic device, it has eliminated the competition, and in so 
doing, gained the attention of our browser. This is the best possible start for reading to 
begin. 
3.3 Crossing the threshold 
The rhetorical action performed through peritextual productions, which emphasises the 
individual value of the self-help book, is now clear. It works to summon a reader to cross 
the threshold of the text: to progress from the peritext into the Text (Genette, 1997). This 
is part of what I shall provisionally call "hooking the reader"s8. Different things happen 
when we get inside. Self-help books typically open with a narrative variably formulated 
around research findings, personal experiences, theories, vignettes and so forth. There is a 
common aim: the identification of "problems" which are located out in the world, 
existing independently of their formulation by a self-help book and its author. For 
example: 
58 Here [take up, develop and extend Simonds (1992) important analysis of the range of devices that self-
help books authors use to invoke reading. 
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Study after study shows record levels of dissatisfaction with modern life. Young 
people, in particular, enjoying the highest living standards since records began, 
are often deeply miserable during the proverbial 'best years of their lives'. Two-
thirds of Britons aged between 18 and 35 feel depressed or unhappy, according to 
a major survey carried out a few years ago by analysts Publicis.59 
This author, Harrold, points to an external and identified matter of concern, of endemic 
proportions - the declining psychological health of the British public. What makes this a 
problem, a reportable matter, is that it should be considered relevant to readers; however 
much it might appear not to apply to them. If young people, those "enjoying the highest 
living standards since records began", are experiencing problems with psychological 
well-being, then all those others who do not have at their disposal the best opportunities 
for living in modern life should be concerned. This problem is deliberately not imposed 
on readers, in any specific way. But complicit in its presentation is the suggestion that 
"modern life" - whose most prosperous demographic is depressed and unhappy - might 
effect, or be effecting, them too. It is this potential problem (of becoming a problem, or a 
latent problem) that is being underscored. Consider: 
Life is difficult. This is one truth, one of the greatest truths. It is a great truth 
because once we truly see this truth, we transcend it. [oo.] Most of us do not fully 
see this truth that life is difficult. Instead, they moan more or less incessantly, 
noisily, or subtly, about the enormity of their problems, their burdens, and their 
difficulties as if life were generally easy, as if life should be easy. [oo.] Do we 
want to moan about them or solve them?6o 
This author, Peck, formulates an account that "life is difficult", which is "one of the 
greatest truths". It applies irrespective of situation or circumstance. It is a natural 
condition of life that people continually fail to appreciate because they expect that this 
" From Harrold (2005b: 9) The 7 Rules of Success. 
60 From Peck (2006: 3) The Road Less Travelled 
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condition should not apply to them. The response to this kind of life is resistance - a 
pattern of moaning about problems. Peck makes use of various extreme case formulations 
to substantiate these claims: "greatest", "truly", "fully", "most" and "incessantly". These 
markers of extremity strengthen the claim that this is a matter of fact; life is difficult, 
people do moan about their problems (cf. Pomerantz, 1986; Edwards, 2000). With Peck, 
as with Harrold, we have, on the one hand, the acceptance of the stated character and 
prior existence of the world61 , and on the other, those upon whom this world exerts its 
difficulties. This categorization assembles a fixed point of location: the real world out 
there, which is problematic. Two things are critical. The world; that is the first. And 
people; that is the second. Although separate, and separated, they relate in specific ways. 
This narrative is not so much characterizing as informing the reader. S/he has not 
been addressed specifically. So when Peck refers to "us" - "Most of us do not fully see 
this truth that life is difficult" - he is not referring to his readers, but to a generic 
population whose moaning strategies conceal the truth; that life is difficult. This is made 
especially clear when reference to this population is modified, now referred to as "they". 
Thus, "they" (that is, most people) are located beyond the self-help book, those who will 
continue to be presented with problems and, failing to see them as an inherent part of life, 
continue to moan about them. Peck's subsequent question, "Do we want to moan about 
them or solve them?" is not incidental. The category of reference has once again shifted, 
moving from "us", then "they", to "we". The question is directed to a different 
population. Another self-help book author deploys this pronoun shift: 
They go struggling, perhaps even whining, through their days with a sense of dull 
resentment at what they consider the "bad breaks" life has given them. In a sense 
there may be such as thing as "bad breaks" in this life, but there is also a spirit and 
method by which we can control and even determine those breaks.62 
61 We might see this as a "social fact", a Durkheimian term, coined to describe phenomena that have an 
existence in and of themselves and are not contingent on the actions of individuals. 
62 From Peale (1952: ix) The Power of Positive Thinking. 
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Here, Peale's use of the plural pronoun "they", like Peck, is pointing to a category of 
people "out-there" in the world against which a more specific, "we" category is being 
prioritized. This "we" category is being invoked as part of a collection of people wishing 
to pursue that quest to "solve" its problems. This is a group who wants to "control" and 
"determine" the "bad breaks". The pronoun shift is restricting the applicability of this 
self-help book, to those occupying the "we" category. 
Barthes' (1974) textual analytic work has drawn attention to the use of 
"connotation" as a strategy with which the meanings of texts are determined. This is a 
resource, invoked by the text and deployed by readers, to correlate parts of text into an 
orderly narrative. Tt is articulated by a hermeneutic code, or "a sequential space, a series 
of orders, a space subject to the successivity of sentences, in which meaning proliferates 
by layering" (p. 8). Because Barthes' remarks point to the way in which reading is 
regulated by specific networks of signification in a short story - he analyzed Sarrasine-
and do not intend a system of classification as such, they need to be adapted so as to 
bring out the specific character of this regulation in self-help books. Thus, self-help 
books, through their sequential path thus far, have invoked readers' use of connotation 
insomuch as they have created an enigma. They have raised questions: Where is the text 
leading? How does the narrative relate to me? What is the character of this "we"? This 
code is driven by expectation, which "becomes the basic condition for truth: truth, these 
narratives [self-help books] tell us, is what is at the end of expectation" (p. 76 original 
italics). So: the hermeneutic narrative maintains reading, upon the completion of which 
readers expect to reveal the enigma. Answers will be uncovered. Importantly, at this 
point, things proceed so as to establish the subject and predicate of reading. 
One of the problems faced by self-help book authors is the specificity with which 
they communicate to a readership. They need to establish that they possess knowledge 
and are knowledgeable about the claims that they make, to the satisfaction of all of their 
readers. They are required to formulate claims which are general enough to appeal to 
millions of readers and yet specific enough to appeal to the individual reader. Self-help 
book authors obviously do not know their readers personally. They are unable to 
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distinguish one reader from another. And they are clearly absent from readers in the 
context of reading. Thus: self-help book authors need to manage (compensate for?) this 
absence created by reading, and invoke a sense of presence. One way to do this is through 
forms of address. Consider: 
[Y]ou face challenges and problems each and every day. You [ ... ] may feel that 
what is happening to you simply is not fair. If a problem is important to you, then 
that's enough; that qualifies it as worthy. It's important, because you are 
important.63 
Analytically, this is an especially important extract, arising at a critical juncture in the 
narrative of the self-help book. I want to set aside some time to develop analysis. The 
general, third person plural form has now disappeared; but so has the first person plural 
form "we". Substituted is a singular form, a specific individual: "you". The recipient of 
this form of address is an "I". This pronoun shift introduces the self-help book as a form 
of engagement with an individual reader, as against categories of people to which a single 
reader belongs. McGraw, the author of this last extract, may be addressing an individual 
reader, but he is also beginning to address individual problems. This is how the self-help 
book works: varying the levels of specificity of its argument. The general and the specific 
enjoin, almost without notice. First, there is a reiteration of the general state of the world, 
here normatively experienced by everyone (readers included): "you face challenges and 
problems each and everyday". Well, no one can argue with this; we all face problems. 
Not very specific, certainly; but then look: "if a problem is important to you, then that's 
enough". This is far more specific; there is now a possible, candidate single problem. 
Readers have to decide here - whether a problem is deemed as important to them. This is 
part of the fulfillment of the "if' clause. But McGraw has presupposed this decision: ''It's 
important because you are important". Readers have decided, as far as McGraw is 
concerned, that there is a problem. The problem is now an entity: it is an "it". 
63 From McGraw (1999: 11-12) Life Strategies. 
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A lot has happened in this extract. McGraw has introduced presuppositional 
content; he has not simply stated things "as they are". How has the existence of a 
problem been constituted, now identified as an "it", all in the space of a paragraph? 
McGraw does not know his readers, not personally: how does he know that they consider 
a particular problem, isolatable as a "problem", to be important? This is part of reading's 
work. Readers want to make sense of the text, to bring coherence to its narrative. [n so 
doing, they must follow the thread or pattern. They must find meaning. There is a 
"natural" sequence here: the instantiation of a problem occurs across consecutive 
sentences. As McHoul (1982: 71-75) has observed, a feature of such sentences that is 
available as a resource for readers is that, because one follows from the other, 
sequentially and temporally, they are accounted for in the text in the order of their 
happening64• This gives coherence to the work required to give shape to the narrative. As 
there is nothing causing an "interruption" to this order, each sentence, after the first, is 
explained by the prior sentence. Look at this last sentence again: "[t's important because 
you are important". Notice the conjunction "because". This word is bearing a lot of 
weight. It infers that the topic of McGraw's prior sentence was generated from the 
knowledge he has claimed of it in his subsequent sentence65. [t is assumed that, in 
following this order and doing what it requires, readers will have participated in this 
temporality so as to make sense of the text. They will have been able to select from a 
number of "problems", to identify a specific problem in their lives. This has an effect: 
although McGraw does not know the nature of the problem, he can identify its existence 
because it is there to be identified. A problem has arisen in and as reading. 
64 McHoul draws on the appearance of this same phenomenon in conversational interaction, and points to 
Sacks (1972: 331), who says "While it is quite clear that not any two consecutive sentences, not even any 
consecutive sentences that report occurrences, are heard, and properly heard, as reporting that the 
occurrences have occurred in the order in which the sentences have, if the occurrences ought to occur in 
that order, and if there is no information to the contrary (such as a phrase at the beginning of the second, 
like 'before that however') then the order of the sentences indicates the order of the occurrences. [ ... ] 
Hearing it that way, the second sentence is explained by the first; hearing them as consecutive or with the 
second preceding the first, some further explanation is needed, and none being present, we suppose that it is 
not needed". 
65 Wooffitt (2001) draws attention to the ways in which this same conjunction is embedded within 
sequences of interaction in meduimship sittings. Psychics make use of it to display that they have 
knowledge of a preexisting relationship between sitter and spirit. As talk between both sitter and psychic 
progresses, it is assumed that it is progressing on the grounds that the psychic's prior talk was generated by 
the powers of his knowing in his/her ongoing talk. The interaction develops because there is a spirit there, 
wishing to speak to this particular sitter about this particular concern (see especially pp. 355-7). 
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So we think semiotically. We make sense of any given phenomenon in terms of 
its relationship of similarity and contiguity to any other phenomenon (Eco, 1977; 1979; 
(992). Readers routinely accomplish the work of reading by drawing together different 
parts of material, sometimes completely unrelated, so as to render it coherent. They give 
an overall meaning to it (e.g., McHoul, (982). Readers apply this kind of method of 
reading by "treating an actual appearance as "the document of', as "pointing to", as 
"standing on behalf of' a presupposed underlying pattern" (Garfinkel, 1967: 78). 
Suppose, for a moment, that a reason for reading a self-help book is due to a lack of 
knowledge concerning the nature of some "problem", particularly how to solve it, then it 
must only be vaguely specifiable prior to undertaking the action that is intended to bring 
about its solution. [n other words, the character of that problem, and, for that matter, the 
reader, can be (re)constructed and modified according to the context in which they are 
formulated. The self-help book is, then, produced around the ongoing function of 
connotation, the work readers undertake in bringing sections of the text together, making 
determinations across its narrative. Connotation reaches across textual/extratextual 
relationalities, "where certain areas of the text [correlate] other meanings outside the 
material text and, with them, forming "nebulae" of signifieds" (Barthes, 1974: 8; see also 
McHoul, (982). 
Understanding the self-help book does not simply mean follow its unfolding 
narrative and accruing the sum of words so as to establish meaning. Rather, it is a 
function of levels of meaning. One level, say a word, is only meaningful in terms of its 
correlation with another level, say a sentence, which in turn is only meaningful in terms 
of another level of the narrative (e.g., the subject, a plot). Thus, readers move across the 
text, traversing it from one level to another (Barthes, 1977). [n addition, as readers 
ongoingly search for meaning, any current remark of the self-help book can alter the 
sense of prior remarks, so that reading is not just cumulative and prospective but 
reassembles current material retrospectively. 
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The self-help book, at this point in its narrative, requires the reader to search for 
those problems which, having been previously specified by the author as worthy of 
attention, are reportable. Problems are present and exist prior to reading; they are treated 
as if recited, pointed to and referred to by, not as, reading. By connotation, the reader is 
encouraged to self-identify whereby his/her extratextual life at once becomes a resource 
with which to understand the narrative of the self-help book. Self-diagnosis is required. 
Simply by the fact and manner of this self-identification, readers' problems become 
explicable in the same terms as those general problems and difficulties of life thus 
formulated in the self-help book. Those extratextual problems of the reader, perhaps 
selected on an individual basis, "stand on behalf of", and "point to", that general-pattern-
of-problems arising from the difficulty of life. The reader, reaching this point in the self-
help book, has revealed part of its enigma; by placing their extratextual, material world in 
the text, so that it provides a reflection, the reader has made it personal. S/he is the 
Reader. New questions obtain: How can I transcend the difficulty of life? How do I solve 
my problems? What are the methods by which I can control and even determine those 
breaks? 
3.4 Seducing the reader into reading 
A task for an author is to develop a rapport with a reader; like a relationship between 
happy lovers, certain strategies remain close to securing the covenant of trust. In short, 
the author must seduce the reader (Barthes, 1974; 1975; 1977; du Plessix Gray, 2003). 
According to literary traditions, the act of seduction of the text corresponds to the way in 
which its unity can be ongoingly reestablished by its indeterminate composition; the 
sliding of codes, which allow its reader even to write it anew and to break out from 
his/her subject position. The effect of this text creates bliss in the experience of reading 
(cf. Barthes, 1975).66 This kind of text develops, where reading "instinctively" unfolds, 
through stimulation created by uncertainty and novelty invoked by the work (if that is the 
right word, when bliss is involved) of reading. Here, seduction operates to suppress the 
identity of the reader as "the text imposes a state of loss, the text that 
66 This appeal to the seduction ofa text is found, too, in Barthes' (1974) "writerly text", Eco's (1979) "open 
text", Fish's (1972) "dialectical text", and Rosenblatt's (1938) "aesthetic text". 
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discomforts ... unsettles the reader's historical, cultural psychological assumptions, the 
consistency of his tastes, values, memories, brings to a crisis his relation with language" 
(Barthes, 1975: 14). Things are different for the self-help book. It seeks to delimit the 
configuration and range of the reader through a specific act of seduction. 
Adorno's (1994) analysis of an astrology column in the Los Angeles Times, first 
published in the 1950s, spelt out the motivations and underlying psychology to which the 
columnist appealed in his horoscopes. Adorno considered the attitude adopted by the 
column, like other popular psychological writings, to be one that seduced its readers. It 
drew on a wider, established ideology, firmly embedded in the cultural context in which 
the column was written. There are no surprises here: this is unadulterated individualism. 
Importantly, the mode of this seduction meant that the column was not articulated, so to 
speak, at a distance from readers, where certain kinds of work were required before an 
understanding was reached. Quite the contrary; it spoke directly to them, telling them 
what was already familiar. The fundamental point of entry, for the columnist, is reaching 
readers on their terms: For "[t]he columnist, even if he were equipped with a complete 
knowledge of Freud, cannot hope to change psychologically any of those to whom he 
speaks, he has to keep within the external zones of the personality. What really 
distinguishes "world-wise" institutions like the column from real psychology is not so 
much observations and possibly not even the columnist's underlying interpretations, but 
the direction in which he moves and manipulates his reader's psychology" (p. 53). 
Coincidently, it is clear that Freud himself had realized this in the psychoanalytic 
context, where he spent time with his patients. A doctor has no problem in "[m]aking him 
[the patient] a supporter of some particular theory [ ... ] but this only effects his 
intelligence, not his illness. After all, his conflicts will only be successfully solved and 
his resistances overcome if the anticipatory ideas he is given tally with what is real in 
him"(Freud, 1966: 562-3). The patient, like the reader of the astrology column, in 
overcoming his conflicts, needs to be "touched"; he needs to be "effected" in a way that 
is familiar to him before we say he has been "moved in his person". Part of how readers 
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are "moved in their person" is exactly this appeal to their "illness", or, to follow Adorno, 
"external zone of the personality". 
I return to how McGraw, in the last extract, plays on the separation established on 
the beginning of a self-help book. You remember: the world, on the one hand, and those 
upon whom it has its effects, on the other. The reader is situated in the "inevitable" 
position of facing those problems which life throws at them. It remains unclear where the 
agencies responsible for these problems are located, or even how they operate. Suffice it 
to say that readers have identified that problems exist for them. By identifying a particular 
problem, a favorable assessment of readers is thus given: "[t's important, because you are 
important". It gratifies the reader. What of the detail of this import of gratification? The 
reader is confronting their problems. This is what makes them important. They face their 
problems; not like other people, the non-readers. This sets the whole thing up. Problems 
need to be present to allow reading to proceed. But this logic is reversed. That the reader 
is important is a prerequisite for identifying problems. So: the reader is important, first 
and foremost. Then there are problems, which come later, after or because of the 
importance of the reader. (Would the reader still be important if slhe did not identity any 
problems, simply ignored them?). This works to seduce the reader, putting them into a 
state of bliss (however transient it might be): 
[ will think of you, speak to you and work alongside you with absolute faith in 
you and your abilities. [ will have high expectations for you and will want the 
very best for you. [ will believe in your phenomenal potential to do, have and be 
whatever you want. 67 
Like the readers of the astrology column, the readers of this self-help book receive the 
narcissistic gratification that they are important. They are special. There is no limitation 
imposed on the possibilities of their "phenomenal potential" and literally everything (the 
range within which readers interpret "have whatever you want" being limitless) is within 
reach. Eco's (1979) analysis of the ideology implicit in the construction of Superman, the 
67 From Harrold (200 I: 5) Be Your Own Life Coach. 
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comic book superhero, makes clear how its devoted readers are asked to identify with the 
character, or rather, that part of his changing identification. Superman is of course the 
superhero, whose superhuman powers are unlimited; but Superman also masquerades as 
the mild mannered reporter, Clark Kent, an identity enacted to conceal his "real" calling. 
Clark Kent, then, is invoked as the "average" reader of Superman. He is restrained by 
context and social circumstance, but whose "real" nature awaits presentation. Similarly, 
the self-help book anticipates another level of existence for readers, that something like 
perfection, that is, the height of potential, is achievable. In orienting to that achievement, 
readers represent those persons "who [are] capable of redeeming years of mediocre 
experience" (p. 108). 
By seducing readers in this manner, ostentatiously "flattering" them by catering to 
their ego identities, self-help book authors, like astrology columnists, are aware that 
"vanity is nourished by so powerful instinctual sources that he who plays up to it gets 
away with almost anything" (Adorno, 1994: 53). Self-help book authors are aware that 
appeals to narcissism are unlikely to be questioned by readers, being received with ease 
and gratitude. This mode of seduction, then, does not so much work towards bliss as 
pleasure; it is the text "that contents, fills, grants euphoria; the text that comes from 
culture and does not break with it, is linked to a comfortable practice of reading" 
(Barthes, 1975: 14 original italics). Paradoxically, this readership is being seduced into 
the very same ideology from which it is being addressed. It knows about individualism, 
about being unique. But then most things will be accepted without question, if they do 
not rock the boat. In meeting a readership at its "external zone of the personality", this 
seduction requires it to affirm, agree, endorse. In short: to follow. And it will. 
Investing readers with "phenomenal potential", some largely unspecified quality 
to undertake actions ("to do, have and be"), which is currently concealed and not totally 
visible (to readers), affords certain allowances. But it withholds others. Although readers 
have been granted ownership of the potential to act so as to accomplish these personal 
goals (again, unspeci fied), they are not allowed to consider their present actions as 
meeting those goals. Thus, and this is important, readers are conceived as already having 
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what is required to accomplish their goals - we might say an essence - but which is 
insufficiently developed, not "apparent" or "available" to them. Carnegie goes on, only 
more forcefully: 
Compared to what we ought to be", said the famous professor William lames of 
Harvard, "compared to what we ought to be, we are only half awake. We are 
making use of only a small part of our physical and mental resources. Stating the 
thing broadly, the human individual thus lives far within his limits. He possesses 
powers of various sorts which he habitually fails to use.68 
He uses the reported speech of Professor William lames in offering an account of the 
"human individual". The content of the reported speech might be considered 
controversial, even derogatory. Its credibility, which will have consequences for 
subsequent remarks by Carnegie, might be open to rebuttals. A function of this reported 
speech, however, is that it displays the compelling force of the original speaker, "the 
famous professor William lames of Harvard". This is not merely a professor but "the 
famous" professor, that is, the renowned, esteemed, credible; and the famous professor is 
located at Harvard, the most prestigious university in the world. Thus, the reputation of 
the speaker of the reported speech is entrusted in the reported speech itself, not only 
making it reportable, but robust, reliable. Carnegie, only being the reporter of the speech, 
or the "principal" (cf. Goffman, 1981), protects himself against rebut, which, in any 
event, should be directed to the producer of the speech (Buttny & Williams 2000; Holt & 
Clift, 2006). However, given this reputation of the original speaker (we can see now 
clearly the reason for reporting his speech), rebuttals are unlikely. Furthermore, reporting 
(controversial) speech, as against stating it as if it were one's own speech, is rhetorically 
more defensible as it acts as a demonstration (e.g., Clark & Gerrig, 1990), providing an 
evidential base to claims made (e.g., Holt, 1996; Stokoe & Edwards, 2007). 
Look, the singular form, "you", the subject of the reported speech, has widened to 
the plural form, "we". This is a meta-account of human nature again. What is happening? 
68 From Carnegie (1936: xix) How To Win Friends And Inflllence People. 
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This pronoun shift makes the formulation deliberately ambiguous whether the condition 
applies to the individual reader. Nevertheless, part of the ambiguity connotes that this 
will be the case. Thus, the reader determines its applicability, through the connotation of 
the text, by choosing whether to impose it upon him/herself. In any case, whether the 
reader is aware of his/her limits, or has even reached them, is neither here nor there. What 
is being invoked is the possibility that an additional set of resources is available, in 
reserve, which "ought" to be attended to further. There is an implicit issue of 
accountabi Iity: the reader is betraying those resources if she "chooses" not to uncover 
them. Given that we (the reader?) are "making use of only a small part of our physical 
and mental resources" which is a "natural inclination of the individual", reading is a 
candidate action against this inclination. It displays a choice not to be like the (average, 
ordinary) "human individual", but to be like a unique, extraordinary reader. Just like 
Superman. Reading the self-help book is like donning that special red cape. The 
polarization of "us" (this reader) and "them" (all those non-readers) is thus invoked to 
move the reader in a certain direction. Yes: towards the self-help book. 
, 
Reading as a requirement 
The self-help book is con figuring an argument which comprises a tension. Like the 
astrology column, concomitant with narcissistic gratification is the suggestion that 
something is compromising the reader's individuality, preventing the realization of their 
phenomenal potential. Thus, "[t]he idea that the reader is somehow threatened must be 
maintained because only if some mild terror is exercised, he will seek help" (Adorno, 
1994: 53). It is assumed that readers will feel threatened, presumably by their problems, 
and as such, the self-help book "reaches them only if it establishes an intelligence with 
the reader in the zone of that threat" (Ibid). And the "zone of that threat"; 
... is the hope that problems will go away of their own accord. Problems don't go 
away. They must be worked through or else they remain, forever a barrier to the 
growth and development of the spirit.69 
69 From Peck (2006: \8) The Road Less Travelled. 
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Readers are engaged in terms of the character of the threat with which they are 
confronted. Furthermore, readers have been laboring under the misapprehension that their 
problems, worthy of attention, will simply disappear of their own accord. That some 
other domain of agency will "take care of them". As victims of circumstance, an inferred 
strategy for readers, then, is the mere "suppression" of problems, which avoids the 
necessary action: "work". Task avoidance, the lack of work completed by readers, 
becomes the obstruction for "growth" and "development". Thus, it is made clear that 
some course of action is not being pursued, but pursuable, and in not pursuing it, readers 
are imposing a restraint on their potential to grow, develop. Take another excerpt, written 
by a clinical psychologist and a clinical psychiatrist, which is recommended as a "high 
quality,,70 self-help book and appears on the reading list of the Cardiff Book Prescription 
Scheme. This self-help book is prioritized over the commonplace, generic self-help books 
whose authors are not "professionally trained" (presumably all those self-help books 
which I have been spotlighting thus far): 
It may seem safer to keep things as they are - indeed the very thought of change 
may cause a temporary increase in anxiety! It is important to remember to 
confront the reality that although limitations in your lifestyle [ ... ] may make your 
life more "comfortable", in the long term such restrictions are very disabling.71 
Recognize the similarity in linguistic style and rhetorical strategy with those excerpts 
from other, "Iow quality" self-help books analyzed hitherto! Look at the threat posed to 
readers, and the location of responsibility for those effects. One specified method used by 
readers, to "keep things as they are", does not simply prevent development, growth etc. 
On the contrary, it is considered a "limitation" and "such restrictions are very disabling". 
The threat, then, is not posed merely as the lack of action undertaken by readers to 
achieve their potential, but is conflated with the inadequacy of readers' current methods 
of dealing with their problems. The "status" of readers, before any discussion of a self-
help book, is diminishing. Their lives are becoming even more uncomfortable, simply by 
70 A term used by the clinical psychologist who generated the Cardiff Prescription Scheme (see frude, 
2004). 
71 From Si love & Manicavasagar (1997: 48) Overcoming Panic. 
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taking the view that their "problems will go away". This has implications for how readers 
are positioned and what responsibilities they display to their problems: 
You are [ ... ] accountable; you have always been accountable; you will always be 
accountable. That is how it is. If you are not happy, you are accountable. 
Whatever your life circumstance is, accepting this law means that you can no 
longer dodge responsibility for how and why your life is the way is it.72 
There are a number of important shifts undertaken here by McGraw, to do with agency 
and responsibility, which configure readers in very consequential ways. The agency of 
the problems with which readers are presented, on a daily basis, has been relocated. The 
general conditions of life give way to the specific ways in which readers accept or deny 
responsibility for them. The seeming inevitability of those problems in life becomes the 
intentional consequence of readers' present actions. The solution to problems derives 
from whether readers assume personal responsibility. This self-help book has pointed to a 
mechanism that imposes an agency upon readers. Acting according to the principles of a 
law and applicable to all circumstances, readers are accountable for every action they 
perform. Readers, who may have previously considered themselves unable to change the 
circumstances in which they find themselves, can "no longer" be victims of external 
agencies that operate beyond their control. Readers, because they have "always been 
accountable" for their actions and routinely exercise an agency to control "how and why" 
their lives are configured as they are, can exercise this control to bring about the life they 
want. That is, the life they desire. McGraw continues: 
While everybody else is still out there blaming those who aren't responsible for 
the results in their life, you can be as on target as a laser-guided missile, and 
therefore, work only on those things that will truly change your life. That gives 
you a tremendous head start in the solution category.73 
72 From McGraw (1999: 57) Life Strategies. 
73 Ibid. (p. 59). 
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Making readers aware that they are able to determine their own breaks, to get the results 
they want of their own accord, further distinguishes them from those unaware of such 
matters. You know the ones - those non-readers, everybody else. What McGraw has 
given to his readers, in making them aware of their own agency, is a sense of privilege 
and a mark of distinction. They have risen above the crowd: they are reading his self-help 
book. Furthermore, part of this separation is the aim of a refinement of an individuality 
that seeks to be become even more individualized. Like a finely crafted machine, readers 
can precisely "work" on themselves, as accurately as a "laser-guided missile". McGraw, 
like the other self-help book authors, assumes that the endorsement of this hyper-
individualism, being part of wider ideology within which readers are so deeply 
embedded, will be accepted without question, even craved. 
The acceptance of an institution manifest in the "information" tendered by a self-
help book has its charm. It satisfies a readership in the pursuit of a certain kind of 
knowledge of itself. There is something important about receiving knowledge, however 
unspecified, connected with the academic discipline of psychology. Normatively, like 
most academic fields, psychology is impenetrable to those outside its boundaries. Self-
help books assimilate psychology in such a way that non-intellectual readers can identify 
with it. They can apply it at a personal, practical level. The knowledge in a self-help book 
is attractive to its readers because the popularization of psychology, through self-help 
books, appeals to the "everyday psychology" of its readers (Jones & Elcock, 200 I). 
People mobilize their lives through arguing, guessing, interpreting and reasoning about 
themselves and those around them. It is all about people, so they say. It is all psychology; 
you do not need to ask a psychologist to know this. Thus, each reader is semi-erudite to 
the extent that s/he "vaguely wants to understand and is also driven by the narcissistic 
wish to prove superior to the plain people but is not in a position to carry through 
complicated intellectual operations" (Ado mo, 1994: 45). This is not academic 
psychology, after all. Readers want self-help books, not psychology texts. In other words, 
the self-help book "provides a short-cut by bringing the complex to a handy formula and 
offering pleasant gratification that he who is excluded from educational privileges 
nevertheless belongs to the minority "in the know" (Ibid.). 
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This self-help book is securing its presence in the life of the reader. It becomes the 
candidate "next action"; it affirms its own efficiency at supplying what is required: 
The rules we have set down are not mere theories or guesswork. They work like 
magic. Incredible as it sounds, I have seen the application of these principles 
literally revolutionise the lives of many people.74 
The required results will be obtained because of the nature of the method employed. This 
self-help book represents more than simply the inscription of a few interesting ideas 
scribbled down by its author. It is informed by something more important: rules. Thus, 
rules have a transparent character insomuch as they describe some direction of conduct 
that operates according to general principles, true in most or all cases. Specific details, 
such as the specific contexts of their application, do not matter. The effectiveness of these 
rules is contrasted with "theories and guesswork", which are, comparatively, imprecise. 
Theories can be fuzzy; guesswork is often wrong. There is a sense of exactness: this self-
help book demands total control. This is just the precision specified earlier by McGraw 
("you can be as on target as a laser-guided missile") for readers to successfully solve their 
problems. So, readers require a precision tool, and this self-help book is as precise as they 
come. The exact nature of how reading this self-help book will benefit readers is unclear; 
suffice it say that, whatever its specificity, it will "work like magic". To follow this 
metaphor, to the extent that reading represents a performance of magic, then we do not 
need to know how it works (like magic, its effects are unexplainable) only that its effects 
are undeniable. It is hard to believe, even incredible. The magical nature of the self-help 
book (its inexplicability) is substantiated insomuch as its author has observed its results. 
And they do not just change, but "revolutionise the lives of many people". In short, the 
rules have been demonstrated to work. And there is no need to question what works, is 
there? Their value is placed beyond the announcement of the claim of their value. Rules 
exist out there in the world. People apply them. They just work. 
74 From Carnegie (1936: xvii) How To Win Friends And Influence People. 
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So change happens when a self-help book is read. A transformation. Readers are 
again told this much: 
If you read this book thoughtfully, carefully absorbing its teachings [oo.] you can 
experience an amazing improvement within yourself. 75 
This is reassuring. It is convincing too. Even if reading (the details of which are yet to be 
specified) means fulfilling the "if' part of the clause - reading the book "thoughtfully, 
carefully absorbing its teachings" - the reader can still enjoy an "amazing improvement". 
But this is an ambiguous, underdetermined formulation: amazing improvement. It implies 
so much, yet does not identify what it implies. What happened to the precision we saw 
with the application of those rules? And what exactly will be improved? This is left to the 
reader: sihe must once again employ connotation. It must refer to improving the problem. 
At any rate, an amazing improvement sounds like it will be just what is needed. 
[mportantly, it is through reading that this amazing improvement arises. The self-help 
book is needed for this task; it is critical to the improvement of the reader. 
The self-help book proceeds along a linear path, which is part of the sequential 
character of the hermeneutic code. There are only two possible courses of action set. The 
first, discarding the self-help book and keeping things as they are, is discouraged, it being 
personally hazardous; and the second, reading the self-help book, being the "opposite" of 
not reading, must therefore be personally beneficial. Thus, reading the self-help book 
becomes preferable. Better: it is a requirement for readers. The endorsement of a process 
of becoming a self-sufficient individual through reading a self-help book operates in the 
absence of any critical perspective. Readers readily attach themselves to this 
individualistic ideology in which they embrace their own distinction from other people, 
their uniqueness, but nevertheless fail to appreciate that a similar quest is pursued by 
millions of other "individuals". This much is made plainly clear. Look, it was scattered 
across the front cover of the book you are reading. But readers also happily betray their 
own sense of identity by accepting that the authors of self-help books are able to know 
75 From Peale (1952: x) The Power aiPasitive Thinking. 
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what readers are like and to have knowledge of what, to follow the ideology, does not 
belong to them, cannot belong to them. It is in this sense that self-help books may be 
characterized as irrational, or represent the manifestation of pseudo-rationality, just as 
Adorno characterized the astrology column. This is not simply a reversal of rational 
behavior, operating beyond rationality, but the "result rot] the process of self-
preservation 'run amuck'" (Adorno, 1994: 34). 
Reading as problematic 
The narrative of the self-help book accepts that the world functions according to its own 
independent criteria. Because it is "external" to readers, who are only able to experience 
its effects, it is unable to be changed. In short, the world becomes a static object 
experienced variably from one reader to the next. What the world means depends on how 
readers experience it. Thus, these self-help books locate individual readers as the site of 
modification: the world cannot be changed but how readers interpret it can. Not 
surprisingly, given the individualistic ideology by which these self-help books are 
informed, they adopt a highly normative, psychological profile of each of their readers 
(e.g., Danziger, 1990). The "work" required to be undertaken by readers in the quest for 
self-help, so as to "activate" individual agency, solve problems and determine the breaks, 
comprises an adjustment in their "psychology": 
It has been said that thoughts are things, that they actually posses a dynamic 
power. Judged by the power they exercise one can readily accept such an 
appraisal. You can actually think yourself into or out of situations. You can make 
yourself ill with your thoughts and by the same token you can make yourself well 
by the use of a different and healing type of thought. Think one way and you 
attract the conditions which that type of thinking indicates. Think another way 
and you can create an entirely different set of conditions. Conditions are created 
by thoughts far more powerfully than conditions create thoughts.76 
76 From Peale (1952: 169) The Power of Positive Thinking. 
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What is happening to the activity of reading, the essential requirement for readers to 
accomplish their quest for self-help? The status of reading, which readers have only 
identified through reading thus far, emerges when it is established that the source of the 
problem (and therefore the solution, too) is thought. A shift is taking place: from reading 
to thinking. Reading will not be satisfactory because a different ontological category is 
now made relevant - written text gives rise to ways of thinking. It is not how, or even 
whether, readers pursue reading, but how they think. Readers are required to do 
something with thinking; and merely reading will not change thought. And: it is change 
that needs to happen. Look again. The self-help book represented such a powerful 
contingency on the successful completion of self-help, possessing a "natural" value that 
could only be extracted by reading. We have seen what has happened: looking at it, 
touching the pretty font designs on its front cover, opening its first page, and then, finally, 
reading it. No matter how close readers get to it - and reading is the height of proximity 
to it - the self-help book becomes inadequate. Its status, like reading it, has changed, such 
that the self-help book is no longer prioritized as part of the work needing to be 
undertaken by readers. The required adjustment is a specific change in thinking. 
Cognition is at fault. For their quest to be successful, readers need to think differently. 
The self-help book relocates the problem, and sacrifices its self-sufficiency, as readers 
must now modify the way they think. The focus, and potential value, is turned to what 
readers do, not what the self-help book represents. 
Thinking, a practice located at the level ofthe individual reader, is isolated as the 
primary, or only, mechanism of individual action. A paradox is present but nevertheless 
concealed. Although the "conditions" of culture - social interaction, rules, customs, 
authorities, institutions, for instance - impose problems, they do not delimit or "create" 
readers as much as readers create those conditions. Thus, no explanation is available how 
readers arrive at thought and what stimulates thinking in the first place. To ask these 
questions, or to point to their explication, would be too erudite. It is best left alone; that is 
what professionals are for. Things may be cloudy, very unclear, but as we know, 
narcissism covers up most things. So it is assumed that thinking is self-serving: one 
thought produces another thought. The reader is an isolatable object, working much like a 
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machine. To change the output, you need to change the input. It all happens in the mind, 
the processor. As part of this shift, from reading to thinking, the self-help book retains a 
specified value; it provides insight into how thinking is to be modified. This insight is 
simple. Readers are encouraged to adopt a habit of positive thinking, a defining feature of 
the genre which other textual analytic work has charted so clearly (Hazel don, 2003; 
Wood stock, 2007). Positive thinking, which is to be substituted for a habit of negative 
thinking, generates an awareness of the agency of readers and allows them to create those 
preferred, self-created conditions for action: 
But practice thinking confident thoughts, make it a dominant habit, and you will 
develop such a strong sense of capacity that regardless of what difficulties arise 
you will be able to overcome them.77 
Practice thinking: that is the activity to be undertaken. What readers are required to 
accept is what I shall call "the endorsement of yes", which is to say, the adjustment to 
positive thinking as a strategy with which to respond to the world. This preferred method 
of thought converts every "negative" into a "positive". This endorsement of yes means 
the construction of an external world takes place in the mind of readers. The world can be 
whatever readers want it to be; it just means thinking in specific, positive ways. A 
powerful technique for positive thinking is for readers to use positive statements with 
which to describe themselves. Affirmations are recommended. They like something like 
this: 
J like myself 
J am good enough 
J approve of myself completely, and in the presence of others 
J now choose to like and trust myself and to treat myself with the utmost 
respect. 78 
77 From Carnegie (1936: 23) How To Win Friends And lrifluence People. 
78 From Harrold (2001: 39-40 original italics) Be Your Own Life Coach. 
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Accepting this endorsement of yes, by describing not only themselves but also their 
approach to life affirmatively, means that all things become attainable to readers. 
Anything can be achieved if they affirm it. If they just say yes. Repeating the affirmations 
from this self-help book is not reading, as we have understood it, even although words 
are being followed on a page. There is a deeper level of work involved, which reading 
had not allowed. The words need to be taken from the page, and dealt with through a 
more intensive, engrained process of thinking. The affirmations must travel further, and 
connect with the source of readers' problems. They must do something to change 
thinking. But how do readers know when they are thinking? Look at the first affirmation: 
what would satisfy the requirement of liking oneself'? Reading these affirmations is 
inadequate. How about saying them? But what is the difference between reading and 
saying? What is, then, the status of thought? So many questions; but they are questions 
nevertheless that the self-help books deal with pragmatically. There is a preferred method 
of the use of affirmations, as Lindenfield, the author of another "high quality" self-help 
book on the Cardiff Book Prescription Scheme, makes clear: 
When saying affirmations, speak them aloud whenever possible, while using an 
appropriately positive and assertive tone. Relax and smile as you are speaking. 
Often people say them aloud routinely when they are alone [oo.]. If you do this, 
you will find that the affirmations are more likely to leap easily to mind when you 
need a boost of silent positive self-talk in a difficult or depressing situation. 79 
Reading affirmations is no good; but saying affirmations is no good either. Affirmations 
must be spoken aloud. Speaking them, as the authors of them in their speaking, is a 
display of positive thinking. There is significance to the act of saying - readers are doing 
something with the written text. When readers speak, they use their voice: the 
affirmations become part of an embodied experience. Readers are actively involved in the 
expression of their thoughts. Why the need for the verbalization of thought? 
79 From Lindenfield (2000: 69-70) Self-Esteem: Simple Steps To Develop Self-Worth and Heal Emotional 
Wounds. 
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Thinking as problematic 
Positive thinking is absolutely necessary in the quest for self-help. That is why reading is 
no longer being pursued. And yet, thinking itself has become a grossly ambiguous 
category. What are readers doing in their minds, with their thoughts? The self-help book 
authors do not know. But then neither, so far as we can tell, do readers. It is difficult to 
know what counts as thought. We know this: thoughts need to be verbalized; affirmations 
need to be spoken. The status of thought is being problematized. Thinking is becoming as 
unsatisfactory as what it was designed to replace, which is to say, reading. This much is 
made clear when readers are given exercises to undertake: 
You should go through each exercise in the order given and you should write 
down your answers. Some people have tried to avoid the bother of writing down 
their answers, thinking that it is the same if they just do the exercises in their 
head. It is not. l ... ] [f you just think about your answers, you will never need to 
confront what you really believe about yourself and your life. You will never 
surprise yourself, never move on. 80 
Simply thinking will not help readers confront what they really believe about themselves. 
[t is important to scribble things down. What is the status of these written notes, and 
(how) do they differ from thinking? [t is like the difference between reading and speaking 
affirmations. [t can be seen as a tension around activity versus inactivity. Thus, although 
thinking is seen as driving the actions of readers, it is nevertheless difficult to evidence it; 
it requires, for its visibility, to be translated8l into action. Without readers performing the 
work which translation requires - e.g., writing down answers and not keeping them in 
their "minds" - there is no activity, or rather, no proof against which thinking can be 
measured. More importantly, however, this respecification of thinking also respecifies 
what is required to accomplish self-help. It is difficult to document whether positive 
thinking has been achieved, or, more precisely, is being practiced, without being able to 
80 From Mapstone (2004: 24) Stop Dreaming Start Living. 
" Translation is a technical term originating in actor network theory (particularly the work of Latour), and 
describes how the status of a given process, in its relation with another process, is altered or changed as part 
of its ongoing relationship with it) or because of it. 
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point to it. But the need for this pointing displays the inadequacy of thought as a method 
by which self-help is fulfilled. Action is required if self-help is to be undertaken. Another 
shift, another ontological category prioritized: from thinking to the practical 
circumstances of doing self-help. Just ask these two self-help book authors: 
But it is not sufficient to apply to the mind even such an important affirmation 
therapy ... unless throughout the day you also base your actions and attitudes upon 
fundamental principles of happy living.s2 
The difference between thinkers and doers is what they do at this point. Revving 
up your psychology will only take you so far. The next step is doing something. 
Demonstrate your commitment to your desires and plans. Get busy. You know 
what you need to do, so just do it!SJ 
The self-help book could not provide what was required for readers to undertake self-
help: to think differently. Readers had to do that for themselves, outside of reading. And 
they did, we can suppose. But thinking now suffers from a similar insufficiency; it will 
not indicate the performance of self-help. Thinking must be replaced by action, and 
therefore abandoned. It can be divided, as the author of this last extract, Fiona Harrold, 
does here, into thinking and doing. Or better: thinking is not doing. Readers need to get 
busy because thinking is inactivity. The best way to overcome panic attacks, for instance, 
as the authors of this next "high quality" self-help book suggest, is to do something about 
it: 
Wear a rubber band loosely around your wrist. When you feel a panic attack 
starting, stretch the rubber band out and let it snap back on to the inside of your 
wrist. Often, the short, sharp sensation of pain will be enough to redirect your 
attention away from the beginning of panic symptoms.84 
8Z From Peale (1952: 71) The Power of Positive Thinking 
83 From Harrold (2004: 69·70) Reinvent Yourself. 
S4 From Silove & Manicavasagar (1997: 85) Overcoming Panic. 
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Wearing a rubber band, stretching it and feeling its impact on the wrist in controlling a 
panic attack - these are very practical actions, extratextual activities. Importantly, like the 
verbalization of affirmations and the physical act of writing answers down and having 
material "facts", these actions differ from thinking. We see things happening; readers are 
doing something. Action is the opposite of thinking: activity as against inactivity. While 
readers are thinking, they are not doing. The relationship of readers to the self-help book 
is undergoing the last of a series of shifts. Thinking is now subverted and action is 
encouraged, while reading has all but disappeared entirely. Everything that is required for 
readers' quest for self-help is pointing way from the self-help book. Although the self-
help book may be implicitly confessing its limited capacity, as an agent in readers' quest 
for self-help, it is nevertheless assuming that things have developed according to plan. 
Concomitant with the initial process of self-identification, where the self-help book relies· 
on readers successfully identifying themselves in its narrative, here we see a similar 
connotation. Self-help book authors are anticipating that readers will, first, complete 
those various extratextual actions, and second, will do so in ways already known or 
predetermined: 
Are you letting yourself be dictated to by your chronological age, and the 
preconceptions you have about growing old? Take a pen and answer these 
questions: 
I. How old do you feel? 
2. How old do you look? 
3. How often do I talk about growing older, or blame my inability to do 
something on my age? 
4. Do I expect to become illlinfirm/put on weight/move less easily as I become 
older? [ ... ] 
Well, do you look or feel older than you are? Did you discover a few horribly 
negative preconceptions that you have about old age? Great. Better to get them all 
out and have a good look at them. Then we can nail them for good. sS 
ss From Harrold (2001: 239) Be Your Own Life Coach. 
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We can suppose that readers will not have any problems answering the first question 
posed by this self-help book, "Are you letting yourself be dictated to by your 
chronological age, and the preconceptions you have about growing old?" However, the 
way in which this question is likely to be answered is problematic; it is insufficient to 
retain the answer. Thinking about it is no good. The answer needs to be written down, 
made public, but answered according to specific other questions. This requirement, to 
answer these other questions, is not so much because readers are not to be trusted to 
answer the first one as they wish, but because there is a preferred answer. Readers' 
answers to these questions (l to 4) are to be recycled so as to supply further answers to 
some closing questions. This self-help book author is expecting these closing questions to 
be answered affirmatively. She even provides a receipt for them: "Great!" Readers are 
assumed to have written down something approximating: "yes, [ do have a few horribly 
negative preconceptions about old age". [n other words, readers are being asked to follow 
a predetermined path as this self-help book displays its ideal effects by responding with 
specific remarks and eliciting those expectations that further reading will satisfy. 
Importantly, these latter answers derive from evidence, written answers to the previous 
questions, giving not only readers but also this self-help book author, something at which 
to point. So: there is something "factual" and undeniable, and readers can see what 
authors are pointing to. 
Analytical interest, then, is not with the "empirical" reader of a self-help book, the 
"actual" or "real" reader. It is the reader as an encoded subject, made available 
semiotically in the text. Part of the interpretive work of reading is for the (empirical) 
reader to pick up the ensemble of codes, to decode them and follow the path thus 
generated. It is assumed that both self-help book author and reader share a sense of the 
codes. Thus, the self-help book author must "foresee a model of the possible reader 
(hereafter Model Reader) supposedly able to deal interpretively with the expressions [of 
the self-help book] in the same way that the author deals generatively with them" (Bco, 
1979: 7). Although this model assumes certain competencies and preferences on the part 
of the reader, the text also "creates" them through its use of a specific literary style, 
narrative organization, specific linguistic codes etc. (Ibid.). The invocation of an 
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individual reader is not the summoning of a specific reader (the empirical reader) outside 
of the text; it simply marks his/her textual instantiation as a recognizable "idiolect" - part 
of a genre, group or, perhaps best, role (p.l 0 original italics). This kind of involvement of 
an "isolatable" subject, is concomitant with the activation of this Model Reader, "whose 
intellectual profile is determined only by the sort of interpretive operation he [sic 1 is 
supposed to perform" (p.II). 
The task of reading a self-help book, from its opening narrative onwards, for 
readers, has been to identify (with) this Model Reader, and in that identification, agree to 
its terms, its conditions of reading. Readers are obligated contractually, in the sense that 
they are required to follow the path of the self-help book, and only that path, to bring 
about the prescribed results. So: reading represents the conjiguration86 of readers, as it 
delimits the boundaries within which they understand themselves. It sets constraints on 
their future actions. Although we can see this throughout the narrative of the self-help 
book, it is particularly transparent from the preferred sequence of actions in this last 
extract. At any rate, assuming the role of the Model Reader is not a matter of identifying 
some intention, finding the meaning that self-help book authors have implanted; nor is it 
the extent to which such correspondence between reader and author is successful. Instead, 
the series of actions being undertaken, in trying to make their movements as transparent 
as possible, emerge from "the intention o/the text" (Eco, 1992: 25 original italics). This 
intention, which makes way for reading, is not a "dormant" feature of self-help books, 
objectified on the page; readers have to decide to render it visible. Textual interpretation, 
the ongoing conjectures of readers, reveals the strategies that are intended to produce a 
Model Reader. Resembling the process of the hermeneutic circle, any interpretation of 
the text is confirmed by the text, which in turn is confirmed by the interpretation thus far. 
So, "more than a parameter used to validate the interpretation, the text is an object that 
86 Woolger (1991) provides a useful account of how the design and production of computer technologies 
con figure their users, delimiting the ways in which they respond to, and thus how they see themselves as 
entities in relationship to, those technologies. 
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the interpretation builds up in the course of the circular effort of validating itself on the 
basis of what it makes up as its result" (p. 64)87. 
In nearing the end of the self-help book, the accomplishments of the Model 
Reader should be noted. We can be reasonably certain in detailing these accomplishments 
because they are present in the text insomuch as self-help book authors have constructed 
them to be followed. As for empirical readers, to the extent that they have achieved 
identity with the Model Reader, they will have followed them accordingly. Consider: 
You are now equipped to make a life strategy that allows you to begin changing 
your life, one step, one goal, one priority at a time. 88 
This self-help book author assumes that readers have successfully followed the path so 
carefully set out for them. They have completed the various tasks as part of the work of 
reading, just as they have been told. Perhaps most importantly, this author has assumed 
that, in following this path, readers have had no reason to disagree or dispute its 
legitimacy, or experienced any problems arising out of its applicability. To the contrary, 
it is expected that readers have unconditionally endorsed the whole process. Readers, 
then, have aligned themselves to the self-help book and its aims in "promoting 
conventional, conformist and contented attitudes and that any insights into the negative 
aspects of reality [be] kept under control by making everything dependant on [them] 
rather than on objective conditions" (Adomo, 1994: 65). Paradoxically, in appealing to 
the narcissistic tendencies of readers, and promoting the importance of their individuality, 
the self-help book has prevented its expression, or rather, allowed it to the extent that it 
submits to the conditions as set out. Readers can express their individuality provided it 
remains passive and uncritical. They must, at all costs, continue to affirm the ideology of 
the self-help book; they must keep saying yes. In short, by discouraging thought 
"Respect for the text, which is needed for this process to unfold, should not be misplaced, or redirected to 
the domain ofthe author/reader as the actors making possible this process. Eco's argument, in this respect, 
offers a more empirically based account than does Booth's (1961) "Implied Author" and Iser's (1974; 
1978) "Implied Reader"; these categories are actively con figured textual manifestations, not metaphysical, 
"ghostly" presences that cannot be pointed to by the text itself but nonetheless make it so. 
88 From McGraw (1999: 266) Life Strategies. 
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generally and "independent" thought specifically, clearly displayed by its preference and 
prescription of practice (doing), the self-help book also discourages any substantive 
notion of "intellect". It is not so much that what it offers, and recommends, is non-
intellectual as anti-intellectual (Claussen, 2004). Readers can have or pursue intelligence, 
and in fact that is encouraged as part of the narcissistic quest, but not intellect; the one is 
antithetical to the other. Hofstadter (1962: 25), discussing the prevalence of anti-
intellectualism in American cultural history, makes this clear: 
[i]intelligence is an excellence of mind that is employed within a fairly narrow, 
immediate, and predictable range; it is a manipulative, adjustive, unfailingly 
practical quality [ ... and] works within the framework of limited but clearly stated 
goals, and may be quick to shear away questions of thought that do not seem to 
help in reaching them. 
Intelligence (activity) as against intellect (inactivity): dealing with the practical 
circumstances of goal-oriented tasks, not merely thinking about doing them. Practicality 
is the criteria for assessing what readers do and, in turn, who they are and who they 
become. "Whereas intelligence seeks to grasp, manipulate, re-order, adjust, intellect 
examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes, imagines. Intellect evaluates 
evaluations" (Ibid.). More seriously, in suppressing thought, or anything that resists 
acceptance of its discourse, the self-help book is also suppressing critical inquiry, 
devaluing the rewards from e.g., "speculation", "creative novelty" and "reflection". The 
message: arguing, especially arguing for the sake of arguing, does not do anything; it 
does not further readers' quest for self-help. 
What we observe, with the shifts from reading, to thinking, to action, is a return, 
from the temporality of the reading experience of the self-help book, to the general, 
temporally unspecified and "continuous" unfolding of life. Readers are being reoriented, 
placed back into a life beyond the self-help book from whence they came. Through the 
process of reading - which the self-help book has assumed has been carried out as 
prescribed - readers have undergone a transformation. The result of reading, or at least 
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time with the self-help book, a fixed period of work defined by its ability to "change" its 
readers, has discarded a set of relations, principally the relations of the self-help book 
with its readers. And in so doing, it has introduced another set of relations, between 
readers and the world. The self-help book disappears as the world reappears. The 
ontological status of the self-help book, then, has changed in terms of what it represents 
to readers. Like Plato's famous ladder of knowledge, which the philosopher ascends in 
his search for truth, readers of the self-help book, in searching for self-help by the effort 
of reading, advance the rungs of the ladder, passing from ignorance to knowledge. 
As far as the self-help book considers its own purpose, following Fish (1972: 2), 
the outcome of its reading is quite literally a "conversion" for readers. [n reexamining 
and even discrediting their own assumptions about themselves, readers have reached the 
point beyond which rational thought can assist them. They can no longer rely on the self-
help book, for it has been "consumed" by the operation of its own effects. It becomes 
"the vehicle of its own abandonment" (p.3). [n other words, in transferring readers to 
another "level" of insight (or action, thought, consciousness etc.), using itself up by 
imparting its value and encouraging readers to seek further inquiry beyond its own 
boundaries, the self-help book invalidates the basis on which it has been proceeding. 
Thus, like Plato's ladder, "[t]he final rung, the level of insight that stands (or, more 
properly, on which the reader stands) because it is the last, and is, of course, the rejection 
of written artifacts, a rejection that, far from contradicting what has preceded, 
corresponds exactly to what the reader, in his repeated abandoning of successive stages in 
the argument, has been doing" (p.l3). Or, in another sense, because the hermeneutic code 
of the self-help book involves a move from a question to an answer, from how to 
determine and control the breaks, to controlling and determing them, it is "irreversible." 
Once the code has been revealed, it cannot be unrevealed; readers, if the code is to have 
full effect, must follow its logico-temporal order, which means completing the quest for 
self-help now being set out (cf. Barthes, 1974: 29-30). The self-help book is now the 
point of departure for readers: 
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Emotional control [ ... ] cannot be gained in any magical or easy way. You cannot 
develop it by merely reading a book. The only sure method is by working at it 
regularly, persistently. 89 
The possession of the mere materials of knowledge is something very different 
from wisdom and understanding, which are reached through a higher kind of 
discipline than that of reading - which is often but a mere passive reception of 
other men's thoughts; there being little or no active effort of mind in the 
transaction. 9o 
Resolving the code of the self-help book means parting ways with the specified activities 
of reading, thinking and acting. What has been achieved - continuing with the Platonic 
metaphor - in reaching the last rung of the ladder, has not been the accomplishment of 
self-help, but rather the knowledge that reading the self-help book merely defers that 
accomplishment. The tension arising from reading, the lack of opportunity it affords 
readers in the practical business of doing self-help, even when compensated by 
extratextual work, nevertheless falls short. Reading thus needs to be abandoned as a 
legitimate quest, being parasitic (on self-help book authors) insomuch as it is a "mere 
passive reception of other men's thoughts". What is necessary for readers, to successfully 
produce and not merely receive self-help, is that which the self-help book cannot supply, 
which is to say, the active role undertaken by interacting with the world: "working at it 
regularly, persistently". Readers, then, are forced to return to the world beyond the self-
help book to pursue a "higher kind of discipline". The remarkable, highly specified 
character of self-help constructed in the self-help book is reconfigured as the mundane, 
highly unspecified practice of everyday life. 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
The self-help book has undergone the activity of reading. It has been revived: we have 
seen it through the movement of its discourse, from the first page to the last. The 
89 From Peale (1952: 89) The Power of Positive Thinking. 
90 From Smiles (1859: 217-8) Self-Help. 
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battering social critique may have told us to beware of the self-help book, to treat it with 
caution. However, it did not inform us that the self-help book could possibly provide its 
own critique. Or better: that its textual form is composed of the very arguments used 
against it by the skeptics. This is revealed through a tension, visible throughout the self-
help book. On the one hand, it characterizes itself as self-sufficient (or self-contained), 
where the work of reading alone is the single requirement for readers to accomplish their 
quest for self-help; on the other, the invocation of reading itself is insufficient for self-
help. The tension becomes noticeably transparent when the work of reading is specified. 
This means extending beyond the self-help book. There it is: a self-refuting attack of the 
very method through which the self-help book is articulated, writing and therefore 
reading. The whole project of textual communication is renounced. The self-help book is 
to be abandoned as a site of self-help. 
But let us not be so hasty. This tension is concealed in various ways; the self-help 
book is too clever a beast to admit defeat that easily. Let us return to Fish for a moment. 
He conceived of two texts. The "rhetorical" text, like Eco's closed text, delimits the 
experience of reading to that with which readers are already familiar; it tells them what 
they already know. The "dialectical" text, like Eco's open text, requires its readers to 
establish knowledge for themselves, to question everything they currently live by. Fish 
had considered only the dialectical text to undergo its own denouncement during reading. 
Thus in assisting its readers to experience it to a point at which it no longer provides the 
assistance it did before that experience, the dialectical text becomes inadequate. [t has 
moved its readers, but in so doing, has expended itself; it has been, as Fish describes, a 
self-consuming artifact. 
We are unable to delineate the self-help book as simply as this: rhetorical or 
dialectical. This is because it has assumed the status of both types of text. Encouraging 
the ongoing production of reading in terms of the mutually derived understanding of 
readers' problems - generally suggested by authors, specifically connoted by readers -
the self-help book satisfies the needs of its readership. [t reaches them through 
intersubjectivity. [n tandem, in addressing these problems, the self-help book 
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progressively points away from itself, as things are required to be done beyond reading. 
Speaking is required. Thinking needs to be done. And actions too. But in pointing away 
from itself, to the world out there beyond reading, the self-help book has assumed that 
such pointing is part of the "working through" of problems, and not the insufficiency of 
reading as part of that work. The questions have been answered. The exercises have been 
done. Nothing else matters, no other contingencies apply, so long as these tasks have 
been completed. Their successful completion is presupposed. Readers' problems do not 
change according to contingencies. Their status remains fixed and knowable; these are 
the terms in which the self-help book engages readers. Problems have been isolated and 
reconfigured through the reading, thinking and acting shifts. 
What is being transferred into the world, beyond the self-help book, is not the sum 
aggregate of problems. No: that has already been addressed, or will be addressed if the 
guidelines have been followed. There is of course a temporal dimension. Problems will 
routinely arise in everyday life, and the self-help book knows that readers have to return 
to a life beyond reading. Life amounts to more than this transient relationship. In other 
words, readers will need to ongoingly manage their problems (the reemergence of old 
problems or emergence of new ones) and so will need to reapply the "rules" of the self-
help book, as and when circumstances dictate. So the self-help book has done all it can; it 
has been expended. As the self-help book disappears from view, it is now down to 
readers. Do you see what has happened? What was a rhetorical text, aligned to the zone 
of the personality of its readers, is now, having served its function by implanting its 
knowledge and wisdom, and getting readers to face the world beyond reading, a 
dialectical text. Before reading, it was a requirement; after reading, it must be forsaken. 
So there is a tension, but it is revealed later, after reading. With the quest for se\f-
help still to be completed, beyond "mock" exercises, readers go out into the world. They 
want to apply those rules. They do of course face contingencies, which raises new 
problems. But at least they can control and determine the bad breaks of life. They have 
agency. Everything ought to go according to plan. The world should serve the will of 
readers. But: with nothing to account for all of those unspecified, undetermined 
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contingencies in everyday life, which are nevertheless confronted, things get messy. 
Controlling for contingency is difficult. Other agencies, other things, impose themselves. 
Readers are faced with the world, with new problems, composed of ongoing contingency. 
Uncertainty arises. Personal agency is not always effective. What do readers do? They 
select another self-help book, of course. Agency must be re-affirmed. Some way of 
dealing with those darned contingencies must be available. Readers have control, so they 
are told, but no way to guarantee its successful application in the world. The self-help 
book, they remember, will provide answers. Unlike the world, it will meet them in the 
zone of their personality. It will comfort them, in the sense that Barthes has given to the 
term. The status of problems has changed; but it is just a question of getting the "right" 
self-help book. So: the cycle of reading once again continues ad infinitum. We see the 
enactment of a culture of repeated self-help book reading91 • But readers will be pushed 
away again, out into the world. So where do readers go for self-help? How is the cycle of 
reading broken? 
91 Some reader reviews of the self-help books [have been analyzing (Source: www.amazon.co.uk Accessed 
2310 1/08): On Life Strategies: "1 have read many self-help publications in my life in an effort to improve 
my understanding of human characteristics to enable me to interact with others in such a way to minimize 
friction. To be honest 1 found and learnt much of interest from the majority of these books, but too often the 
advice and suggestions given miss the point which is that it was me who needed to change most of all" 
26/11/01. On How To Win Friends and Influence People: "Once you have read and digested this then 1 
thoroughly recommend the next level, Dr. Covey's '7 Habits of Highly Effective People', though that 
work ... clearly benefited enormous from the early groundwork done by Carnegie, it is in a different league 
altogether" 5/5/06. On Don't Sweat The Small Stuff .... And It's All Small Stuff. "1 read a lot of self-help 
books (did [just say that?) and they are often repetitive and rather patronizing in tone - this book was a 
refreshing change" 15/06/03; "Being a keen reader of self-help books (which normally fail utterly to 
impress me) it was a delight to find this brilliant little book" 12/06/01. These are seasoned self-help book 
readers, moving from one to another. 
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Chapter 4 
Reinvent yourself with Fiona Harrold 
4.1 Introduction 
If readers want to complete their quest for self-help, then they will have to part ways with 
the self-help book. But there is a problem: self-help does not follow from the 
disappearance of the self-help book, as it is expected to. Readers return to the self-help 
book, as a site of self-help, from which they have recently departed, and repeat the 
reading process. This is a widespread occurrence. Thus we see the self-help book genre 
still thriving, continuing to dominate bestsellers lists (Hansen, McHoul & Rapley 2003; 
McGee 2005). Nevertheless, if we read the self-help book carefully, this admission of 
inadequacy, progressively made clear as reading is undertaken, is displayed in a most 
explicit manner. And it derives from the core of the genre itself; the critics do not even 
need to open their mouths. Please meet Fiona Harrold; she is a bestselling life coaching 
book author92• Two categories: self-help and life coaching. The first one we know about; 
the second one we want to know more about. Harrold likes life coaching, not self-help; 
this much is known91 • But, at least from my analysis of her books in the last chapter, 
these categories get blurred. They collide and rub together. Sometimes looking beyond a 
category, to the substantive work being carried out to support it, is the only way to see 
what is going on. So two different categories, but they each gesture to, or even share, a 
common meeting place. 
We decide to read Harrold's life coaching books; anyone of her bestsellers will 
be quite sufficient. We follow a familiar trajectory: from reading, to thinking, to action. 
But then it happens. Those careful readers will spot it at the end of Harrold's books, 
sometimes written by her, sometimes by her publisher - a specification of what is 
92Harrold has many bestsellers: Be Your Own Life Coach (2001). Reinvent yourseif: 7 steps to afresh you 
(2004), Indestructible seif-belief 7 steps to getting it right and keeping it (2005a), The 7 Rules of Success: 
Follow the strategies, experience the results (2005b). 
93 Harrold would most likely deny affiliation with a self-help book genre, substituting another category 
such as "personal development", "self-improvement", or best, "life coaching". Having developed analysis 
of her books, we see the range of features they share with self-help books; and yet, Harrold is obviously 
uncomfortable with the category self-help. She is well aware of the skeptics, and, in a way, in denying 
membership in the genre, but nevertheless writing within it, she provides a point of departure for her "own" 
work (we have seen this strategy too; it is a favorite of the self-help book!). 
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required, in addition to, and particularly after, the book has been completed. It looks like 
this, taken from the back pages of Reinvent Yourself: 
Her [Fiona HarroldJ intention is to take the principles of personal responsibility, 
individual self-help and mutual support to the widest public through The Next 
Level Club, and its wide range of motivational services and courses. [ ... J. Fiona 
says, 'To be a success at anything in life you need high levels of self-confidence 
and the right people behind you. The Next Level Club's combination of expert 
coaches and the camaraderie of like-minded people will guarantee that you feel 
able to achieve anything you really want and put your mind to. Life coaching is 
not the same as having someone tell you what to wear or how to apply your 
lipstick. It's about having someone behind you giving you the confidence and 
self-belief that you can have the life you have always dreamed of (2004: 129-
131 ). 
At least Harrold is being associated with the category self-help! The course of self-help 
has changed again. This extract arises whilst undertaking reading, but notice how the 
activity of reading has disappeared. There is no mention of reading Reinvent Yourselfas a 
value of work completed; and what is now being set out has no linkage with it. It is as if 
reading has served no purpose, other than to point readers somewhere else. This author, 
Harrold, is endorsing the abandonment of reading as a satisfactory prescription for self-
help. We see a proffered terrain on which readers are to travel: contact with other, like-
minded people, and, we must stress, life coaches. Self-help becomes mutual support. [t 
means attaining membership in The Next Level Club - being with other members. The 
reader is addressed and asked to consider him-/herself, not as one, as unique, but as a 
member. So self-help is now situated in an assemblage of people. And this membership is 
not incidental; it places a condition under which self-help will be successfully completed. 
Other people, and particularly life coaching and therefore a life coach, are required to 
perform self-help. What was supposed to result from reading a self-help book will now 
only obtain from being around the right people. 
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The Next Level Club organizes regular workshops for its members. There is a life 
coach; Fiona Harrold is her name. Life coaching takes place. Simple. But I still have 
questions. What is being produced in a self-help workshop that is not being produced in a 
self-help book? What accounts for the variance, if there is any? To answer these 
questions thoroughly enough, I did what anyone in my position would do: Harrold 
received a polite telephone call from a young ethnographer, expressing an interest in the 
activities in her workshops. A little indelicate as a strategy to obtain free admission, but 
Harrold agreed94• I became a member of the club; and I had already read Harrold's books 
too. The workshop to which I was invited had a provocative title, just like her book of the 
same name: Reinvent Yourself. I took my crumpled old notebook, along with my voice 
recorder, and documented what I found. 
I arrive slightly early on the morning of the workshop, only to find I am in the 
company of another 300 members. There is a lively, energetic atmosphere before things 
unfold, as folks talk amongst themselves. Harrold is introduced by one of the organisers 
of the workshop. "She is probably Britain's best known life coach", he says, "the author 
of Reinvent Yourself". This is the title of her current bestseller; it is in here, right on the 
back pages, that readers are told about workshops like this. This introduction by the 
organiser has a function: it is paying tribute to her achievements as an author. This is the 
relevant identity - it is what she will be known for. That the audience is interested in her 
writing is presupposed once again; advance copies of her upcoming book, they are told, 
are available at the workshop. Folks were snooping around the sales stall at the rear of the 
hall earlier, when [ arrived. So her audience is largely composed of her readership. But: 
something does not add up. Are they dissatisfied with her books? With her bestseller, 
Reinvent Yourself? Have they been deprived of something from the reading experience? 
Why their presence at this workshop? 
94 Ethnographers have all sorts of tricks up their sleeves; flattery, so long as it is genuine, remains one of 
the best. 
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4.2 Dialectics of the soul 
There is a special character to speech. This has its origins in the history of philosophy, 
particularly the hierarchy of speech over writing. Aristotle recognized a "purity" of 
speech: "Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the 
symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not 
the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are 
the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images" (On 
Interpretation, I). Speech is the direct expression of mental experience, the highest level 
of, and pathway to, knowledge and reason, while writing, which is derivative of speech 
and twice removed from mental experience, separates that which is written from the 
mental experience which it represents. 
Plato thought that the spoken word was a more appropriate vehicle for philosophy 
too. His philosophy, and in fact the tradition that stems from it, which is to say, Western 
metaphysics, is built on the prioritization of speech. This is made clear in Phaedrus, a 
dialogue between Plato's main protagonist, Socrates, and Phaedrus, when they discuss 
the inferiority of writing to pure thought. Reading as against reasoning. Rhetoric as 
against dialectic. The soul, like mental experience for Aristotle, is central to this 
hierarchy. Socrates says to Phaedrus: "No, it is plain that if we are to address people 
scientifically, we shall show them precisely what is the real and true nature of that object 
on which our discourse is brought to bear. And that object, I take to be the soul" (270e). 
The distance created by writing, from the author to the reader, denies the possibility of 
"proper" communication at the level of the soul. Knowledge is not attained. As the 
dialogue ensues: 
SOCRATES: You know, Phaedrus, that's the strange thing about writing, 
which makes it truly analogous to painting. The painter's products stand before us 
as though they were alive, but if you question them, they maintain a most majestic 
silence. It is the same with written words; they seem to talk to you as though they 
were intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what they say, from a desire 
to be instructed, they go on telling you just the same thing forever. And once it 
liS 
thing is put in writing, the composition, whatever it may be, drifts all over the 
place, getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of 
those who have no business with it; it doesn't know how to address the right 
people, and not to address the wrong. And when it is ill-treated and unfairly 
abused it always needs its parent to come to its help, being unable to defend itself. 
PHAEDRUS: Once again you are perfectly right. 
SOCRATES: But now tell me, is there another sort of discourse, that is 
brother to the written speech, but of unquestioned legitimacy? Can we see how it 
originates, and how much better and more effective it is than the other? 
PHAEDRUS: What sort of discourse have you in mind, and what is its 
origin? 
SOCRATES: The sort that goes together with knowledge, and is written in 
the soul of the learner, that can defend itself, and knows to whom it should speak 
and to whom it should say nothing. 
PHAEDRUS: You mean no dead discourse, but the living speech, the 
original of which the written discourse may fairly be called a kind of image 
(275d-e; 276a). 
Writing is but the seeking for knowledge, or a reminder of what is already known. It 
simply mobilizes a state of knowledge, reaffirms it; the actual genesis of knowledge is 
located somewhere else. Reading is parasitic on writing, which in turn is parasitic on 
speaking. The written word serves as the abandonment of knowledge, being, as Derrida 
would later call it, the original sin95 • Writing does not allow for the very process by which 
knowledge is constituted, how it is put into a shape acceptable to others. Speaking is to 
writing as original is to copy. Writing is, then, a copy, an image of the soul. Abandoned 
from its parent, the written word, unlike the spoken word, is frozen in time; it has no 
9S This is actually part of Derrida's hugely impressive and sustained critique of this prioritization of speech 
over writing. Here is not the place for an exposition of his arguments; suffice it to say that he questioned 
the nature of "voice" as a value of presence: the presence of the object and self-presence in living speech. 
This rendered problematic the idea of speech serving as the origin of meaning. I can only point to the 
"original" arguments found in, for instance, Speech and Phenomena (1973), OfGrammatology (1976) and, 
perhaps best, Writing and Difference (1978). [ am interested, here, to pursue how speech is being 
prioritized at a practical level, for practical purposes; Derrida tended to be overtly theoretical, at the 
expense of practical exposition (though see his classic exchange with Searle: e.g., Derrida, 1977). 
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means of defense against those who question it. It is dead. The alternative is dialectic, to 
which writing must be subordinated. And it derives its legitimacy as it speaks from, and 
to, the soul itself. Speaking is its closest sibling. 
At the centre of Platonic philosophy is the notion that knowledge is to be located 
in the encounter of the soul with "true being", which, based on intuition, is inexpressible, 
and which, if it can be communicated at any rate, requires the living presence of speaker 
and hearer96• Only within this presence is it possible to appropriate knowledge from, so to 
speak, soul to soul. Phaedrus goes on to suggest that through this dialectic a speaker 
"plants" his words of knowledge, "sows" them in his listener, and from whom new words 
"grow" (276e). This immediacy of communication imparts knowledge. Truth is preserved 
in words in their speaking. Dialectics is an activity, then, a movement between one 
speaker and another. Knowledge is acquired through this movement, whereby, as 
Socrates characterises it, as a speaker, you must have "a corresponding discernment of 
the nature of the soul, discover the type of speech appropriate to each nature, and order 
and arrange your discourse accordingly, addressing a variegated soul in a variegated style 
that ranges over the whole gamut of tones, and a simply soul in a simple style" (277b-c). 
This movement, which is knowledge-productive, changes shape and trajectory during the 
activity of speaking. Things arise which need to be engaged in situ: as and when they 
happen. What will be accepted, and acceptable, as knowledge will arise through the lived 
embodiment of speaking contexts. This is the "art" of dialectic. This is what makes the 
situated activity of dialectic important. 
We are present in a workshop. Harrold is prioritising her own speech over her 
own writing. Reading her books was considered unsatisfactory in successfully 
completing self-help; that is why we are all here now. And as her books fade into the 
background, never to be mentioned again, the person behind them appears. This is what 
the audience wants: Harrold, the person, not the writer. We had better be quiet - she is 
96 We have already seen how the self-help book attributes to itself an inherent shortcoming as a written 
form of communication, and the strategies it deploys to compensate. Self-help book authors are deprived of 
the presence made available through speech, as one author makes clear: "Don't let this be some dry rhetoric 
in a book. Read this as though I am speaking directly to you" (McOraw, 1999: 58). 
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approaching the stage now. A huge round of applause fills the hall, gradually falling to 
silence. Harrold starts. A few formal introductory remarks notwithstanding, she begins 
with a personal story: 
Harrold: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 Audience: 
7 Harrold: 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
about twenty years ago I was the most tmiserable 
person on the planet i.) probably i.) in all 
tr:uthfulness iO.2) and I decided there was a 
particular point I got to in my l:ife i.) and I >d'ya 
I just got bo:red< with being so d:ull i.) 
hehh hahh hehh hahh hehhi.) 
and that's the absolute truth i.) <I bored my self to 
death> I couldn't have a conversation i.) ibut) I got 
bored i.) and I decided there and then >y'know< i.) 
enough is enough (.i and tsornetirnes you do have to 
get to that point i.) sometimes you have to go low 
i.) low and a little bit lower i.) and then go d'ya 
know I've had this i.) <I have had this> up to here 
i.) .hhh i.) <so> what I did was a <ma:ssive i.) 
radical i.) drastic reinvention i.) that i.) possibly 
some of you have already doing yourtselves iO.2) 
possibly some of you might not have to i.) do i.) but 
for me everything had to go I had to change the way I 
looked at <the wo:rld> i.) so at that point I was 
very heavily involved i.) in <political th:ings> i.) 
tuhm i.) none of which seemed like they had worked 
o:ut (.) so y'know the miners strike was not 
successful cruise missiles did ( women's 
hospital did get closed i.) [ ... J so everything that 
I was involved with >Ken Livingston's fairs fair 
policy did get crushed< i.) .hhh so everything so I 
got very discourated but I also started to look at 
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28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
life and I.) <the w:orld> I.) in a very sort of 
powerless victim like w:ay 10.2) and tuhm I.) y'know 
that we'd have to wait for the revolution to come 
before we could be happy I ... ] so I had to really 
excavate 10.2) I had to dig deep I.) <change I.) 
everything> I had to change the way I looked at <the 
w:orld> I.) I didn't wanna be right anym:ore 10.2) I 
just wanted to be happy I.) cause at that point I was 
RIGHT about everything 10.3) I knew my position on 
everything I.) .hhh and it made me so miserable I.) I 
lived in this house with I.) uhm I.) it was a sort of 
feminist collective [ ... ] one of the things that we 
did to educate ourselves about (.) the real truth of 
I.) <the w:orld> I.) it was probably me that did it 
more than anyone I.) truthfully (.) is I.) I covered 
every spare space of w:all in our four story shared 
household with I.) <u:hm> I.) articles tfrom (.) 
y'know (.) every radical newspaper you care to think 
about (.) about y'know pretty depressing stuff really 
(.) how many people who'd died there what was 
happening there I.) >so< I.) everywhere you looked it 
was I.) complete doom and gloom I.) and I also 
realised I.) >in that same second<I.) that I couldn't 
reinvent mytself (.) and <stay in the same place> I.) 
This is a lengthy, but richly contextual, experiential report of Harrold's own reinvention. 
This is powerful stuff: an extreme example of reinvention. We see a requirement for 
change. Look at the context. Prior to her reinvention, Harrold's political consciousness 
had formed a substantive part of her identity. She lived with a feminist collective; 
surrounded herself with overtly political issues. Maybe she was a political activist? We 
do not know; but we do know that her political interests were proving unsuccessful. 
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Iconic events in left-wing politics were failing. And so the world was not going to 
provide what she wanted - to be happy. The results of so many contingencies, left 
entirely inarticulated, were nevertheless attributed to a lack of personal agency. Harrold 
interpreted this as a loss of control to make determinations in her life. She became a 
victim. If politics could not help, then she would have to step in. But reinvention did not 
emerge because there was anything noticeably "wrong" with her political persuasion, or 
the lifestyle through which it was expressed. To the contrary, she was upholding what she 
thought was "right". The point of departure, then, was not disrespectful of her feminist 
lifestyle up until that point. Her reputation, then, would remain intact. Harrold was 
simply personally unfulfilled. She wanted to take control of her life; she wanted to be 
happy. And departing from such an embedded lifestyle, far more significant than, for 
instance, a mere wish to be thin or exude more confidence or whatever, required this 
radical kind of reinvention. She abandoned her political lifestyle, where "lifestyle" 
connotes a whole "way of life". This is why she had to undergo a "massive, radical, 
drastic reinvention". A new life would need to be built. 
Being happy is a subjective assessment. You see, it comes down to individual 
choice; ask any individual. Harrold is embracing the notion of freewill and individual 
agency. This is a widely distributed understanding; it is, we know, the dominant mode of 
thought of Western culture. Individuals are what matter. Harrold is assuming and 
reproducing a view of the individual as enfeebled, in constant need of support and 
improvement, particularly through reflection and self-analysis, using a psychological, 
therapeutic discourse97• There is a fixation on the well being of self. Everything 
"external" disappears: that does not matter. We do not need to ask the audience to know 
that each of its members shares this image of themselves. Of course not: they live within, 
and are addressed from, an established ideology of individualistic thought. Harrold is 
reaching them, just as the self-help books have done, from within their zone of 
personality, just as Adorno described. 
97 For classic expositions (and critiques) of this view, Riefrs work is indispensable (see particularly 1966), 
as is Furedi (2003). 
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Reinvention produced this: Harrold has taken control. She is now happy. She has 
demonstrated the power of individual agency and the ability to, as one self-help book 
author put it, determine the breaks in life. Yes, this is self-help. But the demonstration is 
not simply in this narrative recounting; there is something more powerful. Harrold is 
telling as a professional life coach, author and consultant. She has her own consultancy in 
London. So: one of the results of this reinvention is the development of expertise; she is 
teaching, at a professional level, the principles of her own reinvention. Her expertise wi 11 
likely exceed the instances to which it will be applied. Members of the audience are 
unlikely to have to undergo such "drastic" reinvention: from feminist radical to 
professional life coach. So Harrold is more than sufficiently qualified to deal with the 
demands of her work. This is a narrative of expertise, then. [t is her narrative; she is 
entitled to speak about reinvention, to own that experience (Horton-Salway, 2004; Sacks, 
1992: 243). [t is authentic to the extent that it is based on actual events, which are 
reported in/as the first person singular (Hutchby, 200 I; Van Leeuwen, 200 I). 
Wait a moment. This is the same story that appeared in the book Reinvent 
Yourselj. The bit about her political endeavours, then the feelings of victimisation, and 
finally the feminist collective: yes, it is all here. So this is familiar to the audience, simply 
repetition? No. There is a greater authenticity being pursued by the audience, besides 
simply being the recipients of Harrold's personal story. We must recognise that they are 
undergoing their own experiential encounter. They have read the book, but Harrold was 
not "present" during reading. There was a distance between author and reader; writing 
got in the way. The workshop closes that distance. The clue is what is happening in the 
room. Look, there is interaction. The audience is responsive to Harrold's speech; they 
laugh, gasp and move in their seats when she tells them about her feminist friends. 
Harrold is responsive too. There is intonation in her voice, as she speaks. She stops when 
the audience laughs. Then she continues. This is dialectic. Already, at this early stage of 
an introductory story, Harrold is showing a "discernment of the nature of the soul". There 
is proximity. The story is being produced for, and in response to, the "movements" of the 
audience. Thus, the audience is in the presence of the narrative in its basic form: as it is 
spoken. [t comes from the soul, not from text, which mediates this form. This workshop 
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may be more expensive than the book, but there is an immediacy of what was delayed in 
reading. The audience has made contact with the soul of Harrold. And this proximity will 
only get more acute. 
4.3 Problem formulation 
Members are at the workshop to do something about their problems. They want 
something practical, besides reading. They were off to a good start when they were 
talking to other people at the beginning; now they are listening to Harrold. She tells us 
that reinvention involves discarding something that is no longer "productive", and 
replacing it with something that "works for you". She says it is not about becoming a 
different person so much as returning to, or renewing, "the real you". Things happen, she 
says, which prevent or conceal our "original spirit". Reinvention is respecifying an 
identity, which has changed shape in light of life events. Adjustment is necessary, back to 
the original. In removing the "debris" (a Harroldian term; "sludge" is another) concealing 
the original, and in pointing to the authentic, reinvention is positioned as itself part of that 
domain of authenticity. We are told that childhood is important here. "Those around us 
influenced us when we were young", Harrold says. She tells how her schoolteacher had 
labelled her in certain ways. It is during those formative years, we are told, that we pick 
up "unproductive" labels. These can hold us back; they prevent us from being who we 
want to be. Reinvention means overcoming these labels. Although events happened over 
which we may have had little control, we can step in, like Harrold did, and change how 
they affect us. 
We must use our pen and paper. Harrold folds over the first page of her flip chart, 
neatly resting on a tall stand so everyone can see. Our first exercise: scribble down our 
unproductive labels. She asks for five, but two will do if you have trouble. Members 
know how to follow instructions and make lists; it follows the path of the self-help book. 
It is all the more familiar as it was required activity when reading Harrold's Reinvent 
Yourself. We must not keep these labels to ourselves: that would defeat the point of a 
workshop. So Harrold asks for members to share one of their labels. Charles volunteers: 
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I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Charles: 
Harrold: 
Charles: 
Harrold: 
Charles: 
Harrold: 
Charles: 
Harrold: 
Charles: 
Harrold: 
Charles: 
Harrold: 
Charles: 
indecisive (0.3) 
<indecisive> (0.2) so Charles do you know where 
thattcame from (.) 
<u:h> (0.2) probably from (.) >u:hm< (0.3) previous 
job or u:h~ 
=>no< earlier (0.5) unless you were working at n:ine 
(0.2) 
from parents= 
~r:ight (0.3) what can y- (.) can you <rem:ember> (.) 
a <mother uh (0.4) your father> (.) actually saying 
that to tyou (0.2) h:ow did that come about (0.2) 
>yes< (O.2) 
and was it a regu~lar thing (O.3) 
'it happened qu:ite a lot' (O.2) 
got it (0.2) okay (.) .hhh and can you see that i- it 
(O.5) HAS it sort of sh:aped the way you see 
yourtself (0.4) 
yeah (.) 
a:lrighty (0.2) now would you like to dr:9E that 
label Charles (0.3) 
'ye: ah' (O.2) 
Charles has provided Harrold with his label. Harrold has inquired about its origin and its 
influence in his life. She asks if Charles would like to change things: to drop the label. So 
personal experiences are being confirmed, known only to Charles and reported so 
Harrold knows too. She has given Charles the opportunity to display his agency of the 
problem by specifying its features and his relation to it, in his terms. This is his problem. 
It is formulated with his words, his voice. And he wants to do something about it. Thus, 
plainly communication has been successful; Harrold has been informed that Charles 
wants to drop the label. This is the appeal of dialectic; Charles and Harrold defend and 
modify their contributions in response to the other. Harrold is applying her expertise, to 
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specifics, to an individual: Charles. He did not get this personal address at his particular 
problem when reading Reinvent Yourself. Harrold wants to know things; Charles tells it 
how it is. Charles wants to drop a label that has its life "out there", away from the 
workshop, and Harrold can help, by engaging it "in here", in the workshop. Here is the 
attraction of the workshop: things can be brought in from out there in the world and dealt 
with in situ. Right here, where everyone can see. So far, so good: Harrold is finding out 
what things are like. And everyone is sitting comfortably, in the warm. 
Let us not get sentimental, just because we are in the company of a professional. 
This is not a simple and unproblematic procedure that "accesses" an unproductive label. 
[t is not mere knowledge confirmation. Rather, both parties are co-producing a specific 
interactional order. Charles responds to Harro[d in a way that attends to her talk as 
questions. Harrold treats these prior turns as satisfying what she has made "conditionally 
relevant", which is to say, answers (cf. Schegloff, 1968). Moreover, the grammatical 
form of these questions, as part of their design, expects not simply any answer, but a 
preferred answer (cf. Pomerantz, 1984), or a "type-conforming response" (Raymond, 
2006). This is what Charles does. His turns are short, with no elaboration; he is treating 
this as part of a chain of questions. Each answer affirms what Harrold has put forward to 
be affirmed with her questions. His turns are agreeing to the terms of the questions to 
which they are a response. Things proceed with a line of common activities: question and 
answer sequences. Harrold's questions set the terms by which Charles is to respond. [n 
other words, these questions "maximally exploit the agenda setting and subsequent 
conduct constraining potential of initiating a course of action" (p. 119). We see 
indecisiveness, but it does not follow from what Charles is like, beyond this occasioning 
in which it is present. It is produced as a specific kind of problem, arranged according to 
the conditions of Harrold's questions. This is the power she exerts, and the control she 
commands, by her use of interrogative syntax. [s this the substance of expertise? 
The problem "in here" is different from the problem "out there". [n the workshop 
Harrold is making the problem fit a specific set of conditions. [t is presented with the 
resources "in here", and is produced as a specific domain of phenomena. Specific 
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agencies, actors and circumstances get ignored, while others become relevant. Problems 
are produced in a similar way in medical settings. Heritage & Robinson (2006) note that, 
during health consultations, patients typically have an opportunity to present their 
medical concerns. This is where we see the work of "problem presentation" (p.89). 
However, it is physicians that typically initiate and tenninate problem presentation. 
Physicians ask questions. They want to know about problems. When they ask questions, 
physicians go "first" in the interaction, while patients, who provide answers, go "second". 
Physicians' opening questions, and what they make conditionally relevant as an answer, 
heavily constrain what patients can say. These questions of inquiry "frame" the character 
of the problem, restricting how patients explore their condition. Because the interaction 
always returns to physicians, due to the sequential organisation of this interaction, they 
can select to, and routinely do, terminate a topic, initiate a new topic, or otherwise move 
the interaction on. They have the ability, then, using interactional resources not available 
to patients, to determine the status of patients' problems. Here, then, problems emerge 
out of the design of the interaction, and the extent to which physicians and patients are 
aligned to the work it is designed to perform. They become problems as a performance 
"in here", in the consulting room. The context of the "out there" disappears. 
Asking known information questions 98 
Harrold is like a friendly physician, always asking questions. When Harrold conducts her 
workshop, like the physician in the context of the consulting room, she plays a vital role 
in how problems are produced. Dislocated from "out there" and relocated "in here", 
Harrold becomes an agent in the activity of problem formulation. There is something 
else, aside from the asymmetry arising from the distribution of questions and answers. 
Harrold had earlier spoken about how we acquire unproductive labels early in life. This 
has negative effects. It prevents us from being who we want to be, she said. Look at some 
of her questions: "can you <rem:ember> (.) a <mother uh (0.4) your father> (.) actually 
saying that to tyou (0.2) h:ow did that come about". Does this seem to be a question 
98 The notion of "known information" questions is taken from Searle (1969). Such questions, as the name 
suggests, are posed when the questioner already has the answer. We find these questions in classroom 
discourse, where the teacher, already knowing the answer~ uses them for evaluative purposes (see Koshik, 
2002; Lee, 2007; Mehan, 1979). 
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whose answer is ostensibly already "available"? Has it not been assumed by Harrold's 
earlier remarks, even given in the content of the question? Surely parents are the single 
largest influence on a young person's life? And this: "HAS it sort ofsh:aped the way you 
see your1'self'. Again, a candidate answer, "yes", which is given, has been proposed by 
virtue of the label being an "influence" in Charles's life. Its "unwanted" influence talks 
directly to the reasons for Charles's presence; he already knows he wants to drop the 
label. And another one: "would you like to dr:Qll. that label Charles". Could this possibly 
be simply a redundant question whose answer is utterly presupposed, given that Charles 
is present, wants to pursue reinvention? These questions continue: 
Harrold: --> so what do you nee- (.) what's the bel:ief that you 
2 need to replac:: (.) what do you need to put <in 
3 place> (.) that all:ows you to see yourself tas (0.3) 
4 the opposite (.) decisive (0.3) so what's the 
5 opposite o:f (0.2) u:hm (.) indecisive (.) >to you< 
6 (.) 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Charles: 
Harrold: 
Charles: 
or need to be decisiveo I need to make decisions (0.4) 
o:kay (.)well Rita has a microphone so you might as 
well use it (0.6) 
>oh< (0.2) hehh hahh (.) yeah (.) tr (.) r need 
11 [to makeJ 
12 Harrold: --> [so you'Jre sort of indecisive (.) <y:ou>= 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Charles: 
Harrold: 
=yeah (.) r n:eed to make decisions (.)a lot of them 
we- whether the- (.) >y'know< (0.4) r shouldn't be 
afraid of making mistakes (.) y·tknow (0.2) 
>got< it (.) 
Harrold has provided an answer to her own question - look at it, repackaged with a bunch 
of other questions as if it is presenting something new. The opposite of indecisive is of 
course decisive; we all know that. Harrold knows it too. She then repeats what is already 
known, formulated as another question: "so you're sort of indecisive". As Charles 
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provides an affirmative, type-conforming response, it is receipted with a "got it". Harrold 
now has something she did not have before: she has got it. But what has Harrold got? 
Whatever it is, Harrold is trying to get it from someone else too. Later she asks for a label 
from Sophie, another member of the audience. Sophie has trouble reporting her label, so 
Harrold helps out: 
Sophie: °I'rn not (lov. ) 
2 (0.6) 
3 very loveab. (0.4) I'm not (. ) very (f:eel) 0 (0.2) 
4 Harrold: sorry (. ) h:old the micropho[ne ~ (. ) 
5 Sophie: [o:hh) 
6 Harrold: -.> is it I'm unlovable ( . ) 
7 Sophie: yes (. ) 
8 Harrold: -.> >is it< (. ) tI'm not good enough to b:e loved (. ) >is 
9 it< (. ) I'm not w: orthy (0.2) 
10 Sophie: a:ll of that (. ) 
II Harrold: -.> <"k:ay> (0.2) >80< (0.4) is that still r: :unning 
12 through you (0.2) are you still w:earing tthat ( . ) 
13 Sophie: yes (. ) 
14 Harrold: -.> is that a dr:ag: (. ) 
15 Sophie: yes (. ) 
Even although Sophie has affirmed what the label is - unlovable - Harrold poses new, 
modified questions: ">is it< (.) tI'm not good enough to b:e loved (.) >is it< (.) I'm not 
w:orthy". We suppose that Harrold just wants to be sure, in asking if her candidate 
answers are what Sophie "had in mind". So in "completing" Sophie's tum, Harrold is 
simply bringing to light what Sophie has failed to, on her behalf (cf. Antaki, Diaz & 
Collins, 1996). Sophie then agrees: "a:ll of that (.)". Harrold has now got it; she receipts it 
with "okay". But there are more questions whose answers, like Charles's answers, are 
presupposed, namely by the fact that Sophie is present in a reinvention workshop. The 
label is still running through her; it is a drag. The questions are bringing nothing new to 
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the table. They are repeating what is already known. Given that the presence of the 
audience indicates an admission that they wish to undertake reinvention, to some yet to 
be determined extent, and that Harrold has specified how labels "cause" what reinvention 
is supposed to repair, what is the function of these questions? 
Look again at the sequential development of these interactions. We have topic 
initiating questions. Then answers. More questions, sometimes revised or modified, 
follow. To a large extent, then, these answers are providing resources for Harrold to 
reformulate or develop further the agenda, by asking more questions (cf. Atkinson & 
Drew, 1979; Hutchby, 2006; Wooffitt, 2006). Harrold is building a case, or an argument 
to be used later, by simply using the resources from prior answers, even when they are 
single turn affirmatives. Her questions transparently draw on, and are an extension of, 
prior remarks to prior questions. That these questions are receipted with answers, 
however obvious are those answers, gives them a self-evident significance. Although 
these questions may give the impression of being impartial, neutral forms of inquiry -
simply finding out what Harrold's members "think", "feel" or whatever - the fact that 
they seek preferred and specifically expected answers means they are nothing of the sort. 
They are embodied with presuppositional content about aspects of members' actions, 
interests and so forth (Heritage, 2003). 
Harrold's questions provide the motivational content for the answers they receive. 
Members' knowledge of, and experience with, an unproductive label, for instance, 
becomes the foundation for answering. That the format of the interaction has produced 
that version of events is entirely concealed99• So: Sophie considers it a drag to be carrying 
the label "unlovable" because she is unlovable, not because the terms of the question, that 
is, "is that a drag", specify that response as the expected answer. No matter. This way, 
99 This is of course a candidate instance of mundane reason '5 assumption that an objective reality exists and 
is external to, and unconnected with, the contexts in which it is produced (Pollner, 1987). Members' 
problems belong "out there", in the world, not "in here", in the workshop. Harrold is not producing, and 
neither, for that matter, are members, the reality that they are merely describing. remarking on or 
representing. 
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knowledge is established and work is done quickly and economically. Harrold's 
questions are designed to retrieve "no problem answers" (Heritage, 2002a) and more 
generally to avoid and guard against "troubles" in answering (Houtkoop-Steenstra & 
Antaki, 1997). And Harrold gets what she is looking for. Her questions privilege this type 
of experience of unproductive labels, which are known in these situated terms, as answers 
to these questions. At any rate, due to their routine production, these answers act as the 
audience's understanding and evaluation, which is to say, the reason for their import (cf. 
Heritage, 2003: 65). Each question is legitimated and seen to have relevance for the 
unfolding interaction. Harrold keeps asking questions. The audience keeps providing 
answers. Each respective role is secured. The reason for each next question is to be found 
in the answer a prior question received. There is a cycle. Both parties are tied to this 
cyclical motion, and their talk makes sense within it. Is this the attraction of dialectic, 
which was absent when reading a self-help book? 
The omnirelevance o/the workshop 
Posing known answer questions serves a specific function. It performs institutional 
business, or better: it is part of the performance of Harrold, the professional life coach. 
This is doing life coaching. How to get closer to this? Atkinson & Drew (1979) have 
shown convincingly how specific questioning formats - particularly asking known 
information questions - perform institutional work in courtroom cross-examinations. 
When defendants are asked questions whose answers are either known to the counsel 
beforehand, or are ostensibly already known from prior answers, it is for a good reason. 
These answers, given in response to questions by defendants, display for the court the 
public commitment to a version of events. It determines facts. It confirms to the court 
what "really" happened, and how defendants should be placed in terms of those facts. 
Prosecution is based on whether a defendant committed the crime. Questions are a device 
for determining the basis of that commitment. Their obviousness makes the process of the 
institutional work being carried out as straightforward as possible. It simplifies things by 
discarding all of the unwanted, or irrelevant details, leaving nothing but the facts. Just 
answer the question as stated, so everyone can hear: innocent or guilty. That is all the 
court wants to know. 
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We can get closer still. Edwards & Stokoe (2008) have noted how the use of 
known answer or "silly" questions during police interrogations is designed to determine 
the "knowledge state" of a suspect at the time of the crime. These questions, and more 
specifically the answers they obtain, are criminally implicative; they are carrying out 
specific, institutional work. Thus by posing questions related to the crime to which 
suspects have already admitted, police officers set about eliciting and confirming 
testimonial accounts. They wish to determine the intentions of the suspect: whether they 
meant - intended - to commit the crime. They pursue criminal intent. Suspects' answers 
to silly questions are official statements of commitment to a course of action; in 
confirming whether a crime was planned, for instance, they can be recorded, as Edwards 
& Stokoe (p. 93 my italics) remark, '''for the record"'. 
There it is, right there. Harrold's known information questions are designed to 
produce public commitment to a point of view. Or again, we might say that, in answering 
these questions, members are committing themselves to a perspective. They have done 
so, when Harrold has so courteously allowed them to speak for themselves, with their 
own voice. Those questions act to "reveal" the soul, to bring out what needs to be brought 
out. And right into the open, so the audience can see. This is truth, as it comes from 
speaking, which comes from the soul. "Who am I to argue", as Harrold will say, "if that 
is your truth". Is it a drag, being unlovable? Do you want to drop that label? Harrold must 
know what the problem is, and whether these members want to do something about it. 
That is all she wants to know. Precision is needed; all "surplus" detail must be removed. 
And we must remember: all of this is not taking place in a quiet, confidential office at 
Harrold's consultancy in London. There may not be a jury, or a prosecution, but other 
people are here, lots of them, listening with interest. An ethnographer is present, 
conspicuously recording every word. Although we may only hear one, or perhaps two 
people speaking at once, no doubt Harrold and her recipient, we can see the audience. 
Look: 
Peter: I I'm saying this as u:hh (.) something I'm w:orking 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
Harrold: 
Peter: 
And this ... 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Harrold: 
Sophie: 
on (.) o>this isn't something I arn<o (.) 
okay peter (.) sit tup straight there (0.3) 
... lift the microphone up (.) 
yeah (.) 
no (.) just let her talk (.) cause I wanna get it in 
her word~ (0.3) s:o (.)what's the l:abel (0.2) the 
label will be something like (.) tI:'m something or 
other (0.9) 
°I'm not (firm) (0.6) (very love) (0.4) (I'm not (.) 
very f:eel)' (0.2) 
7 Harrold: ... sorry (.) h:old the microph[one u]p (.) 
8 Sophie: 
And this ... 
Harrold: don't make it difficult (.) trust me (.) the evidence 
2 is there (0.2)I just want you to re~lax (0.5) allow 
3 for the possibility that the evidence is th:ere (0.2) 
4 ... and I want you just to give me the evidence (.) hold 
5 up the microphone so we can hear you (0.2) just l:ook 
6 at your tlife (6.0) 
. Can you hear the microphone? It is simply a piece of technology allowing the voice to be 
amplified so other people can hear. Yes, but why its presence? Harrold is addressing each 
person individually; they, in turn, are addressing Harrold, not the audience. Why does 
Harrold not simply stand closer to Charles when they speak about his label? Then there 
would be no need for the microphone. This is why: "What did Peter say to Harrold?" "I 
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did not hear Sophie's unproductive label" etc. Members of the audience would be 
deprived of the content of the interaction, the in situ details. And Harrold wants them to 
hear. So the microphone is a rhetorical device; it is building an argument for the 
relevance of these stretches of talk beyond the two-party interaction in which they occur. 
It is important that Peter lifts the microphone up. The audience has to be able to hear 
what he says. Sophie might be an individual, but that does not matter here. The audience 
does not want to know about her uniqueness. The details of how she has been influenced 
by an unproductive label must be comparable; they must be recognisable by the audience. 
However specific her case, it is being made to travel across the audience. Identities are 
being compared. People are encouraged to look for similarities, not differences. A 
microphone is one thing, but: 
Charles: yeah (.) from parents (.) 
2 Harrold: -+ r:ight (.) cause y'see (.) <here's> the fr:eaky 
3 thing (0.4) that if we really get att::ached (.) to 
4 <some>tthing (.) a label or a bel:ie! (.) about 
5 ourselves >tthen< (.) life is one great big self 
6 fulfilling prophecy (.) we go out there and we 
7 acc:umulate evidence (0.4) to support that bel:ief 
8 (0.3) we tend to tfind (.) other people perhaps (.) 
9 reinf:orcing that original <tidea> (.) >are you twith 
10 me< (0.3) .hhh >so< (.) parents (.) Charles (0.3) 
Harrold is speaking with Charles again. She then turns, moving her eye contact, to 
address the audience, abandoning her exchange with him. This is the production of a 
meta-account of "what people are like" (arrowed). The pronoun has shifted from singular 
to plural, from Charles to some generic plurality, "we". This refers to all people; this is 
everybody in the workshop. Charles may be a specific instance, but his story is relevant 
to the audience because he is an instance of a general phenomenon, which is applicable to 
everyone. We all hold beliefs; we, like Charles, can find evidence to support our beliefs. 
But beliefs can be unproductive, and this can be a problem, no matter who you are. 
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Labels then need to be discarded. So people have these labels, and lots of them are here, 
at the workshop. It is no different for Lilly, someone else who offered a label at Harrold's 
request: 
2 
3 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
lthat's- (0.2) <gr:ea[t> II mean that may 
[u:hml 
well be the case (.) 
4 Lilly: uhm (.) 
5 Harrold: y:ea[hl 
6 Lilly: [ul ohm (.) 
7 Harrold: .hhh can 1 just <process> you a tiny bit 
8 further on this (.) 
9 Lilly: u:hm (.) 
10 Harrold -> >okay< (0.2) this is a good way to <u:n~> any 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Audience: 
Harrold: 
(0.5) resistance that you h:ave to making changes in 
your tlife (.) so whether it's a >we:ight< issue 
whether it's a <boyfriend> issue (0.3) >uh< (.) like 
getting one (.) not having one that sort of thing (.) 
whether it's your j:ob or whatever (.) see sometimes 
people say they want something (.) and then they come 
to me because they're not getting the result that 
they (.) <s:ay they want> and 1 process them fo- for 
about one minute (0.6) and they realise d'ya know 
(.)1 don't want a boyfriend at all (.) am 1 cr:alzy 
(.) do 1 wanna come home at the end of an 
exha:us[ting day to halve to talk to somebody (.) 
[hehh hahh hehhl 
are you <m:ad> (.) 
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Harrold has just spent the last fifteen minutes speaking with Lilly, "processing" her about 
her beliefs about her weight. So we have another two-party interaction: Harrold and Lilly. 
But look, like her interaction with Charles, Harrold departs from her exchange of turns 
with Lilly, and begins her meta-narrative again (arrowed). The rest of the world is now 
the recipient of her talk. Lilly has problems with her weight, which is specific. Harrold 
has been asking her to look at her beliefs, so Lilly will see things differently. What 
Harrold has been doing, while talking to Lilly, is not specific to this case: "this is a good 
way to <u:ncover> any (0.5) resistance that you h:ave to making changes in your ilife". 
She is talking about a general principle, applying it in Lilly's case and making sense of 
this specificity in general terms. The general, because it is general, is expandable and can 
be applied to all of us. Weight, relationships, employment: everything. It does not matter 
about specifics. It all follows a common pattern. There you go: people are being asked to 
abandon their sense of uniqueness, and enjoin in sharing a common problem. But why? 
What is the function of this import of a collective identity? 
4.4 An expert prescription 
There is an audience present. That means one thing: a performance has been taking place. 
There has been a performer and her name is Fiona Harrold. This is not simply questions 
and answers, like you might see elsewhere, but part of her script. This is Harrold doing 
her job, applying her expertise. She is life coaching. The expertise she has developed 
from her own reinvention, the years of managing a life coaching consultancy, all of those 
places "out there", is now present "in here". It is being performed, here and now. The 
situated use of questions, the respect for asking individuals about individual problems - it 
all plays a part. 
Her expertise has been revealing. There cannot be total specificity in this self-help 
workshop, absolute individuality. For one thing, Harrold needs to be able to comment on 
Charles's indecisiveness, while moving to Lilly's weight. Then there is Sophie; she is 
unlovable. How to deal with these things? Commonality deals with them. Charles might 
have trouble making decisions, and Lilly might have difficulty seeing herself as naturally 
slim, but it is all about beliefs. These separate threads are engaged as a homogeneous 
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unity in order to unify the differences. Each member shares a problem in what they 
believe in, how they think. We see that beliefs do get specified. But they are not Lilly's 
beliefs; they are not Sophie's, either. What is specified is a conceptual, or idealised 
version: a general class of belief. This has a universal quality. Harrold identifies this as an 
original spirit, or the real you. Charles is made to fit to it. That is what prevents him from 
being more decisive: not fitting. Sophie has deviated from it; she needs to love herself 
again, on the inside. Vicky, who we will see later, fits it perfectly; she has self-belief, and 
has developed courage from having to live with a strict father. She does not need to do 
anything. 
What distinguishes the members of the workshop, their uniqueness, is now what 
brings them together: they all have beliefs in need of modification. There is a common 
problem. Harrold can point to it; the audience can point to it too. But each party has to do 
work to see the same thing, to see the common problem. For members, the problem is out 
in the world; for Harrold, the problem is the answers to her questions in the workshop. 
She is making sense out of something that the audience is having trouble with, using a 
normative, generalised model as the explanatory framework 100. This model provides the 
gloss; it covers all of those things which have been unspecified, unarticulated. These 
things are left "out there". And members are being encouraged, for their own 
understanding, to work towards it. We need to note that, thus far, a problem with self-
belief is a strategy simply transferred from the self-help book; just select anyone of them 
at random and see for yourself. Try Harrold's own Reinvent Yourself, starting at page 
twenty-nine. Members are familiar with the script; they have read the books. The 
question is: what does expertise tell Harrold to do next? What is the prescription for 
unproductive labels, Ms Harrold? We are at a workshop, after all. Charles wants to be 
more decisive, so: 
100 Antaki (2007) has discussed the ways in which "problems", as clients are reporting them, get glossed by 
therapists with the use of idiomatic expressions (universal, generalised accounts of the state of the world, 
people). The inference is that the problem becomes reportable and thus manageable; it becomes knowable 
as an instance of a general phenomenon. But: it implies that the "problem" is being "volunteered" by 
clients. Here, idiomatic expressions are simply summaries of what clients have said. What this does is fit 
"an emerging general pattern of idiomatic normalisation of unhappy experience" (p. 534). 
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1 Harrold: 
2 
3 
4 
5 Charles: 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 Harrold: 
11 
12 Charles: 
13 Harrold: 
14 
15 Charles: 
16 Harrold: 
an affirmation for you to work with (.) >to help< 
that transition (.) and if somebody next to Charles 
(.) writes it down for thim (.) i:s (0.5) I'm now 
ready to trust myself (0.9) 
(1. 9) 
I'm (.) >tNAT<~urally (.) let's get r::eally >really< 
outrageous here (0.2) I'm tnaturally (0.8) ~decisive 
(2.0) 
does tthat lift your spirit (.) when I say that (0.3) 
I'm naturally decisive (.) 
«swallows)) <y[es» 
[th)at you Charles are (.) naturally 
decisive[e) 
[Oy)esO (.) yes (0.2) 
.hhh (.) thanks Charles (.) 
Harrold's prescription for becoming more decisive is the production of an affirmation. 
Charles is required first to listen to the affirmation as Harrold produces it; someone else 
must write it down for him. He needs to concentrate, as this is important enough to 
warrant total attention. After all, this is going to help. Harrold asks if the affirmation has 
lifted his spirit, just to get confirmation. "Yes", Charles says. So the affirmation is 
delivered: job done. Charles can get on with becoming more decisive. He will have to use 
that scribbled down affirmation when he gets home, perhaps speaking it aloud in front of 
the mirror. Harrold is satisfied that the affirmation has worked, as Charles has endorsed 
it, and so moves on; there are more people to help. But hold on. The affirmation helps, 
but how? Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, there is the interactional organisation in 
which the affirmation has been produced. Charles's response was built into the design of 
the question. He was aligned to the activity being performed in Harrold's question, and 
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gave a type-conforming response 101. This is a phenomenon in itself, the way the 
"internal" structure of talk determines what is said, and much has been said ofthat lO2 • 
Harrold is concealing so much detail with the style and manner of her interaction 
with Charles. How does Harrold know that Charles is naturally decisive? What is this 
based on? In what circumstances does Charles display indecisiveness? And in what 
company? What are these decisions, exactly? How accurate is the prescription? Is it the 
"right" one? Specifics are disregarded. We are not told about them; and Harrold does not 
ask, either. As we have seen, they do not matter anyway, because we need only concern 
ourselves with generalisations. The affirmation is being prescribed to "mop up" and 
account for particulars. There is other detail that we do not see: the contexts of the 
application of this affirmation. The mistakes. The successes. That is to say, doing being 
more decisive. We do not see what those two little words, and the hyphen, refer to: self-
help. There is a good chance Charles has already used affirmations. He has read the book, 
and is now at the workshop, because the book was not enough. Harrold has finished but 
Charles still needs to perform self-help. His quest is still pending. It is placed back "out 
there", away from the workshop, reunited with the details we were not told about in the 
formulation of the problem. Harrold told us that simply "receiving" an affirmation is not 
sufficient; it will have to be applied. She says so in Reinvent Yourselflol. And we know 
she had to work hard to reinvent herself, as she has carefully told us. Old beliefs may 
101 There is a normative pattern for second pair parts: requests are granted, invitations are accepted and 
confirmation of what is proposed in the grammar of questions is normatively preferred, except, for 
instance, when what is proposed includes self-deprecations or accusations. We must be sure that this is not 
the expression of the individual as such, a psychological preference, but a normative structure ofthe design 
of adjacency pair turns. This has been called a "grammaticalized normativity" (Heritage, 2002b: (427). 
102 Conversation analysis has been established as a field of sociological inquiry, better equipped than any 
other, to describe the fine details of the machinery of talk in interaction. Talk is its topic and domain of 
p,henomenon; everything else (the world, people, things) arises out of, and emerges from, talk. 
03 "Practise, Practise, Practise. Take every opportunity to practise your new persona. Get those new habits 
in place. Be real. Get them booked into your diary. They won't happen automatically or overnight· that's 
not the nature of habits. They need to be adopted and followed. If you want to be 'an exerciser', get those 
classes and runs built in to your diary. When you falter, get back into it again. Good habits are for li fe, not 
just for now" (Harrold, 2004: 35). "Once you know what you want and have aligned your perspective, you 
have to do something to make things happen. The difference between thinkers and doers is what they do at 
this point. Rewing up your psychology will only take you so far. The next step is doing something. 
Demonstrate your commitment to your desires and plans. Get busy. You know what you need to do, so just 
do it!" (p. 69·70). "Think less and be more the person you want to be. [ ... ] The more you behave as you are 
confident, cheerful, happy and optimistic, the more you'll feel it and become it" (p. 88). 
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have been replaced with new beliefs, but that was not enough. A whole lifestyle was 
abandoned, replaced with a new one. Then there were new friends, a new house and, 
reflecting her desire to be happy, a new profession. So many things contributed to her 
reinvention, so many details. Charles is given an affirmation to work with. That is all. 
Resistance to prescription 
The internal structure of talk does not always determine what is said. People do not 
always align themselves with what other people say. [t looks like this. We see that Sophie 
is not excluded from the power of an affirmation: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
\3 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Harrold: 
Sophie: 
Harrold: 
Sophie: 
Harrold: 
Sophie: 
Harrold: 
Sophie: 
Harrold: 
Sophie (.) >okay< (.) okay (0.3) °I'm Sophie (.) I'm 
innocent (0.5) I'm Sophie (0.2) I'm a loving (0.3) 
lovable (.) person (.)1 des:erve to be loved (0.4)1 
Sophie (.) am a loving (0.2) lovable person (0.3) 1 
deserve (0.2) to be loved (.) I l:ove (0.4) and 
accept myself (0.2) exactly (.) as 1 am (0.9) 
>is tthat< (.) any of that (.) thittin- (.) <spots> 
(.) is any of that (.) hitting home (0.2) 
<yes> (0.4) 
which (.) which o:nes (.) which wordsI0.6) 
or accept myselfO 
(0.7) 
1 >LOVE< (.) and accept myself~ 
~I love and accept myself 
11. 2) 
<exactly> as I am (.) 
exactly as I am (0.5) 
let me ask you this (0.2) do you love yourtself 
(0.6) 
do you (0.2) tf::ind yourself I.) lovable 
(0.6) 
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22 Sophie: ~ u: ohm (0.3) >no< (0.2) 
We have seen this procedure before, with Charles. Harrold wants the affirmation to be 
carried out; she wants Sophie to repeat it back to her, verbatim. And Sophie does. But 
when Harrold asks if Sophie loves herself, as repeating the affirmation should confirm or 
restate, she says no (arrowed). Is this a retraction, saying yes to the affirmation, then no to 
the question? No. Sop hie is required to say yes: the affirmations do hit home with her. 
The problem is that Sophie will not be won over by the work of the affirmation. Sophie's 
resistance to the affirmation is not evidence, for her, that she is unlovable. We must 
acknowledge Sophie's sheer honesty here; the affirmation will not simply "wash" over 
the problem and she is not going to follow the endorsement of yes. Things are more 
complicated than that. However, for Harrold, whether Sophie loves herself is a function 
of the affirmation. It is and can be the only evidence available and needed to confirm (or 
deny) her "lovableness". So Harrold suggests several reasons for this denial; she accounts 
for that non-conforming response. Harrold says this is an instance of a lack of self-
awareness, Sophie being unable to see the label needing to be replaced. This means 
another label is not forthcoming, and therefore there is no evidence to justify why this 
new label should be present. This generalised account is being used to explain a specific 
case: Sophie's "no". Resistance to the affirmation is a problem attributed to Sophie, and 
not an inadequacy of the affirmation as a prescription. Harrold assures Sophie that the 
evidence, that she is lovable, is there - it just needs to be uncovered. Harrold searches for 
it, with more questions: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Sophie: 
Audience: 
Harrold: 
°u:hmo (.) I I give my husband three ch:ildren(O.2) 
hehh hahh hehh h[ahh hehh hahh 
[((clapping)) (4.0) 
and that (.) <to y:ou> (.) d:emonstrates (0.4) to 
you being a lovable person (0.2) I just need to 
6 understand the way you're seeing this (1.0) 
7 Sophie: -> y:e (.) yes (0.21 or no (.) bec:ause (0.5) I'm 
8 confused about that (.) tif my husband really loves 
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9 
10 
11 
Harrold: 
me (0.3) 
never mind your husband loving you (.) I'm talking 
about y:o[u lovi]ng you (0.2) 
12 Angie: [ty:eah] 
13 Sophie: -> but the(h)re's a confusion there hehh (.) 
14 Harrold: no I just want you to love you (.) 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Sophie: 
Harrold: 
yeah (.) 
that's all I wan- (0.2) right now (.) that's all I'm 
concerned with (.) is how y:ou feel about you (.) 
>never mind about your husband (.) or anybody else< 
(0.2) I want y:ou (.) to look at something you have 
done (.) that leaves you with a feeling a pr::ide 
(0.2) 
Sophie has provided evidence: she has given her husband three children. But look what 
happens when Harrold asks if this is demonstrable evidence. A type-conforming response 
is given, which is then modified with a non-conforming response (line 7, arrowed). 
Sophie has departed from the constraints of the preferred response option - a "yes" -
made relevant by the question, introducing other, relevant material: the status of her 
relationship with her husband. One of the features of marriage, which Sophie is pointing 
to, is having children. It indicates part of a loving relationship that husband and wife 
share. But Sophie is not sure if her husband loves her; this is evidence that she is not 
lovable. Harrold dismisses Sophie's uncertainty but, once again, Sophie does not accept 
the terms and presuppositions embodied in Harrold's question (line 13, arrowed)104. The 
question did not permit her to include the details of her marriage. These contingencies, 
not accounted for in the design of the question, are once again rejected as relevant to the 
job at hand: finding evidence of Sophie's feelings toward herself. 
104 Even when a type-conforming response is preferred, recipients in talk often provide a non-conforming 
response, displaying their departure from the constraints embodied in the initial speaker's turn (e.g., 
Heritage, 2003; Raymond, 2006). Consequently, recipients, in their turns at talk, often introduce additional 
or new information which was not made relevant, or allowed for, in the first speaker's turn/inquiry/question 
etc. We see this with Sophie. 
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Things were far simper with the affirmations. And there was obviously a 
preference for them as a device with which to establish "loving oneself". The beauty is 
that they were not evidence-based: they did not require the resources of these "others" 
(her husband) for an answer. But, since they did not work, or were not endorsed by 
Sophie, Harrold is searching for and has found alternative evidence, but it is getting too 
complicated. It is missing the point, the source of the problem. So in an effort to erase 
unnecessary details, to get to the fundamentals, (to return to the simplicity of the 
affirmations?), Harrold is discarding the relevance of Sophie's relationship with her 
husband. These other details can be, so to speak, stricken from the record 105. Harrold tries 
again, and asks more questions about Sophie's role as a mother: 
2 
3 
Harrold: so I.) can you s:ee 10.3) that you were a good 
tmother I.) that you we- I.) that you are I.) a good 
mother I.) that you are tgenerous 10.3) 
4 Sophie: --> °noo 10.2) 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Harrold: 
Audience: 
Harrold: 
OOS:ophi:: :eoo (0.6) are your children very different 
I.) from I.) other peoples I.) childr[en 10.2) tlJike 
[ohehh hahh 0 J 
I.) did you have to get up in the middle of the night 
and f:eed them an all that ~stuff 10.9) 
10 Sophie: --> °yesO I.) but it wasn't difficult 10.3) 
Harrold is offering a version of childrearing - what mothering is like. She is producing a 
gloss of what a mother's work should entail; it ought to provide the evidence of Sop hie's 
loveableness. Sophie does not buy this as an adequate description of her own experience. 
She first offers a non-conforming response (line 4), then later, a type-conforming 
response, which becomes non-conforming (line 10). "Yes (.) but it wasn't difficult", 
Sophie says. While Harrold is trying to produce motherhood as remarkable and in need of 
105 Drew (1992) provides an extensive analysis of a similar sequence of interaction in the context of 
courtroom examination. 
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special attention, Sophie is treating it as an ordinary, normal part of life. It was done, and 
done as mothering should be done, but that is no reason to justify its use as a solution to 
the "problem-as-it-is-being-produced-here". Sophie's display of honesty, and not her 
display of resistance, is not allowing Harrold's positive thinking prescription to 
characterise her situation. Harrold needs something else, another point of entry. 
Seeking depth 
What do we see? Harrold is certainly working hard at her performance as a life coach. 
But that does not mean self-help is being performed. Harrold needs to know how Sophie 
is "seeing things" and to find out what she thinks about herself and her life. But we all 
know what thinking means as a prescription for self-help. Exactly: it is of little value 
without action. This is supposed to be a workshop that members attend in order to meet 
an insufficiency from reading self-help books. It is supposed to exceed the activity of 
reading, but we remain at the level of thinking, which we know is not much better than 
reading. Thinking does not do anything; it is inactivity. And that is bad. Just read 
Reinvent Yourself. Charles will need to engage the world away from the workshop and 
deal with those ad hoc, situation-specific concerns in his daily life, as he has done before, 
if he is to make good decisions. Sophie still needs to love herself, but it is not taking 
place here. That will come later, "out there". So we simply have the recitation of the self-
help book, with its inadequacy plainly in view. 
Things get complicated when the endorsement of yes is not followed. When 
affirmations are not accepted, then there are problems. That is why Sophie's resistance to 
Harrold's questions still needs to be accounted for. Something is not right. More 
questions are needed. Depth is the key; either Harrold, through her questions, or more 
likely, Sophie, through her responses, has not attained the right depth. We had better let 
Harrold explain: 
2 
3 
Harrold: this is so deep (.1 if I 2£ened Sophie up tinside (.1 
guess what I'd find (.1 >deep (.1 deep (.1 deep (.1 
d:eep (.1 right at your tc:ore (0.31 that I could see 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
Sophie: 
Harrold: 
a rock running through tit (.) that I am un>lovable 
(.)cause it's deep with you isn't it (.) 
yes (.) 
I mean it's so bloody deep (0.2) 
There you go. They both agree that the problem is deep. Harrold's questions are 
searching to attain a level of depth. That is why the evidence is not forthcoming - Sophie 
has never gone deep enough. But what is meant by depth? For Harrold, it means the 
endorsement of yes, agreeing with the terms of her questions. But depth is also attained 
through resistance; Sophie's non-conforming responses are revealing her "unconscious". 
Things are not retrieved with ease, and confusion is present, as they are painful to talk 
about. Perhaps they have not been considered like (or as deeply as) this before; that is 
why there is resistance. So Harrold is making progress, slowly. As for Sophie, well she is 
finding it difficult to separate all of the things outside of the workshop, away from the 
questions: her husband, her children, and her life. Harrold does not see this; she just sees 
resistance as reaching closer to the source of the problem. Harrold must achieve depth, so 
she asks ifSophie has done anything for someone else that only she knows about: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Sophie: 
Audience: 
Audience: 
Harrold: 
Sophie: 
Fiona: 
°u:hhO (0.2) I have a sister who is a year younger 
than m:e (.) and when we were fourteen and fifteen 
(0.5) .hhh (0.2) we were put to (.) the choice (.) a 
man wanted to £ape one of us (0.2) and I offered 
~self for my sistOerO (0.2) 
o.h: [hh]O 
109] :odO (0.2) 
good (0.4) °okayo (0.6) °okayo (0.2) everybody keep 
breathing (.) 
o.hhh (0.2) hhh (0.2) .hhho (0.5) 
can I leave you twith that (0.4) can tthat b:e (0.4) 
an <en:ormous> (.) indication (.) tof (.) .your value 
(.) as a human being (.) of your self worth (0.2) and 
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14 
15 
your <justification> (.) to love yourtself (0.2) will 
you take that (.) on b:oard (3.6) 
16 Sophie: -> °u:hh' (0.3) I 'don't understand' (0.2) 
17 Harrold: altright (0.3) how do you <f:eel> (.) about 
18 
19 
20 
21 
yourself (.) doing that 
(6.8) 
you did something (0.3) incr:edible (.) unbelievable 
(.) for someone else (.) 
22 Sophie: -> >yes< (0.5) because I love my siste(rj 
23 Harrold: (yjeah~ 
24 Sophie: ~my little sister (.) 
25 Harrold: y:eah(0.2) 
26 Sophie: -+ but she's not even tnice to me now= 
27 Harrold: ~never mind hoer (0.2) 
28 Sophie: -> yeah b (utj 
29 Harrold: ('njever mind.' (0.2) >no no n(oj< 
30 Sophie: (yJeah~ 
31 Harrold: ~you did something (0.2) <remarkable> (.) and 
32 
33 
34 
incr:edible (.) and ~not anybody here kn:ow~ (.) that 
they could definitely do the same thing (.) in that 
situation (0.2) 
Keep breathing indeed! This is serious, and certainly a candidate for having reached 
depth. But what does Harrold do with depth, given that Sophie has revealed something 
you might expect only a well-acquainted counsellor or therapist to be told, in confidence 
and after a number of successful meetings? Sophie says she sacrificed herself for her 
sister, and became a victim of rape. Harrold asks Sophie to treat this as the evidence she 
needs to see herself as a lovable person. While Harrold is trying to tell one story, one 
with a life coaching perspective, Sophie wants to tell another story, one that includes 
those complicated specifics, from "out there" (lines 16, 22, 26 and 28, arrowed). But 
specifics get in the way of Harrold's neat story, and are once again rejected as relevant to 
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the job at hand. Harrold continues with her agenda, and is insensitive to the details of the 
problem. There is a pattern. As with her previous two requests for evidence that Sophie is 
lovable, Harrold has been supplied with counter evidence: Sophie provides empirical 
instances of her being unlovable. Sophie is telling of a legitimate occasion on which she 
ought to have received love, but never did. It is her sister, as Sophie tells: "she's not even 
tnice to me now". This does not matter to Harrold. 
Evidence is flexible. It is the task of the defence and prosecution in a courtroom to 
make evidence say different things. It depends on perspective. And so it is here. Harrold 
wants Sophie to see the evidence she has provided and evaluate it differently than she is 
now. The substantive content of the events which the evidence is part of does not matter; 
that is bracketed off, left "out there", along with the story Sophie is trying to tell. Sophie 
has work to do: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Harrold: 
Sophie: 
Harrold: 
Sophie: 
Harrold: 
I'm telling you <n:ow> 10.5) that you need to chalk 
that up and see that 10.2) as a very very good 
re::ason 10.3) a <compelling> reason 10.2) to 
appreciate yourself I.) >to love yourself< because 
you did something remarkable I.) you did something 
generous 10.2) can you see that 10.7) YOU DIDN'T HAVE 
TO DO IT I.) you choose to do it 10.2) 
-) °it was in my heado (0.2) 0°1 had toOO (.) 
>okay< you f:elt that you had to do it~ 
--> ~>n [0] < 
[b]ut the truth is I.) you didn't have to do it 
10.3) the tsimple I.) answer I.) in truth is I.) 
<you> <did> not have to do tthat I.) there was a 
truth I.) and you exercised your choice I.) and your 
choice was to do it I.) to sacrifice yours:elf 10.8) 
yeah? 10.2) °okayo 10.2) I'm gonna leave it there 10.2) 
thank you I.) 
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Harrold attributes the problem to Sophie's perspective, reproducing the hyper-
individualism of the self-help book. Sophie's attempts at telling of the events of the rape 
(lines 8 and 10, arrowed) belong to another perspective, which supports her reported 
unproductive label, and are once again rejected. Something that is not currently being 
done, but which is required to be done, will not be done "in here", when Harrold is 
present and engaging Sophie, where we can see. Harrold must move to the next item on 
her agenda for the workshop; there is probably someone else who wants to talk. Harrold 
has terminated the expertise she has applied to Sophie's case. The prescription has been 
delivered: Sophie needs to see this reported case of rape as "a very very good re::ason 
(0.3) a <compelling> reason (0.2) to appreciate yourself'. But what would satisfy this 
request? Harrold wants Sophie to provide a confirmatory report, that she does now see 
this as evidence of her own self-worth. Surely that would be insufficient. Sophie will not 
have done anything, at a practical, action-based level. [t would just be words, like the 
thousands read and mulled over during the activity of reading a self-help book. Harrold 
has told her readers, time and again, about the inadequacies of thought without action. 
In any case, Sophie has more to tell. If nothing else, this will be required to more 
thoroughly constitute the details of the problem, to get things straight. Perhaps she will 
need to go even deeper, maybe speak with her sister and the rest of the family. Greater 
sensitivity to these features of her story would certainly tell us something. But Harrold 
must give way to practical matters, and move on. This is a workshop: other people have 
problems too. Nonetheless, Harrold has abandoned the very feature that promised to 
sufficiently address and engage Sophie's problem - dialectic. All channels of 
communication have been severed. [t is now Sophie who has to deal with things; and the 
problem is left floating in mid air. How will it be brought down to earth? We do not 
know, because what might be required is empirically unavailable. Harrold cannot tell us 
because she is now talking to someone else. 
Meet Lilly. She has been working hard to establish and develop a successful 
business with her husband. She says she has been spending time developing herself too; 
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she gets many compliments from friends and colleagues for her positive attitude. But 
Lilly still has one problem, which her positive attitude has simply concealed over the 
years: her weight. It began in childhood, when peers teased her. She was, to use the 
proper Harroldian vocabulary, labelled. The problem is engrained to the extent that a 
positive attitude has been insufficient at dealing with this unproductive label. It just 
pushed it to one side. Deferred it. That is why she is present in the workshop: to deal with 
a lifelong issue over her appearance. Harrold's self-help books have not worked, and 
neither have the various others she has likely read. Perhaps something else is needed, 
beyond a positive attitude? What is going wrong? When Harrold asks if she thinks that it 
is natural for her to be overweight, Lilly disagrees. "That's a really good place to start", 
Harrold says. But neither does Lilly think it is natural for her not to be overweight. She 
shows resistance to being slim. Harrold has found something; she has "got it". She 
applies the prescription on which she has relied since the beginning of the workshop: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
so (.) straight aw:ay (0.2) we've gotta g- change the 
way that you think so that you truly deep down 
bel:ieve (0.3) that actually your natural state is to 
be slim because y- >at one level< (.) 0- ( ) you 
say t>yeah< (.) I'm not attached to seeing myself as 
naturally over weight or whatever (0.6) but 
<factually> (0.3) your not <compl:etely> okay with 
the notion that your natural state is to be tslirn (.) 
,there's confusion (.) there's resistance< (.) okay 
(0.2) so there's that (0.2) 
it's like a lack of honesty there (.) or something 
(.) it's flike (.) 
>well [no< no] 
[its lik]e I'm not true t[o] 
[n]o no no(.)you don't 
<believe> (0.5) that your natural state is one of 
slimness (0.2) 
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18 Lilly: "okay" (.1 
Lilly does not believe that it is natural for her to be slim: that is her problem. The world 
where Lilly engages her weight, and comes face to face with all its practicalities, gets 
totally obscured. It is left "out there". All that remains is the symptom, a belief, which 
needs to be modified. Work is required to be undertaken but affirmations will not do: the 
problem runs deeper than that. As was the case with Sophie's label, reaching a level of 
depth is the key here. So Harrold applies another strategy: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
a fear I have of being slim <is> (0.3) 
making the effort and failing (.) 
thank you 
(0.7) 
and the worst thing about failing is (0.4) 
°havingO to pick myself up and try again 
(. ) 
thank you 
(0.5) 
and another fear I have of being slim is 
(7.01 
the first thing that comes into your mind 
(0.2) 
>what< (0.2) I look like when (.) starts to 
happen (.) 
thank you 
(0.5) 
another fear I have of being slim is 
(12.0) 
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Recall those known information questions Harrold used earlier. This is similar. Mehan 
(1979) recognised that part of the structure of classroom discourse, where we typically 
see the use of known information questions, follows a three-part sequence of teacher 
initiation, student response and teacher evaluation (see also Carlson, 1989; Cazden, 1986; 
Koshik, 2002; Lee, 2007; Nassaji & Wells, 2000). Teachers do not just ask questions in 
the classroom for no good reason. Work is being done. Students are being evaluated on 
the answers they give to teachers' questions. So: Lilly is being evaluated. Harrold may 
not be asking questions, but she is initiating turns (lines I, 5, 10 and 18), which receive 
replies (lines 2, 6, 14 and 20) to which Harrold gives evaluative comments (lines 3, 8 and 
16). 
Work is being performed here - not teaching like in a classroom, but life 
coaching. Right here, in the workshop. Harrold starts a sentence and Lilly just has to 
complete it. Harrold is embedding prefatory material relevant to the required answer in 
the sentences. Imagine the game join the dots, where following the dots "gives" the 
answer. Only here Harrold has also "fitted" Lilly into displaying herself as this kind of 
person, someone who has a specific set of relations to this kind of problem, by making 
her assume the "I" position formulated in the sentence she is being asked to complete. 
Harrold says "thank you" when Lilly finishes the sentences. What has she received that 
warrants this courteous reply each time? Depth. Harrold wants to get to the bottom of 
why Lilly displays resistance to being slim; she has to attain the depth necessary to reach 
it. Harrold is performing again. This is the application of expertise oflife coaching. Look, 
when the expected 106 reply is not forthcoming - when, that is, depth is not being pursued 
or revealed - Harrold simplifies her initiations so as to encourage it (cf. Mehan, 1979: 
288-9). We see this when Harrold asks Lilly, on line 12, after a long pause, to just say 
"the first thing that comes into your mind". Harrold must find what she is looking for. 
And this work must be done. 
106 What exactly is expected is not specific, and it does not need to be; what is important is that an answer, 
any answer, is given. Work must be seen to be taking place in the name oflife coaching. 
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Where is this expertise destined? Harrold is searching for a point of depth. Her 
argument, seen through her sequence of interaction with Lilly, must presumably follow 
an increasing acquisition of depth, stage by stage. Start at the surface, and on the basis of 
what you get, dig deeper. But Harrold's line of inquiry does not follow a rational 
argument; and neither do Lilly's replies. If anything, the sequence is irrational. It does not 
move in a logical manner, or according to its own logic of depth. It looks like this. The 
first sentence to complete (line I) was, "a fear I have of being slim is ... " Lilly said a fear 
of failing. Then Harrold asked what the worst thing about failing was (we assume this to 
be Lilly's attempts at being slim) (line 5). This required a reply that would be retrieved 
from a greater depth than Lilly's prior reply; it is the worst thing, ranked, logically and 
rationally, below all other things. But Harrold then simply re-offers the first sentence for 
Lilly to complete again (line (0), in effect returning to the surface and going over old 
ground. Then, deja vu! The same question is once again offered (line 18), this time 
asking for another fear of being slim. What is being reached by the same question, just 
repeated? Depth is not acquired as a result of the practice of this strategy. A burden is 
placed on Harrold's basic sentence, as it is repackaged as if to perform different work. 
Let us return to the sequence: 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
and the worst thing about feeling a <failure 
i:s 
(5.0) 
a place that I don't want to go to 
(3.0) 
what I fe:el about myself when I f:ail i:s 
(. ) 
really bad (.) 
pardon (.) 
really bad (.) 
okay 
(3.6) 
what I feel about myself when I f:ail i:s 
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34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
60 
61 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
Lilly: 
Harrold: 
Audience: 
Harrold: 
(1. 2) 
awful (0.6) 
and above all (.) what I feel myself when I 
fail is 
(1. 8) 
really frustrated (0.5) 
a:nd 
(5.0) 
I hate it (0.5) 
beca:use 
(2.4) 
because it just doesn't fit in with the rest 
of me (.) 
>got it< (0.2) she just doesn't do failure 
(0.2) and sometimes when we just (.) don't do 
failure (0.2) we don't (.) attempt things 
that co:uld incur the risk of failure (.) 
because we don't tDO failure (0.3) would (.) 
ar- ar- identity (.) see you're a very 
together person I can tell that (.) <a m:ile 
away> it doesn't matter what you would choose 
to do Lilly (0.2) who you are (0.2) someone 
who <makes things successful> (0.2) sh- se-
(.) if she asks you to go into business 
with ther (.) gQ into business with her~ 
~hehh hahh hehh hahh hehh~ 
=>no< I'm s:erious (.) cause I can tell (.) 
Harrold starts the sentence. Lilly completes it. Harrold gives her courteous thank you. 
You are familiar too with the reversal of logic exhibited in the offering of the sentences. 
Look, there it is again. Harrold offers the sentence (line 21): "and the worst thing about 
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feeling a <failure> i:s ... " Lilly completes it with: "a place that I don't want to go to". So 
this should be the worst thing about feeling a failure, ranked below every other feeling 
she might have. Has depth been reached? No. More sentences are offered. On line 26: 
"what I fe:el about myself when I f:ail i:s ... " And this same sentence, word for word, is 
re-offered (line 33), which is then re-offered a third time, with an intensifier (line 36): 
"and above all (.) what I feel myself when I fail is ... " But that is still not enough. It has to 
be unpacked further, and in so doing, the sentence is extended. On line 40, Harrold starts 
with "and ... " And again, on line 43, she starts with "because ... " Lilly replies: "because it 
just doesn't fit in with the rest me". Has depth been reached, finally? Yes. "Got it", 
Harrold says. But what has Harrold got? 
Look closer. Lilly has told us, albeit through Harrold's sentences, that she feels 
"awful" and "really frustrated" by trying and failing because "it just doesn't fit with the 
rest of me". Two things. First, Harrold has recognised the attitude that Lilly has to failing. 
Lilly does fail, as she has told us, but that does not mean she does failure. To the 
contrary, it is her attitude to failing which is critical here. She picks herself back up, 
always sees the positive side of things; she is "someone who makes things successful". 
But related to this positivity is the idea that these reported instances of failure are rare, 
exceptional. They stand in contrast to Lilly's typical, character-driven successes in life. 
Second, notice how Harrold summarises this (line 47): "she just doesn't do failure (0.2) 
and sometimes when we just (.) don't do failure (0.2) we don't (.) attempt things that 
co:uld incur the risk of failure". The addressee has shifted. It is no longer the first person 
singular form, with Lilly as the referent of all of those I constructions; and it is no longer 
the second person singular form, the specific addressee referred to as "you", the person 
Harrold is interacting with. It becomes, firstly, "she", a third-person singular form and 
then changes, secondly, to become "we", the first-person plural form. Harrold is not 
addressing Lilly but the audience. Harrold has returned to her "teaching" address and 
Lilly has become the topic of her interaction with everyone here today. She is an example 
of a generality. From specific to general: the omnipresence of the audience. 
155 
While Harrold is addressing everyone else, she is not addressing Lilly's weight, as 
a specified, singular and particular problem. Or rather, Harrold's address is to be applied 
to Lilly too, as she falls within the general address. She is the reason for its being 
formulated now. So the message, as everyone listens attentively, is a warning. The danger 
of this mindset, this fear offailure that Lilly has demonstrated, is that it carries the risk of 
not doing anything. The prescription: the audience needs to act. They need to do rather 
than not do, even if that incurs (the risk of) failure. We know the hierarchy: action rather 
than thinking. And Lilly can take something from this warning. She needs to get busy: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Harrold: 
And this means ... 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
s:o 10.2) >you know tsomething< I.) you need to get 
tover I.) <~f:ailure> I.) you need to get over your 
fear of failure I.) and you n:eed I.) to be able to 
see yourself I.) as 10.3) a gung h:o I.) can do I.) 
dynamic person I.) who makes things work I.) >but< 
whose identityt I.) is not so fragtile I.) and tied 
up with I.) fail:ure I.) success I.) that they can't 
take trisks I.) ... 
if you give a <tserninar:> and for whatever reason (.) 
five people turn up and your expecting twenty tfive 
I.) are you gonna go I.) shoot yourtself: I.) are you 
gonna make it mean (.) that your really not very good 
at I.) things that you th:ought you were very good at 
10.2) the tsmart person I.) thinks I.) tokay I.) 
that's interesting I.) I'm gonna do a great worktshop 
(.) the fact there's only five here means I can take 
a few risks: (.)I can tryout some different thi:ngs: 
I.) <and also> I'm not feeling thr:own I.) because 
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19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
there's not fifty people or five h:undred(.) and then 
I'll go away tonight (.) and over a glass of ~wine 
(.) and chat with a friend (.) I'm gonna figure out 
why only five people turned out (.) what do I need to 
do differently to ensure a bigger outcome next ~time 
(.) how can I use this experience. (.) to f::uel (.) 
future success and change uh (.) >are you twith me< 
This is what Lilly must take away from the workshop: advice that is heavily packaged in 
the rhetoric of self-help. Harrold is approving the endorsement of yes, as we have come 
to expect from the experts. Lilly is encouraged to continue to do what she has reported 
she has been doing all along. Think positively: make things work for you. But there is 
another requirement, perhaps even more important than positive thinking. Lilly needs to 
take action. A seminar is given as an example of what she might endeavour to undertake. 
Hosting a seminar is a concrete, practical activity. Thinking might be necessary, but 
things need to be done. Contingencies are involved, dealing with situations as and when 
they arise. Everything is geared towards action - doing things, trying. Readjusting one's 
actions as a result of outcomes to prior actions: that is the only way for Lilly to overcome 
her fear of failure. Thinking gives rise to action, but the context of action is not here, in 
the workshop; it is only spoken about and pointed to as work to be undertaken 
somewhere else. [t will only happen away from the workshop, when Lilly deals with all 
of those contingencies. 
Something does not add up. Reading a self-help book was found to be an 
inauthentic quest for self-help. As a self-help book author, Harrold herself gestured at this 
inauthenticity. Her book, Reinvent Yourself, would not satisfy the requirement of 
reinvention for her readers. They will need to attend a workshop, like this one. Reading is 
not a practical activity; Harrold (2004) made that perfectly clear in her book: 
Once you know what you want and have aligned your perspective, you have to do 
something to make things happen. The difference between thinkers and doers is 
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what they do at this point. Revving up your psychology will only take you so far. 
The next step is doing something. Demonstrate your commitment to your desires 
and plans. Get busy. You know what you need to do, so just do it!" (p. 69-70). 
"Think less and be more the person you want to be. [ ... ] The more you behave as 
if you are confident, cheerful, happy and optimistic, the more you'll feel it and 
become it (p. 88). 
There: thinkers and doers, or readers of Harrold's self-help book and members of 
Harrold's self-help workshop, or even inactivity versus activity. Harrold's workshop is 
supposed to satisfy the requirement of activity, but instead it is re-enacting the critique, 
widely pointed to by Harrold herself, of reading. It is producing the very same self-
conscious inadequacy at providing what is necessary for members of the workshop to 
complete their quest for self-help. It is actually restricting members from what they 
absolutely need to do to, if they are to deal with their problems. Harrold realises that there 
is a world out there in which members of her workshop live their lives. That is where 
problems arise, and that is where problems are to be dealt with. While they are "in here", 
answering questions and looking at how they think about things "out there", members of 
the audience are not fulfilling the requirement of action. Recall the organisational 
narrative from the self-help book: from reading, to thinking, to action. It could not 
provide the last, most important undertaking - action. Here, in the workshop, there is a 
similar organisational narrative, but reading has been erased. We just see: from thinking 
to action. But presence in the workshop will not allow members to negotiate the last 
hurdle either - action. It remains beyond the reach of members, while they are here. It 
can only be discussed. Questions can be asked, and answers can be given, but it will not 
count. Dialectic is not bringing them any closer to action. 
Post-reinvention reports 
Both Sophie and Lilly may still have work to do, outside of the workshop, but their 
situations are instructive for the audience. "It is important to see the past in a way that 
works for you", Harrold says. Lilly needs to take risks, no matter what the outcome might 
be. Her childhood label does not have to control her life. Sophie does not see herself as 
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lovable because she is still blaming her family. She must let go, and take responsibility, if 
she is to love herself. Harrold identifies this as a general problem. "We live in a blame 
culture", she tells US 107• What to make of this? There has been no specification of what 
this blame culture might be composed of, but that is not necessary. Its focus is primarily 
to prioritise what is happening in the workshop. It builds barriers. It makes spaces where 
specific things get done. If we look "out there", we see a blame culture; that is 
somewhere we do not want to be. But if we look "in here", we see people taking 
responsibility for their own lives. This is better. Presence at the workshop requires 
members to detach themselves from the culture from whence they came, to abandon what 
prevents them from performing self-help. Individual responsibility is necessary, to see 
things in a productive way. She knows what it is like "out there", that is why she wants to 
rescue these members "in here". This is the reason for attendance: to get members to pull 
themselves up by their own bootstraps. This involves, as this idiomatic expression 
implies, activity. This is important. Harrold folds over her flip chart paper again. There is 
more work to do. Write down whom you blame for the things that have not worked out in 
your life. 
We need to see things in a positive way. Harrold is agam reproducing her 
prescription, so deeply embedded in the activity of reading a self-help book, that she 
claimed needed to be overcome. That is why we are here: to do more than think. When 
we stop blaming others, and begin to take action in bringing about our own happiness, 
then we can have the life we want. Things must be seen productively or, if we recall the 
message from the self-help book, positively. "Does that make sense to anyone", Harrold 
asks. "Yes", Vicky replies, another member of the audience who volunteers to give her 
story: 
Vicky: I had difficulty trying to live with my father (0.3) 
2 .hhh (.) but what I see i!.- ~a::s (.) n:ow (.) is (.) 
\07 Specific occasions of people attributing blame, for whatever reason and to whomever, are one thing, but 
a blame cuiture is another. Harrold is pointing to a wide pattern of activities. a whole way of life. 
Something so substantial is at fault - a culture in need of rescue. This. if anything. is Harrold's individualist 
critique of culture. The trouble is that people are not taking enough individual responsibility. Culture 
creates an absence of self· help. 
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Harrold: 
Vicky: 
Harrold: 
Harrold: 
Vicky: 
Harrold: 
Vicky: 
Harrold: 
Vicky: 
Harrold: 
it's brought me the balance (.) because if I'd only 
had my mother (.) I'd 'ave been very tsoft (.) a:nd 
(.) I wouldn't 'ave coped very well with life at a:ll 
(0.2) .hhh but because my father made my life 
in<cr:edibly> I.) difficul~ 10.2) I've learned early 
on (.) what life can do with that(.) >and learnt how 
to cope with i t-< (0.2) and so (.) (I'd recommended) 
for many many years (.) tth:at (.) he did what I 
asked him to 'do' (.) 
on a (sole) level= 
=whichever way you want to look at it (.) that was 
meant to be part of my experience that I could grow 
through (.) and take away as a u:seful (.) thing 
(0.2) w[itJh me (.) 
[so] 
what were the qu:alities (.) that you detveloped as a 
result tof (.) that experience (.) you're your father 
(. ) 
~urage (.) self belief I.) the ability to have a go 
again no matter how many times your knocked down (.) 
so retsilience (.) 
yeah (0.2) s- s- I.) 
so courage (.) self belief (.) retsilience= 
=resilience (.) u:hm (.) tkindness t:oo (.) because 
(.) I never wanted to behave in that way to anyone 
else (0.2) 
got it (.) 
Vicky provides an experiential report of the difficulty of living with her father when she 
was a child. She does most of the talking. Harrold does not reject what Vicky is saying, 
like she did with Sophie. On the contrary, she listens, only speaking to get clarification. 
160 
Harrold just wants to know how Vicky sees things now. And that is simple: she has 
developed courage and self-belief. Look, she has taken responsibility and does not blame 
her father; and she has resilience and kindness too. Vicky is not doing anything here, nor 
is she required to do anything, apart from recounting prior events in her life. Her report is 
quite sufficient. Resilience and kindness: two qualities - four if we count courage and 
self-belief - that point to how Vicky is making things work for herself. She is, as Harrold 
would say, extracting all of the juice from a situation. Harrold is simply allowing Vicky 
to tell things the way she wants. No need for affirmations. And no need to search for 
depth. It is all there, right in front of us. Harrold is satisfied. "Anyone else", she asks: 
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Cathy: 
Harrold: 
Cathy: 
Harrold: 
Cathy: 
Harrold: 
Cathy: 
hhh (.1 >uhm< my name's Cathy I was uhm (.1 I was 
really bullied in tschool (.1 from sort of the age of 
(.) eleven up to (.) sor'ave (.) sixteen seventeen 
(.1 and I've always (felt thatl (0.21 m:ade me very 
kind and very <u:hm> ~ient and tolerant (.1 °and 
those are the sort of skills thatO (.1 I see as being 
important °and uhho (0.21 
<e:xcellent> (.1 
they sort of sh:aped me (.1 I suppose in a ~itive 
way (.1 
beautiful (.1 that's ~fect (0.31 >I mean< you 
obviously re:alise >got to that point< (.1 in time 
( . 1 before today (.1 
yeah (. 1 yeah~ 
=I can see it (.) cause you look clear (.) >y'know 
someti- (.) sometirne-< (.) I don't wanna cause 
somtirn- (.) don't wanna sort of (.) sound spooky 
w:ookys here (.) but sometimes people are very 
cluttered and caught up with the p:ast (.1 they don't 
look as clear tan- very (.) what's your name again(.) 
Cathy (.1 
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Harrold: 
Cathy: 
Harrold: 
Audience: 
Harrold: 
Audience: 
Harrold: 
Cathy: 
Harrold: 
Audience: 
Harrold: 
Audience: 
Harrold: 
they don't t- I.) can I just point you out to people 
I. ) 
t>yeah< I.) 
if you look at Cathy I.) 
hehh hahh hehh I.) 
if you just stand up I.) 
hehh hahh hehh I.) 
tdon't you think there's a real- 10.2) >sort of< I.) 
cl:arity about her I.) y'know the way (.) when you 
talk about someone (.) and you sometimes <say> (.) 
there very straight forward (.) tthere's (.) NOTHING 
hidden (.) there's nothing sort of (.) either ( 
them (.) y'know (.) <what you s:ee (.) is what you 
~> (0.2) there tblack (.) and white (.) y'know the 
way yo- get (.) y'see people like tthat (0.2) that's 
how you look to me (.) your very cl:ear (0.2) very 
very clear (0.2) <uncomplitcated> y- you look very 
straight forward to me (.) >tvery< (0.2) you don't do 
dr:ama in your life (.) do you (.) 
no (.) not really~ 
~>no (.) no< (.) y'know (.) >y'know the way sometimes 
people do drama< (0.2) o:h god (.) you don't look 
like that (0.2) 
hehh h(ahh hehh hahh 
[does th:at make sense t- you (.) 
hehh hahh hehh h[ahh 
[you m:ay sit down (.) 
congratutlations: (0.2) thank you (0.5) 
Cathy used to be bullied at school. But now she has developed patience and tolerance, 
important skills that anyone would like to have. Just by the fact and manner of this report, 
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Harrold can see that Cathy has not let her previous experience get the better of her. She is 
not a victim, but an individual. She is taking responsibility. Harrold has no reason to 
question Cathy's report, and she does not work tD attain any mDre depth. There is no 
need. Harrold can see Cathy's soul reflecting back at her, just by talking. Cathy, like 
Vicky before her, is symbolic. Her account corresponds with what Harrold has been 
talking about. Putting the past behind you. Seeing things positively. Taking action. This 
is such an idealised version of reinvention, a candidate case, that it can be seen by 
anyone. Cathy is asked to stand up, to display her clarity. There is nothing to hide: no 
confusion and no unproductive labels getting in the way. [t is just black and white. This is 
so perfect that it might be mistaken for a dramatic performance, but as Cathy does not do 
drama, there can be no mistake. This is not acting; this is the real thing. 
Look at Vicky and Cathy once mDre. We have nDt seen a performance of life 
coaching; they were just talking. Harrold has not done anything, as far as attendance at 
the workshop is concerned, but then neither has Vicky and Cathy. The substantive 
content of these exchanges is located "out there", away from the workshop, and only 
pointed to by it. We are unable to see it because it has already happened. What Harrold 
has received are post-reinvention reports: after-the-event tellings. We do not see Vicky's 
relationship with her father, when things were bad, or the circumstances surrounding her 
development of courage and self-belief. How is this reinvention practically done: its 
movements, its features and their relations with other features, its site-specific character. 
We do not know. Similarly, we do not see how Cathy developed patience and tolerance 
through her bullying experience. What did she find helped her to overcome her 
victimisation? What does tolerance mean, as self-help? What actions were undertaken 
and contributed to her reinvention? We cannot say. 
Sophie still needs to do work and begin to love herself; we do not see what this 
might look like because it will take place when she goes home. This work of self-help 
will exceed the workshop as a site of self-help. So it is with Lilly. And as for Vicky and 
Cathy, they have already pulled themselves up by their bootstraps. That also exceeded the 
workshop; it happened before they arrived. Once again, we are being promised so much 
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by the presence of expertise, but what is being delivered, to the extent that it is being 
delivered, are more diversions from what is required. Members of the audience might 
wish they could do what Vicky and Cathy have done, and reinvent themselves, but that is 
no substitute for doing it themselves. There is an absence of the very phenomenon that is 
used to qualify the occasion of the workshop. I wanted to see occasions of members 
reinventing themselves in a workshop entitled reinvent yourself: I am not asking for the 
world, just self-help. Or: just reinvention. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
A group of self-help book readers has attended a self-help workshop because it promises 
what was unavailable by reading self-help books. Attendance closes the gap created by 
reading; it provides a more immediate and concentrated version of what was diluted in 
the reading process. These readers are in the company of an expert: Fiona Harrold. The 
occasion showcases the authenticity of live, face-to-face encounter, where things can be 
seen close up. It is all about attaining a richness of detail, at the interactional level, where 
members report specific details of their problems and Harrold applies specific forms of 
her expertise. What has this proximity to expertise accomplished for members? We see 
that Harrold has developed the idea of the uniqueness of every member of the audience. 
They are being addressed as individuals. We have met some of them: Charles, Sophie and 
Lilly. There are problems with making decisions. Then there is a lack of self-worth, being 
unlovable. Body image is there too. We are familiar with this strategy; it is reproducing 
the same addressing function as the self-help books. This is certainly promising. 
But then something happened. There is a room full of individuals, all with 
different problems. Harrold conceals the differences, and treats each respective problem 
in a highly generic fashion. The same sets of questions are asked. Affirmations are 
employed as prescriptions. A common theme is identified as a collective problem: 
thinking. Harrold prioritises thought over action. Because actions are based on thoughts 
and subordinate to them, they are the level at which Harrold engages her audience. 
Thoughts are convenient; Harrold finds out about them by asking questions. The trouble 
is that everything has to become an "answer", and only certain things count. So much 
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detail gets lost. The spontaneity of interaction gives way to the constraints of achieving 
institutional goals. This means uniqueness disappears. It also means that practical activity 
is precluded as a feature of attending the workshop. So, in reproducing the format of the 
self-help book, Harrold has returned her audience to the level of inactivity of reading 
from which she had previous told them they needed to escape. 
Harrold's prescription is bleak. Because thinking is the problem, and because 
thought works to a common rhetoric of performing in a mechanical fashion, members are 
treated "mechanically". Members are no longer, or never have been, producing the 
"correct" responses to the outside world. They should be responding positively: a 
different form of "programming" is required. The programme is called positive thinking. 
Some members have deviated from it. That is all. It is possible, then, to master a given 
phenomenon, which is to say, solve a problem, by following some rule or, most 
generally, instruction. Such mastery is displayed in the form: "x" is followed by "y". If 
what Harrold has to offer, as expertise, is followed as described, then the desired results 
will obtain. Problems will disappear. This expertise applies in all situations; it is 
insensitive to context. Artificial intelligence follows the same image of humans; its many 
failings have been documented convincingly (e.g., Collins, 1990; Dreyfus, 1967; 1972; 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). But we are not robots; nor are we computers. Beliefs are 
messy, and they are hugely sensitive to context. They are embedded in practical, 
situational contexts, not isolated in the skulls of the individuals. So long as problems find 
their expression through changes in context, propositional knowledge will not do. Things 
are just not like that. 
A workshop called reinvent yourself has been attended, but we have not seen 
folks reinventing themselves. Because problems are isolated in cognition, they are hidden 
away from view. But they have only been concealed; they are still present. These folks do 
share something: they will each be performing their problems, in all their detail, when 
they leave today. Out in the world - this is where problems will become visible again. 
While we have been in the workshop, we have not seen them doing things on their own, 
for themselves. Recall what Smiles said about reading, "which is often but a mere passive 
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reception of other men's thoughts; there being little or no active effort of mind in the 
transaction" (1859: 218). And so it is for this self-help workshop. "You need to see 
yourself as lovable", Harrold says to Sophie. "The evidence is there, you just need to 
believe it". Sophie just needs to believe it. But in what might that comprise? And what 
about the world in which Charles is indecisive? Or the positive attitude Lilly needs to 
apply to her weight? So much is left unexplicated. Any specification of individual 
problems, or the practical circumstances of their resolution, is empirically absent. Here in 
the workshop there is no active effort of mind. No application. No self-help. 
Harrold has done a lot of speaking. She has given her thoughts. The audience has 
followed her, but then they have had to answer her questions. So Harrold has been 
performing Harrold; and, in its own way, it has been very entertaining. Nonetheless, it 
has been a performance. Scripts have been followed. She has been working with her own 
interests, in the absence of any in-depth understanding of the lives of the members of the 
audience. You recall how such details, when they were introduced, were quickly negated. 
Harrold had an agenda to follow. But agenda or no agenda, details were being omitted. 
Critical details. She had her chain of questioning to pursue, and the audience had to 
follow. There is a significant gap between what members of the audience know about 
themselves, and what Harrold is treating as allowable to know through the format of her 
performance i08• Harrold cannot, through instruction, convey in words what the audience 
can only do in practice. She is bargaining with the "strong interactional hypothesis"lo9; 
she is assuming that talking in the language of reinvention is indistinguishable from 
undertaking reinvention in practice. The problems of the audience have a life outside of 
the workshop, but because they are made available only indirectly through its format, 
they can only be pointed to. We have reports on them. There are gestures to them. Then 
there are things to do when folks return to them. However, the performative contexts of 
problems are left untouched, out there in the world beyond the self-help workshop (cf. 
108 I am referring to the gap between discourse and action. Talking about a phenomenon is one form of 
expertise. but it falls short, misses a different form of expertise. which is only seen in its contexts of 
practice (see Collins; 1990, Collins & Ev.ns, 2008; Dreyfus, 1972; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). 
J09 A term from Coli ins & Bv.ns (2008: 31). 
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Cherry, 2008a). Harrold talks the talk llo, but does not walk the walk. So self-help is once 
again deferred. Attending the workshop has taken members further away from the 
practical activity of performing their own reinvention. It has prevented them from doing 
what they will need to do to satisfy self-help. Why is self-help evading us? Might 
Harrold's expertise be obstructing its visibility? There is a common problem but no 
means of solving it. [s professional expertise creating its own problems, for those pursing 
the quest for self-help? 
110 Coil ins & Evans (2008: 28) have characterized this as "interactional expertise". This is people who 
have expertise in the language of a domain in the absence of the expertise of its practice. Talking is one 
thing; doing is another. 
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Chapter 5 
Self-help groups and other practical things 
5.1 Introduction 
People live with problems. The experts that talk to them do not. They simply speak from 
a distance, from the outside. As we have seen, Harrold may have professional expertise in 
life coaching, but it does not get rid of the problems in her audience; the self-help 
workshop was not an occasion of self-help. But how so? We know that the import of 
Harrold's professional expertise is propositional in form. By treating the problems of her 
audience in terms of "knowing-that", that is, being uninformed about the "rules" that 
govern a happy life, she has concealed their "know-how". People know a great deal more 
than they are able to bring to conscious attention, especially people with problems. When 
people are detached from this domain of knowledge production, where they "know-how", 
things get missed. Important things are overlooked. Misunderstandings occur; problems 
are only partially seen, and certainly made to conform to formal analysis. But if expertise 
is required to solve a given problem, and professional expertise is inadequate, then on 
whom do we call? Ourselves. It has a name, we recall from the introductory chapter: 
experiential knowledge - personal experience of living with a problem. But we have yet 
to see this, and there are two reasons, at least according to Borkman, the author of the 
seminal article that first introduced the concepti 11. Professionals foil its presence; that is 
the first. And it is unable to survive, and surely unable to develop, at the level of the 
individual; and there is the second. What is absolutely critical is the context in which 
experiential knowledge is produced, and what it is produced to do. [t is not produced 
when we read self-help books; readers are isolated from the presence of others with 
whom experiential knowledge is shared. And neither is it produced in Harrold's life 
coaching workshop; although members may share problems with other members who are 
co-present, Harrold gets in the way with her questions. 
[fwe could just retain the co-presence of those among whom a problem is shared, 
and get rid of the professionals. We can. Thus [ have arrived at my final ethnographic 
111 See too Borkman (1976). 
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site: self-help groups. Mutual aid is a critical dimension to understanding experiential 
knowledge in a self-help group. In receiving help from others, members are helped; in 
serving help to others, members are also helped (Reissman, 1965, Riessman & Carroll 
1995; Roberts, Salem, Rappaport, Toro, Luke, & Seidman, 1999; Tomer, 1980)112. Self-
help groups are composed of people who are experts in their own problems, but this 
expertise is contingent on membership in a self-help group. This is where experiential 
knowledge develops, gets mobilized. As Borkman makes clear, "[s]uccessful, established 
self-help groups create, test, use, and disseminate a body of experiential knowledge about 
their shared problem and a workable resolution for it" (1990: 21). And, just to be sure, 
she and one of her colleagues reaffirms the status of self-help groups, as "voluntary 
associations of persons with a common problem that are oriented to resolving the 
common problem utilizing their own experiential knowledge of it" (Borkman & Parisi, 
1995: 403). So there are two definitional features of a self-help group: a common 
problem and the means of its resolution. Experiential knowledge enjoins the two; it is 
what enables a common problem to be resolved. We shall speak, then, of experiential 
knowledge, a common problem and the means of its resolution interchangeably. 
Things could not be better. [ have been informed by a professional literature of 
the phenomenon of self-help groups, and there is not a journalist in sight. We have seen 
that self-help groups do not attract critique, as do self-help books. The columnists stay 
well away too; I am yet to find a scornful article on self-help groups. That self-help 
groups are not spoken in the same breath as self-help books invokes something we have 
been unable to see hitherto - self-help. Look, it is all here: the absence of professionals, 
the presence of lay-constituted expertise and, something else we have not seen yet, 
practical activities. But let us not get hasty, and miss something important in our 
excitement. Many groups look like self-help groups, especially to us outsiders. Self-help 
group scholars - Borkman, Katz, Kurtz and Riessman are the important examples - have 
told us what constitutes a self-help group. And they are to be distinguished, they tell us, 
from other, alternative categories of group: "support groups", "social groups", "mutual 
112 This is a candidate instance of "contributory expertise" (Collins & Evans, 2008). This "enables those 
who have acquired it to contribute to the domain to which the expertise pertains: contributory experts have 
the ability to do things within the domain of expertise" (p. 24 original italics). 
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aid groups" and, so as to confuse matters further, "self-help mutual groups", "self-help 
mutual aid groups" and "self-help support groups". So many groups, but how to 
distinguish them at a practical level? The self-help group literature does not help here. 
The current chapter is a contribution to an underdeveloped empirical specification 
of self-help groups. [ have already discussed accounts of self-help groups in the 
introductory chapter. Briefly, these accounts take as their domain of phenomena the 
distribution of experiential knowledge through the narratives that members of self-help 
groups share during meetings. Stories get told. Members tell about their experiences of 
living with a common problem; and they develop their experiential knowledge by 
receiving, and not just telling, these stories. So self-help groups can be identified by this 
stock of experiential knowledge, displayed through narrative. Something important: 
contemporary accounts treat the boundaries of self-help groups as more or less fixed. As 
long as there are narratives, then we have self-help groups. It is as if the category has 
been imposed a priori, with its expression conforming to an idealised, theoretical pattern. 
Anything that deviates from that pattern, causing discrepancies, is dismissed as an 
illegitimate phenomenon. It is inauthentic; it is not a self-help group, and perhaps not 
even self-help. So; it is just a question of locating the category - in essence, the 
phenomenon proper - which, having been predefined, can be done, and is done, by 
professional investigators. 
This does not help me, an ethnographer venturing into the field for the first time. 
How do we set about identifying self-help groups, when many of their defining features 
are not visible to those outside of their practice? [s it all in a name, a category? Look, 
there is a self-help group. Yes, but where? Take the five groups documented in my 
fieldwork. Two things add to the confusion. Firstly, many of the groups routinely drop 
any prefix in reference to their category ascription, choosing to refer to themselves as the 
"[problem) group". Alternative categories are often used interchangeably: self-help 
groups at times; support groups at other times. And secondly, one of the groups changed 
the category under which it collects its members. With the reintroduction of its legal 
constitution, a "self-help group" became a "support group". Does this mean a new 
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phenomenon has emerged, or has an old phenomenon simply been renamed? If there is 
such difficulty of identification, even at this stage, am I looking in the right place? Should 
my selected groups properly be called "self-help groups"? Things are unclear. 
5.2 The appearance of a common problem 
I do not want to lose this site of authenticity, but how to secure its presence? There is one 
positive indicator. Initial contact with each of the groups reveals an absence of 
professionals. These groups are run by and for members. Expertise derives from the 
experience of members. That is better; this looks like self-help. But the term support 
group is still present. [s this merely a question of semantics? On first inspection, from 
newsletters and initial visits to meetings, a similar pattern of activities is taking place in 
each of the groups. Similar goals are set. How to get purchase on things: a self-help group 
or a support group? [s there any practical difference in the mobilisation of these 
categories? And do we need to find a self-help group before we see "self-help"? 
Professional classification of self-help groups needs to be suspended for a moment. Self-
help group scholars have tended to overlook the activity involved in categorisation. 
Categories move around. They can be affirmed and rejected. [n short, it is a matter that 
has to be routinely engaged, for those who comprise its practice to decide - to affirm or 
reject, and much else besides. Those scenes of practical activities and reasoning of the 
groups must determine the arrangements of my fieldwork. [ must exercise a most 
valuable ethnographic skill: asking questions. Anyway, [ need to check that [ have the 
real thing - authenticity. [ asked the groups about the category self-help group and how it 
relates to their activities in meetings. Here is the lymphoma group: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Scott: some groups call themselves sutpport groups (.) and 
others self help groups (.) and that's:: something 
that thas and continues to. puzzle me (0.2) and 
whether there tis any difference (.) and s:o >#1 know 
this is actually c:ast as a supp:ort group#< (.) but. 
(.) would it be the same as a self help group (0.2) 
is it a self help group (0.2) 
171 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Bob: 
Jeff: 
May: 
Jeff: 
yeah (.) course it- >yeah< (0.4) 
the gr- group is b:oth really~ 
~yeah it's bo[th] 
[we] started the group as u:hh (0.2) a 
group to meet other people with a: common illness 
that we suffer with (.) or an associfation with a 
common illness .hhh (.) so that we could. h:opefully 
learn more about it so (.) y'know and if we can (.) 
thelp anybody we will (.) if we can sutpport anybody 
we will (.) I think that's. (.)that's the way tI look 
at it y' know (.) 
And the arthritis group: 
Scott : 
2 
3 
4 Reg: 
5 Sue: 
6 Reg: 
7 Scott: 
8 Sue: 
9 Scott: 
10 Linda: 
11 Scott: 
12 Tina: 
13 
14 John: 
15 
16 
17 
I'm curious about the term self-help what does that 
mean to people (.) I mean what. I don'tquite (.) 
understand what a self-help group means (0.2) 
you could say helping each other~ 
~yeah (.) 
that's it (.) we'r[e] 
[y]eah 
we b:ond together and we're there for one another (.) 
yeah~ 
=we learn from one another's experiences 
yea[h] 
[c]ome to terms with our conditions (.) help 
ourselves to manage our conditions better (.) 
self-help comes from yourself asking the questions: 
(.) as you have a group if you have a problem you 
ttalk to somebody in the group (.) and that's where 
it comes from as a group= 
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18 Linda: =rather than a professional (. ) 
19 John: that's why it's a self-help group 
20 Dawn: also it it's how the group's run (. ) we've not got 
21 somebody from outsi:de (0.2) runnin it (0.2) 
These groups do not object to my asking them about the category to which they belong or 
with which they affiliate, much less to my offering the label "self-help group" as a 
candidate form of category ascription. The category did not threaten the status of the 
groups or their normative modes of representation. Perhaps more obvious, these members 
formulate the prototypical image of a self-help group, so strongly insisted upon in the 
literature. We see mutual orientation to experiential others with a "common illness": 
good. And we see the exclusion of professionals: this is good, too. However, self-help 
and support are not so easily separated, even when professionals are not around. 
Boundaries converge. The neatness of classification in the literature does not conform to 
the messiness in the field. At any rate, I have been provided with accounts assembled out 
of the very basis on which these groups exist - the canon of experiential knowledge. 
What is the substance of this experiential knowledge? Surely it is producible - indeed, it 
must be produced - in these groups. Members talk. Yes: members talk further about a 
common illness. It is identified when you ask them about it. Look, the visual impairment 
group: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Joan: 
Doreen: 
Joan: 
Doreen: 
Ivy: 
every morning you go blind when you wake up (.) 
yeah (0.3) 
and start again= 
it is the most a::wful feeling that I have to get 
used to right at the beginning that uh (.) I couldn't 
cope with it first thing in the mornings (.) not. 
realising I'd got to go through another d:ay (.) not 
seeing things properly (0.2) uhm and I don't know if 
anyone else has had that (0.2) 
it can be very frustrating= 
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12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Doreen: 
Ivy: 
Doreen: 
Ivy: 
Doreen: 
Ivy: 
Betty: 
~when you wake u[p] 
[y] eah (.) 
and say to y'uh self (.) I'm goin bli:nd (0.3) and I 
think it's just depressing (0.2) 
well when I wake up in the mornings (.) first thing 
(.) I 10- I've got a skylight in my room (.) in my 
ceiling (.) I look at that and can see that (.) I 
just say thank you for another day (.) 
tyeah (.) 
and go for it (.) make the best of it (.) 
yeah (.) that's what you have to do 
And here, a member of the stroke group, Sam, is talking about self-help: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
IQ 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Sam: 
Milly: 
Sam: 
yeah I think the self-help actually starts in 
hospital (.) because the:: thing there is (.) they 
they tell you (.) they don't really know (.) th-
they communicate to you and they don't know what 
stroke's abo:ut (0.2) and they hide behind the fact 
that everyone is diff[erent] 
[diffe]rent (0.3) 
and therefore (.) from tthat moment (.) then your 
carer (.) <particularly> (.) is asking questions 
all the time (.) y' know (.) what do I do (.) and so 
on (.) and so y- you learn self reliance (.) the 
problem wi- with stroke (.) I don't know if it goes 
for everybody he:re (0.2) but. when they decide to 
let you out of hospital (.) I was able to go to the 
cardiac rehabilitation (.) tgym (.) as far as the 
stroke was concerned (.) there was nothing (.) and 
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17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
therefore if you wanted physiotherapy (.) you had to 
source it y'self (.) u:hm if you wanted to improve 
your strength (.) then you had to pay for y'self (.) 
to go to a gym (.) the hospital doesn't want to know 
(.) because they don't have the resources and they 
don't. (.) I think a lot've it is (.) a lot of people 
who've had strokes don't really twant it (.) 
afterwards (.) because they didn't kn:ow (.) I mean 
u:hh one of things I: remember most (.) u:hm how 
tfrightened I was (.) I didn't know what a stroke was 
(.) and when they told me I ha:d one (.) they might 
as well'uh said you've got moon dust in your blood or 
something like that (.) 
And here, two members of the arthritis group, Fred and Linda, talking about arthritis: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Fred: 
Linda: 
Fred: 
Linda: 
Fred: 
Linda: 
you ask Linda how l:ong she's been in hospital w-
with (.) tafter replacements (0.2) 
well the shortest record is about five d:ays (.) and 
that's after sort of uhh thip surgery (.) 
tsimple reason b:eing (.) the doc- the surgeon tnow 
(.) kn:ows that Linda is be- better off at home with 
m: e (.) 
OOyeahOO (.) 
once she's over the initial QEeration (.) 
and because the hostpitals don't cater for you .hhh I 
mean they always have a chair at the s:ide of the bed 
(.) so ~before I go in (.) I say I need that chair 
<on blocks> to traise it up (.) because I can't bend 
d:own (0.2) n:ine times out of t:en (.) nobody's done 
anything (.) 
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16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Fred: 
Linda: 
so she's just slitting there] 
[y:ou've had ]y'surgery (.) you can't 
sit on the ch:air properly (.) cause y
'
1egs are 
dangling from the fl:oor(.) th- uhh no pillo's or 
what'ave you to push you forward (0.2) and they just 
make matters w::orse (.) 
There is more. Dawn, also from the arthritis group, talking about life with arthritis: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Dawn: 
Scott : 
Dawn: 
Scott : 
Dawn: 
Scott: 
and then I reallised (.) twenty years down the li:ne 
(.) I don't want this to happen to other peo:ple (.) 
>that< (.) there should be somewhere for us to tu:rn 
(.) .hhh and I think (.) a lot of people it's really 
difficult when your first diagjno:sed (.) .hhh you 
think that tyou're the only person in the world 
lthat's (0.2) walking funny (.) 
uhm (.) 
un you're the only person in the world with funny 
ha:nds (.) and you're the only person in the world 
that can't pick things up (.) >and they can't take 
the tops off thi:ngs< (.) .hhh and ya come here (.) 
and imme:diately (.) y- you find (.) y'know at least 
three or four people (.) 
uhm (.) 
with funny ha:nds a[nd t]heir trying to use two hands 
[.hh ] 
to pick a cup up or or y'know (.) >hobbling to the 
ba:r< (.) an y' y'know if y- if we all go in the pub 
together (.) nobody stares at us .hhh but if·you walk 
in a pub on your own (.) and your hobblin (.) your 
aware of it= 
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23 Scott: ~yeah~ 
What do you see? There is certainly plenty of talking. But what we have here is a class of 
readily produced illness narratives (Bury, 2001; Hyden, 1997). This is experience of 
living with illness. Just what I am looking for: expertise from living with a common 
problem. Emotions often run high. Failing bodies get in the way of normal lives. 
Uncertainty. Limited knowledge of diseases: what is happening to this body of mine? 
People have to cope. Knowledge is acquired. Linda has had surgery and Fred knows 
better than the surgeons how to stabilize things, at home. There is history and problems 
persist. They emerged before the group and will be there after the group. Bodies hobble. 
There are arthritic hands that look funny. Then there are outsiders that look and stare. 
What might they see? Solidarity. This is just a group of people enjoying the company of 
being around similar others. What do we see? Self-categorization: people enjoined 
through the sharing of phenomenological understandings of illness. A common problem 
forms the basis of categorization and group membership. In other words, we have located 
a genuine version of the phenomenon documented in the literature - self-help groups. 
Experiential knowledge has been revealed. We can see it, clearly. But can we? Or better: 
how can we? 
Consider the context. Insomuch as these are member-produced accounts of 
experiential knowledge, they are visible as particular kinds of accounting. They do not 
arise, normatively, as the production of a self-help group meeting. A social science 
researcher is present, asking questions and interfering. This setting has lost its 
"meetingness". As with all interview material, these accounts are co-productions of the 
interview format (Hammersley, 2003b; Potter & Hepburn, 2005, 2007; Rapley, 200 I; 
Roulston, Baker & Liljestrom, 2001). My actions are significant to the production of the 
talk of the members of these groups; it is dependent on the local interactional 
contingencies of the interview as a site of knowledge production. My interactional work, 
as question/topic initiator and information seeker, is part of the sequencing of talk. Yes, 
there is experiential knowledge of illness, but it is occasioned as a response to questions, 
to satisfy requests for justification of prior accounts and so on. Experiential knowledge is 
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present because I have invoked its presence. I have asked for it. Thus far, then, I have 
arrived where the literature currently stands; our topic of inquiry (that is, experiential 
knowledge) is made visible only as a hybrid form of social science and self-help group 
activity. Confident that these "self-help groupS"I13 have a life beyond social science, I 
will use this as my point of departure. To be sure, illness must have an experiential 
dimension that exceeds interviewing activity "4 (Bury, 2001; Kelly & Field, 1996; 
Lawton, 2003). I have new questions. I must look in other directions. 
5.3 The disappearance of a common problem 
My change in fieldwork activity is not seeking a class of "unsituated" experiential 
knowledge, free from context, circumstance or contingency. All things are situated; all 
things have their indexical expressions 115. Rather, it is simply that, after a point, as we 
move away from the practical circumstances of what is done in self-help groups, we 
begin to lose the phenomenon. It becomes something else. We invoke a new, or another, 
topic. Sensitivity to context is always necessary when conducting fieldwork, and so [ 
must follow the phenomenon, as the members of these groups are practicing it, wherever 
it takes me. Thus, in moving towards it, several questions obtain. What happens when a 
social science researcher does not ask for displays of this experiential knowledge, made 
available and recognizable through problems talk and illness narratives? How might it be 
shown as part of the interactional order of group meetings? How is this order arrived at, 
and what is its specification? And finally, what can be identified as contributing to its 
distribution? 
113 Although [continue to use this term to refer to the groups in my fieldwork, [ do so cautiously. My quest 
to establish whether these groups are in fact self-help groups, and not instances belonging to another 
category of group, is still unresolved. Although members of these groups do not object to the category self-
help group under "interview conditions", [am yet to observe those definitional features ofa self-help group 
in these groups, as part of their naturalistic, normative activities. Thus. ( am still treating the description of 
these groups as problematic and in need of specification through further analysis, and hence my use of 
scare quotes. 
114 It is surprising that important studies have investigated, and continue to investigate, chronic illness (the 
problem, if you will) using interviews (e.g., Anderson & Bury, 1988; MacRae, 2008; Nettleton, 2006; Rich, 
2006). No attention is paid here, to how chronic illness is being produced as a product of the interview 
setting. 
liS This term of course belongs to Garfinkel (1967); it is being applied in the intended ethnomethodological 
spirit. 
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Self-help group meetings comprise more than just telling stories. Different things 
are done. Other actors are involved. Here is a good example: newsletters. Members of 
self-help groups receive regular newsletters. These are extremely accessible artifacts for 
the ethnographer. They can be read before and after meetings; and they can be taken back 
to the office to examine in detail. I requested a corpus of backdated newsletters from the 
groups. I began to read. Composed by the chairperson, with occasional contributions 
from members, newsletters form a constant line of communication between members 
outside of meetings. This is especially true when members are absent from meetings, 
mostly due to surgery or ill health. Reading newsletters reaffirms group membership; it 
reminds individual members of their collective affiliation. But what is the substantive 
content of a self-help group newsletter? What reminds members that they identify 
themselves as a collective? A candidate reply is of course that the newsletter is a site for 
the articulation of members' experiential knowledge of illness. Members can attend to the 
primary criterion of their membership in the collective: a common illness. We can 
anticipate some means of its resolution. Undoubtedly there will be more illness 
narratives; problems talk will likely be padded out too. This will give rise to other things. 
Bodies. Disease. Hospitals. Treatment. Medical procedures. Illness management. Let us 
start with the arthritis group. Here are a few entries from their newsletters: 
September 2006 
MEMBER'S NEWS 
Group member and first time mum Jane has written to me via e-mail and has 
asked me to pass on her thanks to you all for the lovely presents given to her by 
the group on the occasion of her daughter lsabel's birth. You will be pleased to 
know that Jane and baby Isabel are both keeping well and Jane is hoping to bring 
Isabel to a group meeting for you all to see her. 
July 2007 
On Tuesday 26th June. Cindy organised a meal out at the Rufford Arms. There 
was a good turn-out as about 30 people came along and enjoyed an excellent 
value carvery meal. We all agreed that it was a good place to have group meals 
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out as access and parking is good and also the restaurant is large enough for us all 
to sit together in our very own eating area. Thanks Cindy for getting the idea and 
organising this at very short notice. 
Hold on. What is this? Where has arthritis gone, the reason for attending an arthritis self-
help group? You remember - a common problem. Instead the group learns that Jane, one 
of the members, has recently given birth. The group will want to see Jane's baby, [sabel. 
Cindy, another member, is congratulated for organizing an enjoyable group meal. The 
group was able to sit together; the appearance of a group identity is important. Arthritis is 
"concealed" through the presence of this group identity. It is oriented to neither by 
members not outsiders. Arthritis disappears when members sit together. So much so that 
future meals are planned. Two simple things: giving birth and having a meal. These are 
activities you would normatively expect to find, well, anywhere. These experiences 
happen to all of us. We need to look at more newsletters. Here are some extracts from 
newsletters from the Parkinson's group: 
May 2005 
Our next evening meeting, on Thursday May 19th at 7.30 in the day care centre, 
will be a talk by Lieut. Baker, entitled 'My War in Burma'. [n this year in which 
we have just marked 60 years since V.E. Day, it is fitting that we should 
remember that the fighting in Burma didn't end until August 1945. Lieu!. Baker 
went out to India and then to Burma when he was 18. He now lives in Oxbridge 
and is presently vice-chairman of the U3A and a regular supporter of the Carers 
Centre. 
July 2005 
A reminder that for our evening meeting on Thursday July 21 SI all members are 
invited as my guests to a summer evening party in the chairman's garden at 
Hintern House, from 6.00 pm onwards. Food and drink will be provided. Croquet 
and table tennis weather permitting. Wheelchairs welcome on the lawn. Plenty of 
seats available. Please let me know if you plan to come so that [ can have some 
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idea of numbers. There is plenty of convenient parking space. [fyou don't know 
how to get here, or would like a lift, please phone me on 04267 456289. 
There you go: an evening with Lieutenant Baker. An enlightening evening ahead, [ am 
sure, with all ofthose stories about time in Burma as a young soldier. This will be a time 
of reminiscence for the members. Many are war veterans; the chairperson spent most of 
her professional career in Burma. So: the topic holds a special place in their hearts. What 
about Parkinson's disease? And what about the July meeting? A summer evening party 
sounds very nice. [ like croquet too, and I am also known for my fondness of table tennis. 
But [ do not have Parkinson's disease. These evenings are in the service of something 
specific; but Parkinson's disease is not part of the specification. Yes, we see wheelchairs 
are mentioned, and that points to a common problem; but its being pointed to is not about 
making that common problem a feature of the evening. Wheelchairs users will need to 
know that they can access the lawn: that is where the main events of the evening will take 
place. And this is what is important. What these folks want is just a friendly party, some 
light refreshments and a bite to eat. If the weather permits, a few games of table tennis 
will be in order, perhaps some croquet too. Everyone can relax and have a pleasurable 
evening in the sun. Anyway, it gets them out of the day care center, their usual meeting 
venue. 
What is wrong here? The common problem, insomuch as it is appears in any 
consequential way for the group on this evening, does not seem to be present. That is not 
the point of this occasion. And experiential knowledge does not seem to be here either; 
there is nothing that requires members to draw on their illness experience. Parkinson's 
disease might be what essentially brings everyone to the party, but it does not make itself 
visible as the purpose of this meeting. Two things: a common problem and a pleasant 
evening. The point is that they do not co-exist, not here; or they are not both visible. One 
conceals the other. While Frank and Beatrice are playing table tennis, and some of the 
others watch while they drink red wine and enjoy the sunshine, they are not talking about 
Parkinson's disease. They are not doing illness. Have [ lost the phenomenon simply by 
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attempting to get closer to it? Surely not. I move to the Lymphoma group for 
clarification. Here is an opening extract from their January 2006 newsletter: 
Dear Friends 
We had 15 members at our December meeting and had a thoroughly enjoyable 
evening with a festive quiz, together with some mince pies and mulled wine. I 
don't know whether it was the effects ofthe mulled wine or the festive season but 
we all had a good laugh. It was enjoyed so much that I have been asked by a 
couple of members to arrange another quiz night. The quizmaster has already 
agreed to this and it is scheduled in for our June meeting. 
Look at the form of address. Those to whom these remarks are addressed are not 
members but "friends". The kind of group in which these addressees have membership is 
not specified. It is simply a collection of friends. The address says nothing about the 
capacity in which they have friendship. The pronoun usage - "we", "our" and "I" - gives 
us a sense that the author is personally affiliated with the group addressed. The 
production of his role means that he is speaking both on behalf of, and to, friends. He is 
like them. However, that it is a friendship arising out of a common illness, lymphoma, is 
certainly not identifiable on this basis. There are people drinking wine and eating mince 
pies while playing a festive quiz. No wonder these members had an enjoyable evening. 
Members are happy because of the festive season; and they had mulled wine too. The 
outcome of the meeting is important, for it is not just a matter of undertaking these 
various activities as such. Members had a good laugh. Another quiz evening is arranged. 
The organizer of the quiz, another member of the group, is not a member or friend (with 
lymphoma or of a lymphoma group). He is a "quizmaster". He is referred to in the 
capacity in which he will be known for the evening. The others will be "quiz players", or 
maybe "contestants". One of the reasons for attendance, then, is to partake in these 
activities. They will return because there will be more wine. More enjoyment. More 
laughing. But, like the January meeting, no lymphoma. Experiential knowledge o/illness 
is not mentioned. There is already enough for the evening. 
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Illness is important. But laughter is important too. lllness and laughter are so 
entwined in these self-help groups, and yet they are routinely separated. We see one but 
not the other. Take this entry from the May 2006 newsletter from the stroke group. This 
is recurrent across the stroke group newsletters, usually placed at the end. It is the last 
thing members read. 
THINGS YOU NEVER HEAR SAID: 
"That Dale Winton is such a hunk." 
"[fyou ask me, Labour is doing a great job." 
"No, it's my turn to change baby's nappy." 
"[ think the TV license is worth every penny." 
What has happened to Sam's experience in the hospital, with the doctors? Or the fear of 
uncertainty that he mentioned earlier as a feature of the lives of stroke survivors, beyond 
the hospital? Hearing about trips and other group events is one thing; they are practical. 
Even laughing is understandable. But why are we seeing this routine appearance of jokes 
in a self-help group? This has no contingency on heart attack experience; nor does it 
derive its meaning from experiential knowledge of stroke. [ have not experienced stroke 
and still understand the humor. Yes: very funny, especially the one about the Labour 
government! Considering it is commonplace, within this newsletter and across the others, 
there is another function to humour, besides the telling of a joke. It is a reminder of the 
purpose of the group: to keep laughing. Laughter keeps other things at bay, like arthritis. 
And speaking of laughing: 
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THANKS FOR FLOWERS. LETTERS. AND CA RDS 
On behalf of the committee, Lynda and myse lf, I would li ke to thank you all fo r 
your kindness in sending letters, ca rds and presenting nowers in appreciat ion for 
all our work in gelling the Blackpool holi day together. It was very much 
appreciated particularly, as you all know, we have faced many problems along the 
way since Lynda and I tirst came up with the idea of a holiday last September. 
However, I' m pleased to say it all worked out fine in the end and the trip was a 
huge success and enjoyed by all. 
Thi s is an entry from the October 2006 newsletter from the Arthriti s group. Look at the 
photograph aga in. This has been selected among any number of al ternative possible 
photographab le images of the group. It is a large photograph too, occupying much of the 
space of October's newsletter: it is im portant that members see it. The group is on 
holiday. We can see some crutches and wa lking aids; all we have to do is look. There it 
is, a common problem. But that it not the purpose of the holi day that everyone is 
enjoying. It is certa inl y not the purpose of thi s photograph. Look, everyone is smiling. 
These members may have arthri tis but they are having a good time on holiday. Illness is 
incidental. To the extent that it is invoked, it is neither a defining feature of the members 
nor their acti vities together. There is a message undern eath the photograph, conveying 
apprec iation fo r everyone's ass istance in organi si ng the holi day: the tickets, the book ings, 
the trave l and the entertainment. It was a group effort. The practical accomplishment of 
184 
the holiday is be ing ce lebrated; thi s is a newsworth y achievement, even as a reminder for 
those who attended. The experience of the holiday is available for members who did not 
attend too. Gladys will enjoy the photograph; she is stil l at home recovering from 
surgery. Thi s is how the group wishes to be seen: smiling, having fun , together. 
It is not all laughter. Illness does have its place in se lf-help groups: it does become 
··mentionab le". But illness becomes visible for specific purposes. Het'e is an opening 
ex trac t 0 f a newsletter from the lymphoma group: 
Feb 2006 
Dear Fri ends 
I start on a sad note as unfortunate ly since our last meeting, one of our members, 
Jack from Devon has passed away. Jack was able to come to about 3 of our 
meetings but I remember him as the person who spoke out at our inaugural 
meeting say ing that he had been a member of another group in the past and he felt 
that their meetings were all doom and gloom and that he hoped our group would 
hold happy meetings. I hope we do. Jack was onl y 45 and leaves a wife and two 
young children. He was diagnosed with Lymphoma about 10 years ago and had a 
bone marrow transplant 7 years ago and since then he had ex perienced rej ection 
problems. This in turn had caused him lung problems and it was thi s that 
eventually caused hi s death. His wife, Debbie telephoned me to thank our group 
for their support and fri endship and consequently Shirley and I were able to 
represent the group at hi s fun eral ear li er today. 
On a happier note, by the time you receive thi s letter, Peter and Betty will have 
got married and be about to embark on their honeymoon touring Australia and 
New Zealand. Consequently we will not see them at our next two meetings. 
Although I have known about the impending wedding for a little whil e, it was 
Betty's wish that it did not become common knowledge until aftet- the event. She 
has however told me I can spil l the beans in this letter. I am sure YOll all join me 
in wishing Peter and Betty a very long and happy life together. 
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It is unfortunate that my first acquaintance with lymphoma, as naturally ori ented to by the 
group, is under these circumstances: death . This is rare - an orientati on io illness. It has 
taken me by surpri se. A member recently died from complications aro und illness. 
Lymphoma, then bone marrow transplantation , and then a marrow reject ion, and then a 
life lost. Death accounts for thi s appearance. This occasion of illness is not "about" the 
group; its visibil ity is the forma l deli very of news to co-members of the absence of a 
member. This abse nce, if not accounted for, will di srupt group meetings; members wi ll 
ask quest ions when the departed member no longer comes to meetings. An anomaly 
wo uld ari se. At any rate, ill ness, its presence through death , creates a tension . Although a 
formal news item, its delivery represents precisely what the gro up wishes to avo id. This 
group holds happy meet ings; death changes that. It turns it into "doom and gloom". No 
death: illness disappears from view once aga in . Thus a new topic is ini tiated, the recent 
marriage of two other members and their honeymoon. Thi s is happy news. The group 
wants to know about thi s; indeed the chairperson has anticipated telling for some time. 
We should take stock. There is no appearance of a common problem, and an 
empirica l unava il abi lity of anything recogni zable as experi enti al knowledge of illness. 
Subst ituted is the presence of other th ings. Jane's new born daughter, Isabe l. Summer 
parti es. Hol idays. And jokes. Everything, it seems, but illness. How can we engage thi s 
tension, thi s loss of what is expected and , converse ly, ga in of what is unexpected? 
Perhaps discard the newslette rs as a deviant case? No. However unexpected these 
acti viti es might be, they feature as com mon places; they are being attended to and 
embraced by the phenomenon, not deferred, like the se l f~help books. As such, they are 
productive. Specifying the details of their producti vity, for these groups, becomes the 
top ic of inquiry. We need to spe ll thi s out to arri ve at an adequate understanding of what 
is taking place under the category "self-help group". This will mean changing things 
about. A we document the character of these groups in detail, we will need to fo llow 
how authenticity is be ing produced , and how it functions to instantiate the phenomenon. 
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The problem of sligma'16 
Illness is a problem. When we find members of se lf-help groups, they have undertaken, 
or, more likely, are in an ongo ing process of undertaking, a transition. Two categories 
appl y: hea lth and illness. The onset of illness, especiall y chronic Ot· long-te t'm illness, 
in troduces significant disruption to normal patterns of everyday life, particul arly the ways 
in which identities are negot iated (e.g., Bury, 1982; Charmaz, 1983). Adjustments are 
necessary, from hea lth to illness (W illiams, 2000). There are li fe changes. However, thi s 
transition is not a natural fact of illness itse lf; the import of any parti cular illness is used 
to sociall y categori se peo ple. The hea lthy represent a benchmark against which the ill are 
judged. Illness and soc ial identity collide. Still better: social identity, here through illness, 
is sociall y regulated. Identi ty is a socia ll y accountab le matter. Illness, then, plays its part 
in the organi sation of everyday li fe, not onl y the body. We need not ventw'e too ra t· to 
find the source. Gorrman (1963: 15 origina l ita lics) put it best, as a situation whereby: 
... an individual who might have been received eas il y in ord inary social 
in tercourse possesses a trait that can obt rude itse lf upon attention and turn those 
of us whom he meets away from him , break ing the claim that hi s other attributes 
have on him . He possesses a stigma, an undes ired diffe rentness fro m what we had 
antic ipated. We and those who do not depart negati vely from the part icular 
expectations at issue I shall ca ll the 170rmals. 
It is a difficult word, sti gma. Look at what it does; it makes the ill diffe r from the hea lthy. 
They sti ck out. Walking sti cks, limps, artifi cial limbs and weakened bodies: these sti gma 
symbols dev iate from normati ve, expected patterns. Furthermore, the appearance -
Goffman uses the better term "ev identness" - of the stigma becomes the centra l feature in 
social enco un ters, be ing the primary attri bute used to accoun t for the socia l acceptability 
of the person. Illness marks the pe rson, as well as the body. Exc lusion obtains if routine 
acti vities are attempted. This is produced whenever the sti gmatised and the healthy 
in teract: "Each potential SOlff"Ce of di scomfo rt fo r him when we are with him can become 
116 My atlenlion 10 stigma arose, at least initially, out of the ways in which members of these self-help 
groups were characterizing their experiences of thei r ill ness in everyday, social encounters. 
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something we sense he is aware of, aware that we are aware of, and even aware of our 
state of awareness about hi s state of awareness about his awareness" (p. 30). The 
differentness of an illness identity depa rts from the normative character of that which is 
not different, which is to say, the aggregate of others who are neither ill nor defined by 
ill ness. The health y are all simi lar: they share an unspoi led identity. Stigma reveals the 
comment-ab le nature of those who are stigmatised, those who are, as Go ffman (p. 15) 
says, "not quite human". 
The sti gmatised, then: remarkable, extraord inary, unique. So it is a term of abuse. 
It is not necessary to make a di stinction between, on the one hand, enacted stigma, actual 
instances of di scrimination based on the inferi ori ty of those who are ill , and , on the other, 
fell stigma, a fear of potent ial di scrimination and personal feelings of inferi ority (see 
Scambler & Hopk ins, 1986). Fe lt or enacted. stigma still has its elfects; it is seen in those 
manifold contex ts in whi ch it is arti cul ated in the shaping of li ves and identiti es (L ink & 
Phelan, 200 1). Its presence is enough for us to understand its soc ia l import. At any rate, 
the ind ividuality to emerge through stigma is routinely concealed, as Bury ( 1982: 176) 
makes clear: " Indiv iduals beg in to restri ct their terrai n to local and fa mil iar territory 
where they are least likely to be exposed to the gaze and questions of acquaintances and 
strangers" . There is shame. This is evident across a range of illness experi ences, for 
instance in re lat ion to recent ly documented cases of obes ity (Drury & Lou is, 2002) 
autism (Gray, 2002) and anorex ia (Ri ch, 2006). What "those who have suffered bodil y 
trauma do not wish to show and what other people do not wish to see coa lesce in the fact 
that ill people live silent ly with the effects of se ri ous di sease" (Radley, 2002 : 4). The ill 
are outcast. They no longer have ent itlement to community membershi p l17 Friends do 
not have the time to ta lk anymore. Families, although supportive, j ust do not understand . 
The stigmatised are left high and dry. Iso lated . Not qui te human . Where do they go? 
Who do they turn to? 
1I7 For exa mple, Reidpath . Chan, Gifford & All oley (2005) argue that one of the most significant 
characteristics of st igma is its force at excluding the stigmatised from contributing lO the social and 
material resources through which community is assembled and maintai ned. 
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It is not easy visiting fi ve se lf-help gro ups. I have to dri ve extensively to most of 
the groups. But I am able to ride my bicycle to the other two groups; they are close to 
home. There is so much to take in . Different di seases. Different symptoms. All those 
faces and names to re member. Walking aids are scattered about in meetings. Bodies limp 
and hobble around. The arthriti s group meets in the evening, at 7pm ; the visual 
impairment group meets in the morning. Some of the groups meet weekl y; others meet 
fo rtnightl y, even monthly. Venues vary too. The Lymphoma group meets in the 
postgradu ate research building of the local hospital; the stroke group meets in a quiet 
co rner of the town's sports and social club. The arthriti s group is well established. In 
contrast, the lymphoma group is still in its intimacy; it recently ce lebrated its second year 
together. Most of the members of the groups are older; but some are young, perh aps not 
much older than I. The I'arkinson's group is unusual: its member's wea r name badges. So 
there is dispar'ity in selF-help groups. Onl y t'he name is shared, se lf-help, at va ri ous points 
at least. What else could be holding these groups together, for practi ca l pu rposes? 
My ongo ing visits afford me one sav rn g grace: mass ive ly regular patterns of 
behav ior can be fo und . On every occasion of a se lf-help group meeting, after my fi rst 
visits, what is observed is the same as what had been observed before. There is something 
shared across the groups, more than just a name. I noti ce repeated acti viti es within 
meetings; there is a method to the presentation o f a se l f-help group meetin g. Thi s recurs 
across the groups too. The organi zation of the groups corresponds with a shared model, 
which, although it varies in detail s and order, means the groups relate in different ways. 
Like se lf-help books, these similarities share family r'esemblances (c f. Wittgenstein , 
1953). When people arri ve at meetings they exchange greetings. They talk . They arrange 
themselves in a circle"8 Although thi s arrangement has its origin in Alcoholi cs 
Anonymous, the foundational self-help group, where each member in the circle in turn 
te ll s hi s or her story of abstinence from alcohol, here it does not have that functi on. The 
circle does not give rise to stories . Other things are done. The chairperson brings the 
group to order. There is interaction. The specifi cation of this interaction, in part, 
di stingui shes these groups as a domain of phenomena; it gives them their character as 
r ISSeI f~h e l p group scholars refer to this as the "circle of sharing" (e.g., Borkman. 1999: 2). 
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self-help groups. But what exactly is done, if not some orientation to a common problem? 
We are, after all , at the center of the phenomenon. 
No stories or narrati ves. There is another shape to the interacti on. Th is is not 
ord inary conversation, but a form of " institutiona l interaction,,1 19 How to ge t a purchase 
on thi s? Conversat ion analys is, found ed on the analysis of the mundane accomplishment 
of everyday conduct, has shown that the organization of talk in ord inary conversation 
displays a specific "speech exchange system". Th is allows interact ion to take place at a 
practical level (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974) . An estab li shed body of investigation 
into alte rnat ive, non-conversat ional or institutional interacti on has charted the features of 
institutional turn-tak ing systems (e.g. , Anninen, 2005 ; Bardov i-Harlig & Hart fo rcl , 2005 ; 
Boden & Zimmennan, 199 1; Drew & Heritage, 1992). It shows that institutional ta lk 
departs from , or transform s, the norma l arrangements of conversat ional turn-tak ing. 
Whereas aspects of ta lk 's organi zation in ordinary conversat ion - e.g., turn des ign, turn 
content and turn length - is fi'ee to va ry and ari se out of local conversational imperatives, 
institutional talk is different. It di splays a restriction, by allocating, differentiall y at any 
rate, opportuni ties for the types of participat ion when fo lks talk. When talk is produced, it 
fits in to pre-determilled or pre-allocated turns: th is establi shes roles of speakers. It makes 
specific ident ities re levant fo r the completion of some specifically institutional task. But 
people do not simply talk th rough a different sequence of turns, when they do 
institut ional talk. No. A setting is displayed: the context in wh ich they speak. The sett ing 
has a li fe. It talks too. It shapes how things are done. Talk is shaped by it, so that it 
revea ls what that setting means fo r those "within" it (e.g., Arminen, 2000; Hester & 
Francis, 200 I; Schegloff, 1987; 199 1). So things hap pen when people talk . There is 
communicati on, but there are also other things: rules, customs. Cultures come ali ve. This 
stu ff is revealed in institu tional talk. 
119 A range of settings has been documented by looking at the setting-constituti ve features of institutional 
interaction. For instance, in courtroom examinmions (Alkinson & Drew, 1979), news interviews ( Heritage 
& Greatba tch, 1991) and ta lk radio (Hutchby, 1996 ; 2006), each turn-tak ing system reveals the institut ional 
character of talk and how it accomplishes specific, instituti onal tasks embedded in that selling. 
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Self~help group meetings establi sh institutionally relevant identities. Two are 
re levant: "announcer" and "announcement recipient" . This pattern of interaction has a 
di stinctive sequence. Announcers have certain ri ghts to speak and their talk is composed 
over a longer duration. Other members of the group, being recipients of the 
announcement, typically onl y contribute shorter turns. An announcement is typically 
given priority when it is deli vered to rec ipients. The initiation of unprompted or 
otherwise unsolicited talk by the group, between announcements or during them, is 
acti ve ly precluded by the turn tak ing sequence (but see later). Take extract I. Th is is an 
opening sequence from the arthriti s group meeting: 
Ext .... ct l. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Dawn : 
Tina : 
Dawn : 
Tina : 
uhh t apologies fcom Cindy (0 . 21 Eoc tonight ( . 1 
u : hh I got the Chcistmas dinner list ( · 1 iE anybody 
wants to either ch :ange the Eood order ( . 1 o : r (0 . 21 
uhh t add anymore to it (0 . 2) it ' s the last night 
because I ' m going in with the . o : rders to the pub ( . ) 
tomorrow ( . ) o : r >over the weekend< ( . ) or Monday ( . ) 
'in the next day or two' (0 . 2) . hhh u : hh t Christmas 
Tr: affle p r izes (0 . 2) thank you to Heth (0 . 2) I don ' t 
know if you saw at the last meeting ( . ) all those 
br : illiant prizes ( . ) 
a m: : a z ing collection °hehh hahh'(0 . 2) 
such a <g reat> collection an . we were saying to Heth 
( . ) we r eally . thece ' s so much stufE the r e that 
there ' s too much fo - for Christmas ( . ) and we r :eally 
need to think about how we ' re going to i maximise ( . ) 
the pr : izes to ( . ) for fundraising for the group ( . ) 
yeah (0 . 2) 
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18 
19 
20 
2 1 
22 
24 
26 
27 
28 
Dawn : 
Heth : 
how we ' re going to do that ( , ) whether we ' re going to 
have an a :uction next year ( . ) I mean obviously a lot 
of the stuff' s s :easonal . hhh or perishable but 
we ' ll . we ' ll have u : hh u : hh at the raffle ( . ) but it 
someth i ng that we ' re going to think about ( . ) we ' ll 
probably hold . a lot of the . big things back ( . ) and 
have a think about what to do ( , ) so we ' ll and 
perhaps have a chat ab~out that ( . ) if anybody ' s got 
any id :eas of how we can maximise . hhh ( . ) it whether 
we have one pr : ize ( . ) big pcize ( . ) a month ( . ) 
uhm 
Look at the identiti es. Dawn produces several stretches of lengthy turns (lines 1-10, 12-
16 and 18-27), whi ch are separated by va ri ous short turns by other members (lines I I, 17 
and 28). These turns, through their sequence, accomplish the task of doing 
announcements. Compare th is with ordinary co nversat ion, where talk is mess ier; folks 
share the burden of tu rns fa r more freq uent ly across their talk (e.g., Sacks, Schegloff & 
JefTerson, 1974). In effect, these " first turns" constitute agenda sett ing; they are 
produc ing the top ics with wh ich to occupy the business of the meeting. Dawn cou ld be 
interrupted. Other members of the gro up might want to say something. But they do not. 
They know that something is happening: announcements are be ing done. When other 
members do talk, the turn taking is des igned that way; they are not interrupting. For 
instance, when Dawn asks, on lines 8, " I don't know if you saw at the last meet ing (.) a ll 
those br:illiant prizes", although not addressed to any specifi c member, it is nevertheless 
look ing for a response. The members of the groups are relevant now; they are being 
treated as recipients. A candidate response is sought. Look, Tina rep lies with an 
acknowledgment: ··am: :azi ng collection °hehh hahho". 
Dawn has made the presence ofTina's acknowledgment an expectable feature for 
the interaction to proceed . The minimal length of Tina's turn is econom ical; it sati sfies 
the role of providing acknowledgemen t. And it displays attenti veness to the 
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announcement. That is it. See how there is a smooth transfer back to Dawn; they both 
know that Dawn has to continue with announcements. Her identity as announcer takes 
priority. Here, then, the design and transfer of turns demonstrate the goal orientation of 
the interaction, and the institu tio nal identities required to render it possib le. 
And thi s is demonstrated in other ways too. Alth ough turns by different speakers have 
been produced, Dawn has been the main speake,·. She has institutional work to comp lete. 
And the others know this; that is why we do not see them speaking at length . The fl oor is 
given to Dawn. Like news interviews (e.g., Greatbatch, 1988 ; Heritage & Greatbatch, 
199 1), when we see that recipients of announcements withhold from producing a turn , 
particularly when it is possib le and avail ab le to do so, it is ev idence of the institutional 
character of thi s talk. Take extract 2. A member of the Park inson's Society group, Anne, 
is tonnulating detail s ot' a previous fund raising clay attended by some of the members: 
Extract 2, 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Anne : 
Betty : 
Anne : 
and the tst : : ar collector was Sandra ' s husband ( . ) 
who sat for three hours in his chair ( . ) and in his 
box he had a hundred and sixty nine po(h)un(ds hehh 
(a :: : : hh 
(0 . 2) 
I think he gives everybody such a lovely sm(h)ile 
when they w(h)alk past (0 . 2) so ( . ) that ' s ( . ) 
that ' s good news 
(1. 0) 
well that ' e enough notices for the moment ( , ) i I ' m 
( . ) sure some of you may remember su - surin 
Look at line 9, the pause of one second. That is quite a long time, when people should be 
talking. Other members of the gro up could take over, and have a turn at talk , But that 
pause is doing something. It is an intentional action; on the part of the audience, it is 
"do ing" li stening (Greatbatch, 1985; Moerman, 1988). It is withholding from producing a 
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turn and showing an ex pectation that Anne, the speaker, will continue with her talk. 
Conversation analysts have shown that, like other interactional phenomena, such as 
"continuers" (e.g., "mm hm" and "uh huh"), th is silence marks a "passing" on an 
opportuni ty to ta lk. The group is responsive to Anne's task of do ing announcements 
(Jefferson, 1984). Consider ex tract 3: 
Extract 3. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
I1 
12 
Dave : 
Geoff : 
Barbara : 
well ( . ) I think we must accept that (0 . 2) this is 
our little lot 
(0 . 9) 
I don ' t know why there ' s such a small lot 
(0 . 7) 
u : hm ( . ) if I could introduce Geoff Barns ( . ) from 
Bronnley ' s ( . ) he ' s the chemist he ' s come to talk to 
us about ( . ) uhm ( . ) Bronnley ' s and s : oap and things 
like that ( . ) take it away please (0 . 3) 
hello ( . ) as you may know I work with Barbara ( . ) 
and u : : hm ( . ) not quite as long as Barbar[a) 
[hlehh 
Here we see Dave, a member of the lymphoma group, first ges turing at the absence of 
many of the members from the group meeting, and then inquiring about the absence. 
There are two noticeably long pauses (l ines 3 and 5). Like ex tmct 2, these pauses are not 
" fi ll ed" by talk from other members of the group. They are ass umed not to require a 
response, and they do not get one. The other members know that announcements are in 
progress and must be completed. Dave is entitled to continue; he is the announcer. This 
shared expectati on, that Dave can produce these pauses without fea r of speaker transfer, 
where other members will ingly leave those pauses "open", shows the co-product ion of 
situated, institutional identities with spec ific I'O les to play, which is to say, the de li very 
and receipt of announcements. 
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This sequence of interaction serves as a normati ve fea ture of "doing" self- help 
group meetings, which can be made even clearer when that sequence of turn taking is 
breached. Thi s is typica ll y seen by the way in which members of these gro ups de part 
from their pre-allocated and all owab le turns at ta lk, such as unsoli cited responses and 
acknowledgements to announcements. Such departures become accountable. Look at 
extract 4. Thi s is taken from later in the arthrit is group announcements: 
Extract 4. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Dawn : 
Sue : 
Tina : 
Dawn : 
John : 
t u : hm ( . ) the other uhm ( . ) one of t wo items (0 . 2) 
t Christmas cards ( , ) I mentioned in the newsletter 
( . ) what do you th : ink about this money for charity 
( . ) oar do we send each other Ch[ristmas cardso 
[money for charity~ 
~ tcharity (0 . 2) 
shall we have a v : ote (0 . 2) who thinks that we should 
s - ( . ) s - ( . ) y ' know ( . ) all contribute a pound to 
charity ( . ) 
<y : : eah> ( . ) I think that ' s : (0 . 2) 
II Dawn : who thinks we should stick to Christmas cards ( . ) 
12 Marge : -> e xc : use me ( . ) t wha t charity ( . ) 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Dawn : 
Marge : 
Dawn : 
Cindy : 
Dawn : 
a : r t hritis r :e ! search= 
~oh 
(0 . 9) 
so a r e w- ( . ) we having it for charity ( . ) then ( . ) 
°uhmo (0 . 3) 
okay (0 . 3) no Christmas cards to each other 
In initiating a topic for announcement, the chairperson of the arthritis group, Dawn, is 
asking the group to dec ide whether they wish to exchange Christmas ca rds or, 
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alternati ve ly, submit money to charity. However, part of the way through the 
announcement, one of the members, Marge, inquires about the nature of the charity by 
asking a question (line 12). Marge's question, but specifically its preface "exc:use me", is 
an acknowledgment that her current turn is a departure from the announcement sequence, 
indicating its nature as a detour in the deli very o f the announcement. This announcement 
normalive ly requires onl y that members, in their nex t, adjacent turns, prov ide a candidate 
response: to give each other Chri stmas cards or to give money to charity. Other members, 
Sue (line 5), Tina (line 6) and John (line 10), have in fac t ori ented to th is pattern of turn 
taking. As a response to the questi on, Dawn speci fi es the name of the charity (line 13), 
which is receipted by Marge. A gap of almost one second fo llows, between the offer of 
thi s receipt and Dawn's next turn . Stuff is happening here; but it is not anti cipating 
further engagement with Marge. Rather, it is providing a "space" for other members to 
cast their votes on the substance of the announcement: Chri stmas cards or money to 
charity. 
Dawn re-offers her initial question (line 16), giving the members a fin al chance to 
arri ve at a decision. Dawn prefaces her questi on with the conj unction ··so". Like all 
conjuncti ons, thi s is do ing reconnecting wo rk; Dawn is returning her question to the 
business at hand , before Mat·ge' s question. So Marge's question was an interruption to 
announcement work. But the completion of the announcement is still required: Dawn 
needs a decision. In her closing turn (l ine 18), she treats those earlier tokens and receipts, 
the last of which is given by Cindy (line 17), as the co-producti on of a decision. A task 
has been accomplished: the money will go to charity. Announcements are done using pre-
allocated turns at talk, and breaching thi s sequence of interaction becomes vi sible. It is, as 
we have seen, preventing the group from doing business. Here is the visual impairment 
group. As with the extract from the arthritis grOLlp, we see an announcement being made. 
The group is in fo r a treat, as there is the possib ility of a vis it from of a choco late 
company who provides tours and demonstrations of their business to interested parti es: 
Extract 5. 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Tom : 
Floe : 
professionally yours handmade chocolates ( . ) ridge 
way craft centre main road Doncaster and there is 
directions (0 . 2) all ( . ) p : ersonally yours we 
specialise in visiting any interested group of people 
in the comfort of your own premises or meeting place 
to provide an entertaining informative insi[ght 
[o : hh 
almost mouth waterin[g 
9 Doris : ~ [just a minute floe (0 . 2) 
10 Tom : we provide an entertaining and informative insight 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Simone : 
Ivy : 
Tom : 
into art of handmade chocolates well we ' re all for 
that a : ren ' t we= 
=yes ( . ) 
o : h yes ( . ) 
learn about the t history of the origin of chocolate 
( . ) witness the products being made then tantalise 
your taste bus 
Look at where the action is, on lines 7-1 0. Tom is read ing a letter the gro up received 
from the chocolate company and is given normati ve rights to speak. He is do ing an 
announcement, as we recogni ze. When Floe interj ects, at the end of line 7, expressing her 
excitement, it stops Tom from completing the letter. In selecting herself to speak, she has 
stopped a task from be ing done. If the group does not hear it, they will not find out about 
th e visit, and they will not get any chocolate. The success ful completi on of the 
announcement means a lot, as it is mai ntaining the relevance of a set of situated identiti es 
fo r the purposes of conducting specific institutional work (Boden & Zimmennan, 1991 ). 
Look at line 9, where Doris steps in ; she knows something is wrong. She wants the group 
to hear abo ut the chocolate company. Dori s is treating Floe's response as an interruption 
of the announcement, and in effect, terminating the possibili ty of her continuing, or 
producing another turn . Tom then re-offe rs hi s announcement, repeating the patt a lready 
mentioned during speaker overlap . He is treatin g hi s turn as having been interrupted, it 
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not being successfull y de li ve red the first time round. Whereas Floe 's turn was terminated, 
two subsequent turns, by Simone and Ivy (l ines 13 and 14), in responding to the 
announcement, are not. These turns are not interrupting the institutional wo rk performed 
through thi s interacti on; to the contrary, they represent an institutional relevance as they 
are responding as legitimate "rece ivers" of the announcement. Tom (line 12) is 
requesting agreement from those at whom hi s announcement is directed. Thi ngs get done 
when in terru ptions do not occur. Although not seen here, Tom goes on to rece ive 
acceptance from the group of the invitati on from the chocolate company. Through thi s 
organi zation of talk we see the management of the life of these groups. This is not the 
same as the talking you might hear in the street or on the telephone between fr iends. 
Things happen when thi s turn-tak ing is perfo rmed, consequential things that 
define the gro ups in whi ch thi s talking takes place. Tasks are undertaken. Guest speakers 
de li ver their talks. Chari ties receive donations. Visitors arri ve to give demonstrati ons at 
group meetings. Self-help groups go on tri ps. This is interesting enough, but there is no 
sight of illness, not even a glimpse. No common prob lem. And there are no signs that 
they will be produced for me on my visits. 
The reduction o.lstigma 
We know that illness features heavil y in the li ves of peop le. They ta lk about it, again and 
aga in , through illness narrati ves. It contri butes to understandings of their experi ence of 
illness and identity (Bury, 2001 ; Hyden, 1997; Nettl eton, O'Ma lley, Watt & Du ffe y, 
2004; Twohig & Kalitkus, 2004). And it prov ides resources with which li ves are 
reassembled, rewritten and retold . More parti cularl y, and to the point, self-help groups, 
acco rding to the literature, are defined by the presence of a common problem; they 
prov ide the context within which the narrati visation of personal experi ence of illness gets 
done. A common problem shoul d be present, organi zing the producti on of meetings: 
arthriti s, lymphoma, visual impairment, stroke, Parkinson's di sease. And yet, as we are 
forced to consider, from our journey through these sel f-help group meetings thus far, it is 
not. I am aware that it will be inadequate to suggest the absence of a common problelll 
without also hav ing knowledge that that absence is non-tri vial (McI-loul , 1980). In other 
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words, thi s particular absence needs to be cons idered to have significance for what we 
would otherwise expect to be presentllO If not a common problem, then what accounts 
for the ex istence of these se lf-help groups? Now, before we answer that, we can consider 
the logical poss ibilities of the empirical unava ilability of a common problem , just as 
others have suggested lll . Perhaps a common problem is simply not there, which is to say, 
these are not se lf- help groups. In which case, I have been look ing in the wrong place l12 
Or maybe it is because I am an incompetent obse rver; I do not "have" the illness I am 
seeking to illuminate, and therefore do not see it. I am an outs ider. I do not live with the 
common problem\lJ . There is another poss ibility: the common problem is present, but it 
is di sgui sed. 
110 Sacks (n. d.: 26-27) makes the point th us: " If One is going to make the statement which proposes that 
something is absent , then you cannot in any serious way propose that X is absent unless you have some way 
of disc riminating the absence of X from the asscrtable absence of a range of other things that are also not 
present", 
III Personal correspondence with the author of the paper that introduced the concept "experiential 
knowledge" (and therefore the common problem and the means of its resolution), Thomasi na Borkman, 
who read an early draft of this chapter, has provided a num ber of arguments tha t el ucidate these 
possibil it ies, to fo llow. 
122 "[A reason why experiential knowledge is absent] is that you studied social groups, nol problem so lving 
self-help groups---if all they did was think about ranl es, pri zes, social acti vities, they don't sound like any 
se lf-help groups I know" (Borkman , 2008a). 
123 "Experi enti al knowledge of arthritis, for example, is by definiti on part ly/ largely unknown to someone 
without arthritis un less that someone has extensive experience being around and caring for someone with 
arthri tis" (Borkman , 2008b). And more: "[S]ince you (presumably) are a lay person about arthri ti s, 
lymphoma, stroke/heart attack and visual impairments. how do you know the self-helpers weren'l 
communicating experiential knowledge during the meetings but since you don' t know it you can' t see it 
when it is in fro nt of you" (Borkman, 2008c). I do not accept Borkman 's argument, and for a very specific 
reason. It strongly reflects "standpoin t epistemology", most famously art iculated in fem inist scholarshi p: it 
takes the idea that knowledge is situated, 10 an extreme level. The world, or a part of the world, can onl y be 
know/l if it is seen or experienced from a specific perspective, or standpoint. It draws heavily all the 110t ion 
of knowing and experi enci ng from within an embodied, subject position. In Femini st writing, then, \ve can 
onl y understand "women" if we are ourselves women; " men", fo r instance, just do not understand. But that 
is not enough; it gets even more specific, perspecti va lized. We can only understand "black". "disabled" 
women from the standpoint of a black. di sabled woman's embod ied position. If we do not meet those 
criteri a, and see the wo rld from (as) that standpoi nt, then we have no way of knowing what it is li ke to see 
things that way. This is singularity: there is onl y a singl e way of seeing a single phenomenon. Latour says it 
nicely when, speak ing abollt the project of science studies and "non-scientists" in vestiga ting scientific 
practices. he comments: "Just imagine if that slogan [that only scientists should speak about science] were 
generali zed: onl y politicians should speak about pol itics, businessmen about business; or even worse: onl y 
rats will speak about rats, frogs about frogs, electrons about electrons!" (1999b: 17). Latour's remarks are 
not so absurd when we replace singu larity with mu ltip licity; there is not a single reality, but many, and 
there is not a single perspecti ve from which to see it, but man y. BUI perspectivalisl11 is the wrong word ; it 
retains singulari ty, of only knowing the world in relation to somebody's position within it. My earlier 
discllssion in the methods chapter, abollt meth od and practice, should suffice to nesh out thi s alternat ive 
argument. And it is in those terms that I investigate my topic here, self-help groups. So: the common 
problem in these groups is not absent because I do not share it , whatever sharing might entail. Something 
else is in pl ay. 
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We can see that the unava il ability of the common problem cannot be attri buted to 
an experi enti al absence in the li ves of the members in these groups. Despite the 
appearance of social acti vities, these are not "social groups" or "social clubs" . A common 
problem, that feature by which a se lf-help group is identified, is traceable. Look: 
whee lcha irs, hobbling bodies, guide dogs, even death. The signs are there, but they 
pe rfo rm a comm on problem out of "necess ity" . It is di ffi cult for Betty to wa lk to a visual 
impairment group meeting without her wa lking a id or guide dog. Likewise, it is di ffi cul t 
fo r Daisy to arri ve at the arthriti s group meeting without her wheelchair. These things 
must be done; they must be present. Members arri ve at group meetings with a common 
problem, as they limp, hobble and get assistance wa lking. They greet one another, set lip 
the venue for the meeting, organi ze re ti'eshments, and the rest: here we can see the 
hobb ling, the wheelchairs. Simil arl y, members leave at the end with the same common 
problem, still limping and hobbling. But to treat thi s presence as the extent ofa common 
prob lem, as the way in which members dea l with it and make it relevant as an alternati ve 
to il lness narrati ves, is to miss everything my ethnographic journey through these 
meetings is describin g. This ethnographic description is not , or rather not only or simply , 
in the Garfin keli an ethnomethodological sense, draw in g attenti on to a common problem 
as th e "seen but unnoticed" background aga inst which it is alTiculated, but in some way is 
unsuccessful at do ing so. In other words, it is not mi ss ing, or overl ooki ng, what has been 
present a ll a long. What it is showin g, by attending to situated features, is that the 
relevance of a common problem is getting suspended in some way by the acti vities in 
whi ch members are mutuall y engaging themselves . The wheelchairs, the hobbling and 
the guide dogs, a lthough ev idencing a common problem, are being situated at the margin s 
f' . 124 o group meetings . 
Our earli er question: what accounts for the existence of these groups, if it is not 
the common problem? We can begin with a common problem as tac it knowledge. When 
124 I draw 0 11 the term margin frol11 the mundane context of writi ng. Margins of course surround the conten t 
ofa page of lext, and help to define where a line oftex! starts and ends. They set (JP the whole presentation 
of writing. But ahhough important, I am much more interested in what is happening on the page, in the 
substantive text as I am reading it. Like margins. then, a common problem in these self·help group 
meetings makes way for, and yet is of littl e relevance in comparison to, what happens in the meetings 
themselves. We want to see the body of the work; representing the bulk of the acti vity, that is what wi I1 
define its boundari es. 
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members of these groups were newly diagnosed, their knowledge was limited. They 
asked questions, but did not know the answers. Illness wou ld have been highl y visible: 
pointed to, gestured at, questioned, argued. But members li ve with a common problem; 
they get close to it. They develop kn owledge, and learn how to dea l with it. Reca ll 
Gladys, from the arthriti s group. She knows more than the surgeons do about the 
experi ence of her juvenile arthriti s. She is better off at home after surgery, rather than in 
the hospital, where she can better tend to the ex peri ence of hip replacement. She knows 
her body. And so it is l'or Bill , fro m the stroke group, whom we will meet short ly. He 
knows so much about hi s experi ence of stroke that he does not need to talk about a 
common problem when he goes to group meet in gs. Members of these groups, then, have 
expansive knowledge of their illness, and have deve loped such intimate awareness of it, 
th at, unli ke those non-members (outsiders), they no longe r need to point to it. It is the 
same elsewhere, wherever knowledge is developed . Take science, fo r instance. Latour 
has traced the development of a fact in the context of statements produced in the writing 
of sc ience. He looks at how one phenomenon, a growth hormone, becomes a fact th rough 
a sequence of citati on practi ces: 
There is a mass of literature on the growth hormone, and Guill emin 's article 
which I referred to is fi ve pages long. Later papers, taking thi s article as a fact, 
turn it into one sentence: Gui ll emin et a l. (ref.) have determined the sequence of 
GRF: H Tyr Ala Asp Ala lie Phe Thr San Ser Tyr Arg Lys Va l Leu Gly Gin Leu 
Ser Ala Arg Lys Leu Ser Ala Arg Lys Leu Leu Gin Asp lie Met Ser Arg Gin Gly 
Ser Asn Gin Glu Arg Gly Ala Arg Ala AI-g Leu NH2. Later on, thi s sentence itse lf 
is turned into a one-line long statement with only one simpl ifi ed positi ve 
modality: ' X (the author) has shown that Y' ( 1987: 42)_ 
Latour argues th at, if this is to be believed as a fact, each subsequent statement will 
continue to styli se any prior statement. Something significant happens: 
The act ivity of a ll the later papers will result in the name of the author being 
dropped, and only the reference to Guillemin 's paper will mark the ori gin of the 
20 1 
-- -- -- ---------------------------------------------------------
sequence. Th is sequence in turn is still too long to write. If it becomes a fact, it 
will be included in so many other papers that soon it would not be necessary to 
write it at all or even to cite such an incontrovertible fact , it will be transformed 
into something like: 'We injected sixty 20-day-o ld Swiss albino male mice with 
synthetic GRF ... etc' (Ibid.). 
And so it is for se lf-he lp groups. A common problem has travelec1 through the same 
sequence. To point to it , and to make it reportable, is to display a lack of fami liarity with 
it; in short, it demonstrates a lack of experi ential knowledge. Members of these groups, 
then, are speaking to co-experiellt ialists. Illness is uncontroversial. There is no need to 
mention what is already known. Illness, a common prob lem, a fact, is "slowly eroded, 
losing its original shape, encapsul ated in to more and more foreign statements [and 
practi ces], becoming so familiar and routinised that it becomes part of tac it practice and 
di sappears from view'" (pAJ). 
But the tacit status of a common problem does not tell us everyth ing. It is not the 
case that the acti vities I observe in these group meetings merely imply or di splay a 
ghost ly presence of a common problem. Something fa r more active, and exp licit, is in 
play, that means a common problem, the illness, is bei ng intentiona\1y deferred and made 
to disappear. And thi s means trave li ng back to the beginning, before tacit knowledge had 
been developed and from whence a common problem emerged. Recall what the presence 
of a common problem entail s. Stigma: all of those features of a spoi led identity. 
Exc lusion. Isolation. Confinement. Unpacking this reveals more. Stiff j oints on wak ing in 
the mornin g. Night sweats when pain interferes with sleep. Dail y exhaustion from a 
dys functiona l body. Painful courses of chemotherapy that induce sickness. Ongoing visits 
to the hospi tal for treatment and surgery. This is all too fami liar to self-help group 
members; it is part of everyday life, outside of the group. Gladys, from the arthriti s se lf-
help group, has just returned to the group afte r a hip replacement; there was great 
discomfort in hospital. lI ene, one of the youngest members from the stroke group , walks 
through her local town to get out of the house. She gets tired very quick ly and takes onl y 
a few steps at a time. People pass her by with their fast wa lking. They stare. She does not 
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look old enough to be hobbling around. These are all things that invoke illness, a 
common problem. To reproduce a common prob lem in a self-help group is to reassert 
stigma. It is to retain differentness. While there is illness, there is stigma, the loss of a 
leg itimate identity. So: meetings do not attend to the relevance of illness. Other things 
appear, and become the relevant things to do. 
Let us look at it li ke thi s. There is a recursive relationship between what is made 
reportable, and what is not made reportab le in practice. Things are made visible when 
things are said, done or performed. But what is made visible also does work to make 
other things invisible. How to explicate thi s? Billig (2005) provides a compelling 
discussion of the rhetorica l functions of laughter, suggesting that, like any form of 
communicat ion, rhetorical meaning can always be contested. It can always be countered 
with an opposite meaning. In other words, "what ever can be asserted rhetorica ll y can be 
negated rheto ri ca ll y" (p. ln). What one person considers funny another might consider 
serious; what can be communicated as am using can also be communicated as unamusing. 
The rhetorical meaning of laughter, then, is onl y possible because of a co rresponding 
rhetorica l meaning of un laughter. Important ly, if someone shows un laughter, it does not 
simply imply that s/he is not laugh ing. We do not always laugh when we cond uct many 
of our everyday act ivities, but thi s is not, rhetorically speak ing, intentional unlaughing. 
Billig offers a parallel in terms of "unsmi ling": "A person is typica ll y described as 
' unsmiling' when they are conveying seri ousness in moments when they might be 
expected to smile. The word communicates more than an absence of a smile - il is a 
significanl absence" (Ibid. my italics). 
That is it. The relevance of a common problem is significantly absent from these 
group meetings. But the unavailabi li ty of it is indicating far more than an absence as 
such; it is itself a rhetorical presence. It is alluded to, but mostl y by defau lt; it is difficu lt 
not to hobble when yo u have a replacement hip. And this makes its presence fe lt. 
However, it does not develop into, or become part of, the routine activities that members 
participate in , as the defining feature by which these groups produce what it means to do 
self-help grollp meetings. Something important: ils absence is being made 10 be absent. 
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Work is being done to produce thi s absence, to put something in its place, particularly 
when its presence is expected. This is what I am observing, and documenting 
ethnographica ll y, as I journey through the meetings on my visits. What I am seeing, as 
part of the production of routine activ ities, is the absencing wo rk that is performed 
temporally, where it is seen across the duration of meetings, and consensually, where all 
members mutually co-produce it. We had better return to the meeting, where we can see 
what is go ing on. 
The gro ups di sperse for the rest of the meeting; the shar ing ci rcle breaks. 
Announcements are now over. It is a busy evening for the arthriti s group. Some of the 
members are preoccupied, look ing at each other in anticipat ion. I noticed it earl ier, when 
Dawn , the chairperson, was doing announcements. I should have known: there is a 
competition tonight. Teams will be competing. That was some of them ea rli er, gesturing 
across the circle, teasing one anoth er. Th ings get go ing. Brian, enthusiast ica ll y hobbling 
ou t of hi s seat, asks fo r assistance from some of the others in setting up the main acti vity 
of the evening: Boccia. Chairs are posit ioned. Teams are ca lled out. Balls are issued. 
Members of the group arrange themselves into pairs, each pair representing a team. The 
teams are seated at one end of the community center. The game beg ins. Look: three 
teams competing. Other teams wait ing to compete, along with non-competing members 
of the group, observe from the sides of the room. Each member in turn throws a ba ll -
one team has blue balls, the other red - as close as poss ible to a white targe t ball , the jack. 
Some members are ext remely proficient at throwing; others, such as Dai sy, who is sat in 
the cen tre, wear soti padded splints to support weak, arth riti c wrists. Her throwing is 
di stinguishab le from the others in th at she uses both hands and throws the ball very 
slowly. It does not interfere with play. The others do not notice it. Anyway, Dai sy is 
joining in and being part of the evening. 
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The other members are having a good li me too, just watching: cheers, boos, claps and 
hisses abound , A referee - there he is, to the left, with a walk ing stick and hi s blue bat, 
which is used to communicate to the players during play - oversees play and measures 
how close the thrown balls are to the jack at the end of a game. Care is taken to do things 
precise ly, Boccia is played across several meetings; sometimes games are deliberately 
only partially played, and then reconvened later in a meeting, depending on schedu ling, 
When games are fini shed, scores get calculated, Finalists get named and winners get 
congratul ated when Dawn does the announcements, There is usuall y a presentat ion, 
where a trophy is given to a member of the win n ing team of a tournament, just like Brian, 
smi ling, up there, on the right. He has won the trophy twice now, 
It is diFferent in the Parkinson's group , The chairperson, after announcements, 
introduces the speaker for the evening, It is a local traffi c warden, She speaks about her 
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recent trip to the Masai Mara, a large park reserve in southwestern Kenya. The lights are 
dimmed, as slides will be shown. The first slide is of the camp where she stayed with a 
group of others. "There's no electricity, you have the old fashioned lamps with paraffin", 
the traffic warden says. The next sli de. Look, a zebra! And the next slide comes. Thi s is 
quite a contrast to a recent speaker in the lymphoma group: a chemist from a local 
toil etri es manufacturer. He ta lks about soap, the ir main producl. Members are given 
samples of the ingredients used in the manufacture of soap. Noodles are shown - small 
granules of unnavo ured, unprocessed soap. The nood les get mi xed in a huge mi ll , where 
colouring and perfume are added: lavende r, mint and lemon. The soap is extruded from 
the mill , and then cut into sections. Samples are passed around. ··When it comes out like 
that, whatever perfume is in there is in the soap", someone asks. Derek, another member, 
asks if the mi ll is warmed du ring the mixing. The group - tonight on ly ten members are 
present - is fri endly and attentive. More questions are asked and more samp les are 
shown. 
We would have difficu lty - and most likely be incorrect, an yway - identi fyi ng the 
nature of the groups to which these speakers are address ing their remarks. It is just 
holiday photographs and soap. The first speaker could be entertaining a group of close 
friend s after a dinner party; they wo uld like to hear abo ut her holiday. The second 
speaker might even be talking with a group of new employees in the company, giving 
them the speech at the start of the tour. And so it is with the other groups. The arthriti s 
group sits back and enjoys a li vely talk by the loca l fire chief He puts on his safety gear, 
describing its function. Members begin to whistl e with good nature: look, a man is in 
uniform! He gives adv ice on fire precautions in the home. Members are encouraged to 
check their tire alarms. Be safe - that is the message. Two tour gu ides from a chocolate 
factory vi it the visual impai rment group. They speak about the process of mak ing 
chocolate. Pretty samples of chocolate, shaped I ike rabbits, are passed around the tab le. 
There is plenty for everyone. Mouths begin to water. Chocolate rab bits disappear quickly. 
Members are excited; they are ta lking about chocolate. The last chocolate rabbit: gone. 
Recently the Parkinson's group invited the chairman of the Cotswold Canal Trust to one 
of their meetings. He spoke about canal restoration. He was inundated with questions 
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from the group, and things ran over at the end; many of the later activities were 
postponed until their next meeting. Canals are important things. They can be travel led on 
by boat; but they can be spoken about in self-help group meet ings. 
Seeking the ordinClfY 
Members of self-help groups are seek ing to remove their stigma by appropriating a 
co ll ecti ve identity. This identity is not defi ned by stigma. I have already invoked 
Goffman, whose di scuss ion on stigma has provided us with such va luable insight, and I 
shall do so again. He remarks on thi s paradox surrounding the management of stigma, 
and more particularly, for our purposes, the paradox of a self-help group. "The 
indi vidual 's real group, then, is the agg regate of persons who are likely to have to suffer 
the same depri vations as he suffers because of having the same stigma; hi s rea l 'group' , 
in fact, is the category which can serve as hi s di screditing" (Goffman , 1963:137). The 
very phenomenon that brings members of a se lf-help group together, that se rves as thei r 
discrediting, whi ch is to say, a common problem , is what is transgressed by membership . 
Importantly, such transgress ion can only take place when what is transgressed is 
co ll ecti ve ly shared , when it is present. It needs to have a presence in the li ves of membet·s 
before it can become absent. How remarkabl e: the erasure of a phenomenon from the 
very site that is founded on its ex istence. 
Just look at what happens in other illness settings. What about spending time in 
hosp ital, for instance? Patients are sick and wish to get better. That is what the doctors are 
for. But there is something abou t the hospita l: it is a site where illness is enacted. Thus, 
patients often take personal items with them when they stay in hosp ital; thi s lets them 
forget about the reason for attendance. Here we see the acti ve concealment of the illness, 
or, perhaps better, the problem (Radley & Taylor, 2003). It is not on ly in the hosp ita l 
either. Gregory (2005) has shown the ways in which diet-related illness is managed 
through the routi ne import of mundane fam il y eating practices. Specific illnesses carry 
specific dietary requirements. This points to diFferentness. Illness in terferes with normal 
eating and cooking procedures. It di srupts traditional rol e activ ities in the home, 
especiall y around meal times as a site of "doing" fami ly. However, as Gregory points out, 
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food and meal tasks, such as roles and responsibi lit ies for, and over, cooking and eating, 
are strongly preserved when people are ill. Those diagnosed, sometimes with di sab ling 
conditions, will cont inue to cook for their families . Similarl y, special food requirements 
will be neatl y concealed as part of the normal mealtime preparations. Those with special 
diets do not stick out at the dinner table, with the rest of the fami ly. They al l eat together 
and illness is made to di sappear. These preserved roles contribute to the identiti es of the 
ill ; if they are abandoned, then so are identit ies. "They [mealtimesJ may be a convenient 
way to achieve regular nourishment, but they provide also a vehicle through which fam ily 
and individual identities are produced and reprod uced day to day" (p. 375). These routi ne 
practi ces - food preparation, cooking and eating undertaken da il y as a famil y activity -
which went largely unnoticed before, are now, with the intrusion of illness, pan of getting 
on wi th life. Family members want ··· the same as what went before '" (p. 388). Before 
illness, things were normal. So maintaining routine mealtime acti vities are about keeping 
an identity. It means not being relevantly ill. 
There is something to be said for routine, the ordinary. Raymond Will iams has 
di scussed the importance of thi s: 
Culture is ordinary: that is the first fact. Every human society has its own shape, 
its own purposes, its own mean ings . Every human society expresses these, in 
institutions, and in arts and lea rn ing. The making of a society is the fin di ng of 
common meanings and directions, and its growth is an acti ve debate and 
amendment under the pressures of expe ri ence, contact, and discovery, writing 
themselves into the land (Williams, 1989 : 4). 
That is it: "cu lture is ordi nary". Wil li ams is pointing to the idea that cu lture is produced 
read il y and rou tinely through all of those efforts at " finding" "com mon meanings and 
dir·ections". The specificat ion of th is "finding" does not di scriminate status, intelligence, 
name or creed, that is to say, al l of those things tr'aditiona ll y considered to define Cultu re. 
"We use cultu re", Williams continues, " in these two senses: to mean a whole way of li fe 
- the common meanings; to mean the arts and learning - the spec ia l processes of 
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discovery and creati ve effort" (Ibid.). Yes: "a whole way of life". All of those routinely 
produced sites of everyday li fe are cultural practices; to reverse thi s, the ord inary is 
cu lture. And this is cu lture with a small-c; we are not ta lking about generalities but 
particularities of acti vities (McHoul , 2004). Ordinary experiences are creative. They 
produce meaning. They have va lue. It is out of thi s domain of mundane practi ce that 
common meanings are developed; it is from within th is domain that they are prese rved. 
What is important is found in the routine, the ord inary. 
Come on, we are just in time for tea break. Se lt~he lp group meetings follow a 
methodica l order. Meeting time is essentially spli t in to two sections by a tea break, a t 
which point members prepare refreshments. The tea tro lley is wheeled out. Hands delve 
in to the biscui t tin. When members drink tea, they ta lk a lot. Look at the chairpe rson of 
the visual impairmen t group, seen here preparing refreshments . She enjoys bak ing cakes 
fo r the gro up , a different one for each meeting. Everyo ne likes cake. This mOl'l1ing it is a 
gro up favourite - rich coffee sponge with butter icing. 
The cake organi ses tea break time. Members ensure that it is un wrapped carefull y; they 
do not wan t to destroy the beautifu l cake. The unwrapping is met with ant icipat ion: what 
type of cake will the members have with their tea th is morning? Pieces of cake are passed 
around the tab le and there is no shortage of appreciati ve comments. "Eee, ain 't that nice", 
Trevor says. Now the members have to deal with the cups of tea, the saucers and the 
de licious cake. Then there is Sa ll y, one of the guide dogs. Sa ll y rests patiently under the 
tab le, next to her owner. She gen tl y nudges the laps of some of the members with her 
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face: if she is lucky she will get a piece of cake. I happ il y accept the leftovers for my 
journey back home. I show my appreciation by washing the teacups afterwards. 
Of course tea breaks in these groups might be straightforwardly understood as a 
sort of intermission - like yo u typicall y encounter in most social events. And they are. 
Boccia has had its run . There are no more qu iz questions. But we need not dwel l on 
drinking tea , eating cakes and petting affecti onate dogs. There is a reorientati on - litera ll y 
a break from those ea rli er activ ities - to what is recognisable as "small tal k" . Members 
chat amongst themselves, some in pa irs, others in sma ll groups. This was not a pri ority 
earli er, when everyone was cheering as Beatrice hit the jack. But that was then, and th is 
is now. What is all the chatting about, anyway? Maybe problems with an arthritic knee 
j oint? Com ing to terms with increas ingly impaired vision? Perhaps sharing treatment or 
diagnosis narrati ves? Yes, and no. One member of the lymphoma group, Catharine, does 
mention that, since her last course 01' chemotherapy, she sti ll spends most days fee li ng 
exhausted. She gets fever and night sweats. She asks if there is something she can do. 
Someone suggests something. And Peter, a member of the Parkinson's di sease gro up , 
complains that his wife 's consultant has fa iled to reconcile her symptom management. 
Her uncontro llab le tremoring, the most visib le symptom of Parkinson's disease, has been 
getting worse late ly. 
And there is more talk ing. But often, more often than not, stroke is put to one 
side. So is arthriti s, and Parkinson' s disease. Illness just does not wa nt to make itse lf the 
relevant thing about which members want to ta lk. Bil l and Sarah, two members of the 
stroke group , are good friends. They talk all the time in meet ings; sometimes I join them, 
and ta lk too. The ran ge of topics covered is amazi ngly broad: there is always something 
to ta lk about. I try to li sten. Take thi s: 
Bill : 
2 
3 
4 Betty : 
it was on late ( , ) she recorded it Eor me and they 
was on about ( . ) there ' s a bloke in America who ' s 
autistic ( . ) 
yeah ( . ) 
2 10 
--- ---------------------------------------------------------------
5 Bill : he ' s the one the rain man ' s based 00= 
6 Sarah : ~fohh ( . 1 I read that in the paper ( . 1 
7 Bill : you should' ve seen it ( . ) 
8 Sarah : no I didn ' t see it but I read about it= 
9 Bill : =how he manages to do this beca[use 
10 Sarah : [well he ' s got so much 
11 stuff in is brain= 
12 Bill : ~they scanned him ( . 1 
13 Sarah : fah did they ( . 1 
14 Bill : they scanned his brain . ( . ) there was a piece missing 
15 ( . 1 
16 Betty : hehh hahh (0 . 21 
17 Bill : it was what they call the ( . 1 well ( . 1 I forget what 
18 they call it ( . 1 
19 eyril : the hypo something~ 
20 Bill : ~but it jOins the bits of the brain and you could see 
21 on him on the scan ( . ) the y showed it on the scan 
22 that ' s the piece that links it all together ( . 1 
?' 
_J Sarah : yeah (0 . 21 
24 Bill : and they showed the brain scan of his and he said 
25 it ' s all wrong= 
26 Sarah : ~h[ehh hahh 
27 Betty : [hehh hahh (0 . 21 
28 Bill : I mean it was an illustration but r mean all the 
29 information it comes flying around in his head ( . ) 
30 and somebody mentions something and he ' ll link it all 
31 togeth ' ur like Beethoven ' s fifth ( . 1 dot dot dash ( . 1 
32 v an[d 
33 Irene : [ch (0 . 21 Church . (0 . 31 ill~ 
34 Bill : ~Winston Ch : urchill ( . 1 he brought it all together 
211 
What to make of thi s? Here, as with all those other opportunit ies during tea break, 
members, not occupied by the obligations of Boccia or guest speakers, can discuss their 
illness as much as they wish. They can ta ll-: about the restricted movement in the ir join ts. 
They can share their knowledge of strokes, how to manage symptoms. One of the 
members of the Parkinson' s group, Susan, has a speech di sturbance - another symptom 
of Parkinson's - and ta lks through a laryngophone. This is a small device held to the 
th roat that picks up vo ice vibrations di rectly. If she did not use th is, people would not 
hear her speak. The resonance from the device, when Susan speaks, can be heard across 
the room, but it is not noticed. It is not menti oned. Look at Barry, a member of the 
arthritis group. He recent ly had surgery. He now has an artific ia l hipbone. There is sti ll 
pain, and plenty of scars and bru ising. This is not mentioned either. What is mentioned is 
a topica l news item: a recentl y viewed television programme, which has received 
coverage in the press. Look at the way Bi ll and the others are making thi s television 
program me demonstrab ly relevant to one another as the business at hand. We see 
storytellers, and story recipients, but no illness: just a te lev ision programme. What abo ut 
Irene, Bill ' s wife, whose speech is di sjointed? The impact of her hea rt attack means that 
her words come out much slower now. Does that not need to be men tioned? Yes, of 
course, but not at the moment. 
And look. What is thi s? A conve rsat ion between two members from the visual 
impairment gro up : 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Matthew: 
Alex : 
Matthew : 
Alex : 
Betty : 
Mathew: 
really ( . I there isn ' t a solution to it ( . I 
t no ( . 1 no there isn ' t (0 . 2) e : :r r ( . ) the onl y time 
( . ) I ' m unable to get out is when it ' s bad weather 
( . ) particularly when th . ( . ) if there ' S snow on the 
ground ( . 1 t that . ( . ) is a nightmare(0 . 3) 
the wind really a[nd 
[yes ( . ) u :: h ( . ) 
treading on the ( . ) 
we ' ll get some ( . ) there ' s more bad weather soon ( . ) 
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ID Alex : hopefull y we won ' t but they do sa : : y ( . ) have 
11 forecast ( . ) more bad whether ( . ) u : hm ( . ) snow wise 
12 a nywa y ( . ) but (0 . 2) we shall see ( . ) it ' s alright 
13 when it ' s snow ( . ) it ' s when it turns in to ice= 
14 Matthew : =yeah ( . ) 
15 Alex : you can ' t see it ( . ) uhm ( . ) black ice ( . ) that ' s 
16 worse than regular ice ( . ) uhm (0 . 2) 
17 Mathew : well the thing is with rain ( . ) y ' see (0 . 2) from the 
18 point of v : iew of safety ( . ) you can ' t run to get out 
19 of i[t 
20 Alex : [no ( . ) you can ' t just in case you fall ( . ) 
21 Matthew : you know people are runnin about= 
22 Alex : """no there ' s no point (0 . 2) you ' ve just got to grin 
23 and bear it 
The weather is certainl y an important matter, as any meteorologi st will tell you. But thi s 
is a self-initiated topic of conversati on in a self-help group. And at tea break. What 
happened to the crippling effects of visual impairment? At any rate, there are other topics. 
Members talk about hol idays. Wedd ings. Visits. Friends are ment ioned. A member of the 
arthriti s group, Reg, sings songs with hi s gu itar. He even does impressions. The group 
laughs. But that topic is not mentioned: a common prob lem that can be identi fied as a 
principle criteri on of membership of the vi sual impairment group. That topic, di sease and 
il lness, in each respecti ve group , is just not spoken about. That is not how these se l t~he l p 
groups are done. 
The ongo ing inclusion of raffles du ring meetings is an opportun ity for self-help 
groups to generate revenue. As a fund rai sing mechan ism - receiving donations from 
local charities is another - it satisfies the various inevitable expenses of running self-help 
groups. I helped out where I cou ld, always purchas ing a raffle ticket on my visits. I won 
various prizes; a travel drinks container and so me scented bath oi ls, as I reca ll. At the 
beginning of meetings, usually before announcements, members purchase raffle ti ckets, 
213 
retaining them until a member "call s the numbers" later. Sometimes raffle prizes are 
bought commercially before the meeting, a notable example being toiletries. Many 
members prefer to make prizes. Art istic and creative skills are readily deployed as many 
spend considerable time donating prizes brought in from home: pictures, kn itwear, cakes, 
wine. The presentation of the raffle prizes is neither arbitrary nor unimportant. Prizes are 
routinely di splayed for everyone to see. Members crowd around to get a look. People 
comment on the pretty colours; wrapped prizes evoke surpri se. More comments are 
made. 
No matter how elabo rate or, as is sometimes the case, sparse the display of rafne prizes, 
the rafne goes ahead; the di splay is still present. A tin of beans, some home grown 
vegetables and a packet of budget biscu its is quite sufficient. The display of pri zes, which 
have been mutually co ll ected and organised by the members, enables the raffle to take 
place . There is something to win. A member of the group, who se lects ti ckets from an 
empty jar, call s out the raffl e numbers: slowly, and one at a time. Each number is 
announced with a sharp, confident tone. Members have a tendency to talk loudl y when 
tea and biscuits are in volved, so the numbers are deli vered so everyone can hear; many 
are hoping to win a bottle of sparkling wine. Or maybe those luscious, home grown 
aubergines. The raffle is sometimes undertaken during tea break, when members are less 
occupied, or more usuall y before the end of the meeting when members are talking again. 
They will not have a chance to talk again until the next meeting in a fortni ght, or longer. 
"Six eight one", Tina ca ll s out loudly, nearly dropping the ticket jar. " It 's me", David 
screams, the lucky winner. Everyo ne cheers. A prize is won. The aubergines are chosen; 
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Dav id says he likes aubergines. No wonder: fresh vegetables means stay ing hea lthy. A 
few moments later, another winner is ca lled out. Any remaining prizes are stored unti l the 
next meeting. There: we have reached the end of a self-help group meeting. But, there is 
no illness, and no common problem. There is no sti gma, either. 
Look at the course of a se lf-help group meet ing again. Consider the acti vities, the 
things members are do ing together. Arranging trips. Going on holidays . Competing in 
tournaments: Boccia, you remember. Talking to fri ends. Being entertained. Learning: 
canal restoration, the manufacture of soap, fire safety. Conve rsing over refreshments in 
good company. Members have fun when they tell jokes. They clap their hands and join in 
when Reg sings. Membership takes members to diffe rent places; the boundari es of a se lf-
help group extend into other locations. They meet new peo ple when they go on holiday. 
They trave l on coaches, eat in restaurants and drink in pubs. Yes: members get about. But 
then there are all of those objects too. Lots of Ihings. Boccia ball s. Cups of tea. Biscuits 
and cakes. RaFne tickets. Aubergines. There are plenty more. 
So: what do you see? Throwing a red rubber bal l at another, smaller whi te ball at 
the other end of a hall? A coup le of inanimate vegetab les, j ust a few aubergines, that is 
all ? Dri nking tea? 0 , or not simply. These things can no longer be separated so easi ly. 
Act ivities, objects, and illness - they coalesce. The assemblage is seen as a whole; it is 
symbo lic. The meeting speaks from all o f these places. It exceeds illness as it priorities 
health ; it means doing identity wo rk (Rad ley & Taylor, 2003). We see ordinary 
experiences. This exemplifies affecti ve settings, doing normal things. The body, 
constituted and identified through illness, is now enacted th rough acti vity. Self~h e lp 
groups are about recovery. However, "[t)he recovery in question is [ ... ) not a phys ical 
one (in the sense of overcoming di sease) but an existent ia l one - the recovery of 
personhood" (Rad ley, 2002: 20). Recovering or restoring a spoil ed identity is performed 
through participation, with other people and with other things. Throwing a rubber ba ll 
once every few minutes, or eating cake and talking about the weather: these are 
legitimate occasions of the expression of these groups. They signi fy the reduction of 
stigma. They mean joining in, doing things, ordinary things (e.g., Duyvendak & 
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Nederl and, 2007). Body, illness, se lf and worl d enj oin. Barriers have been crossed, as 
members no longer feel confined by a common problem. No illness. No common 
problem. So business as usual : members will see each other at the next meet ing. 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
The pivota l topic of any discuss ion of, and membership in , self-he lp groups is "a 
common problem". It provides the resource around wh ich the whole phenomenon 
unfolds. And yet, it is unava il able for empi ri ca l investigation. This concerns its 
tempora li ty. It is present before joining a self-help group; it wi ll be present after leaving a 
se lf-help group. It is present before meetings; it will be present after meet ings. It does not 
di sappear. Th is is not the purpose of these se lf-help groups, to so lve the common 
problem. This revea ls a noticeable pa radox: membership requires its members to have the 
common problem around whi ch the group i fo rmed, but membership consists in its 
"erasure", To share the com mon problem is a device to forget it. One cannot forget what 
sticks out as indi vidual, as remarkab le. Because the problem has been speci li ed so clearly 
and at length in the daily li ves of members, engaged to the po in t that atten ti on to it 
represents a constant reminder of their "inauthenticity", it is intentiona lly sub verted. It 
gets forgotten, where forgett ing is a mechanism for attain ing normality. In meetings, 
members "know" they are around simi lar others; part of thi s knowi ng is composed of the 
collect ive ly prod uced absencing of the common problem. So: the problem is 
presupposed. Whatever is being done, it is be ing done unse lfconsciously (Oreyfus & 
Oreyfus, 1986). There is expertise here, as members do not need to ask, so to speak, how 
to go on. They are experts on the comm on problem; that experti se does not need to be 
shown. And it is not; it goes unnoticed. Bes ides, the purpose of meetings is to transcend 
the common problem. Joining one of these self- help groups is about a reduction of st igma 
derived from the presence of illness: the assert ion of a creditable social identity. The 
production of illness is the production of stigma. Normatively, then, these self- help 
groups do not contribute to or produce the common prob lem. 
Self-help groups represent a deeply authentic si te of se lf-help. Th is much is 
certain . We see the polar oppos ite of se lf-help books. It is true that illness, and stigma 
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along with it, is negotiated. Peo ple do get on with their li ves, consol idating illness and 
restoring part of a normal identity, just as the sociology of health literature has ident ified. 
But it still leaves the ex istence of se lf-help groups in question. Why are they there? They 
are sati sfying an insuffic iency, variab ly located . Se lf- help groups prov ide the one thing 
that is unattainabl e, or has been unab le to be suffic iently attained, beyond membership : 
the disappearance of illness and its concomi ta nt conce rns. But hold on. Something else 
just caught my attention. I mention it on ly in passing as it di splays thi s demarcation 
around membership of a self-help group. It is a piece of writ ing on the "promotional" 
pamphlet given out by the stroke group. 
By their very nature lea fl ets and posters concerning stroke are severe and 'heavy' 
but we tee l the message can be conveyed in a less stress ful way without losing the 
seri ousness of the sit uat ion; atter all we have all been there and are now enjoying 
li te agai n. Yo u can too. Stroke does not mean a ll doom and gloom. As a self-help 
group we know what its like since we have been there (original underlining). 
A division: membership and non-membershi p in a se l f"~ he l p group. A tempora l shi ft takes 
place, from past tense to present tense, as a result of membership. Current members have 
been there. They are now somewhere else. They were deprived of what they now have. 
Membership makes th is "there", as a tempora l locat ion and identity, disappear. It makes 
it histo rica l. Membership is a requirement to transform the status of the illness; doom and 
gloom gives way to enjoying li fe . Fu lfilment and satisfact ion, these are im portant too. 
They are replacements for illness. What distinguishes self-he lp groups, which is to say, 
membership fro m non-membership, is their contribution to identity reconstructi on. The 
spec ification of thi s age ncy is the co llectivity of a group. Members have admitted that 
"sel f-help" is not something that is pursued, or sati sfied , individuall y. While they are 
away from the group, illness becomes (more) visible; a common problem makes its 
presence felt more strongly. People stare when yo u wal k in the street; they stare when 
you struggle to carry you r shopping in the supermarket. Parents or children may invite 
you to join in with fa mily activities, but they till walk too fast when you go to feed the 
ducks in the park. You trail behind, slowly, with yo ur illness. There is guilt: yo u are just 
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holding yo ur famil y back, not letting them do what they want to do. They make 
allowances for you, for yo ur illness. You just cannot share yo ur illness with them; they 
do not know what it is like. Illness "marks" you as different. But things change in a se lf-
help group. The quest for self-he lp is accomplished through the co-production of a 
co llect ive, shared identity. Thi s is work, as we have seen, which surpasses illness. And 
when act ions are not defin ed by illness, but by participating in the activities with fri ends, 
li fe can be enjoyed aga in. Life can return to, or acquire, normality: doing ordinary things, 
not sti cking out, not hav ing illness, and not being relevantly ill. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussing the promise of the hyphen in self-he lp 
6.1 Tackling the origina l problematic 
I have travell ed across three sites of se lf-help practice. In chapter 3 I undertook the 
activ ity of reading self-help books, in chapter 4 I atte nded a self-help workshop, and 
finall y in chapter 5 I visited many self-help groups. I wanted to find out about se lt:help . 
The term displayed a paradox, encompass ing two opposing ideological positions, 
ind iv idualism and collecti vism. As I read about it, and tracked it through the literature, I 
found that th is tension was being reproduced . The term was un probl ematically separated, 
and handled as two separate phenomena. Within a contemporary context, we saw se lf-
help through two lenses: the first critic izes se lf-help books, but ignores self-help groups, 
while the second endorses self-help groups, but ignores se lf-help books. This tension 
around the term is effectivel y made to di sappea r, as each pole of se lf-help is repell ed 
further away from the other. But th is ent irely di sregards the omnipresence of the term 
itse lf, which is to say, the fact that it does overl ap, and is used interchangeably to 
describe two sets of practices . The literature tells us that se lf-help books and self-he lp 
groups have absolute ly nothing in common, and yet they share the same term . This has 
been my task: to exp lore th is paradoxical split at the centre of the phenomenon. This took 
me to the hyphen that enjoins self and help. It materialized in the form of a se lf-help 
workshop; thi s stemmed from the activi ty of reading se lf-help books, but which also 
di splayed features of se lf-help groups. Could I reconcile se lf and help, by unpac king the 
hyphen? 
My topic moved around when I undertook substantive empirica l work to 
investigate it. It changed. These purportedl y acti vated sites of se lf-help, each in turn , 
made my empirica l aim to see self-help most puzzling. A se lf-help book was not an 
occasion of se lf-help; it increasingly pushed the reader away, first with non-reading, 
extratextual activities, and then by recommending the abandonment of reading al together. 
The practice of reading, then , was clearly insufficient for the quest for se lf-help . 
However, the reader was ori ented to one relevant place: a se lf-help workshop. Here, the 
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reader is mobili zed, from the indi vidual activ ity of reading, to the co ll ecti ve act ivity and 
mutua l production of the quest for se lf-help . But here, the se lf~he lp book was sim ply 
being reproduced; only now it was spoken instead of written. As such , it suffered the 
same insuffi ciency - it was incapab le o f a llowi ng the audience to perform self-help for 
themselves. There was a professional, Fiona Hart'old , asking questi ons, busy perfo rming 
the starring role of the show; she was not a legi timate, that is to say experientiall y equa l, 
member in the workshop. What was left, when the workshop was over, was a group 
attempting to undertake se lf-help. Thus we arrived at a se lf-help group - a co ll ecti vi ty 
defined by the mutual production of experiential knowledge, that is, where peop le help 
themselves, together, using their own expert ise. But hav ing arri ved at the site where we 
have been progressive ly led , to complete the quest for se lf-help, the very reason for se lf-
help di sappears. Members of se lf-help groups revel in the absence of the common 
problem, the thing that unites them. 
I shall return to my original problematic. Here it is: "se lt", "-" and "help". I am 
un ab le to remove the scar'e quotes, and leave my topic as I found it: se lf-help. There is 
something about the promise of the hyphen that has not been fu lfill ed. Self and help just 
do not fit happily together. There is clear divergence between se lf-help books and se lf-
help groups, and a se lf-help workshop wi ll not unite them. This is something that is 
di splayed by the topic , as it gets instan ti ated in practice. 
With the self-help book, we saw the performance of the se lf: the unique 
indi vidual, the single human, the di stinct entity, individuality, the person considered apart 
from society. But we did not see help - nothing to which the se lf was connected. In the 
se lf-help wo rkshop, things changed. We saw the se lf and help: some emergent linkage of 
se lf and help, se lf and a co llecti vity of others. But th is co presence of se lf and help was 
only transient; it kept falling apa rt each time Fiona Harrold intervened, and then broke 
entirely when everyone went home. And in the se l t~he l p group, we saw the di sappearance 
of the se lf, the importance of thinking and indi vidual action, but also, strange ly, a 
di sa ppearance of help, the common problem which unites people. There was just a 
co llectiv ity. So : Fiona Hart'old ' s wo rkshop has exhibited a noticeably strange form of 
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connecti on between self-help books and self-help gro ups. We see a single direct ion of 
travel , begi nning at self-help books and end ing at self- help groups. Maybe one of my 
diagrams can do something here: 
• 
Self-help books Self-help groups 
This is familiar enough. It is the class ic polarization we have been talking about, and the 
conventional way in which the top ic of self-help gets engaged. We see no con tact 
between the two poles; they are as far apart as can be. But: is does not display how the 
topic moves about - how it actuall y performs when we look from the middle, the part that 
everybody ignores. Adjustments are necessary, and more arrows need to be added. Th is 
means anoth er diagram: 
Se"~help books •• --., Self- help workshop --•• Self-help groups 
Th is is bener. The self-help book pushes us to the self-help workshop. Here, the aud ience 
is composed of Fiona Harrold 's readership; thi s is where she discusses her books, 
drawing on their di scourse as her primary resource. That explains the first arrows, 
connecting self-he lp books with the se lf-help workshop. Now we get from the se lf-help 
workshop to self-help groups, after Fiona Harrold has left the scene. But there are no 
ava il ab le signposts indicating a return journey, not to the se lf~he lp workshop and 
certainly not to the self-help book: there is no two-way traffic. The hyphen (F iona 
Harrold 's workshop) forms on ly a temporary bl"idge, between self and help; once it has 
been crossed, all owing us to travel from the self-help book to the self- help group, it fa ll s 
away, breaking any visible connect ion. It looks like se lf and help have not been united , 
and the prom ise of the hyphen in sel f-help , wh ich implies a point of union, has been 
unfulfi lled. 
The term self-help carries a lot of freight. It is so dense, concealing "dark matter" 
that seems to have been fo rced deep from view, and forgotten, or assumed, or simply 
22 1 
never deal t with. It needs to be fu rther unpacked, as it is still pain full y unclear. Let us 
thin k about thi s one-way journey, from the self-help book to the se l f~he l p grou p. Ne ither 
the literature that dea lt with self-h elp books, nor the literature that dealt with self-help 
groups, told us about thi s. Yes, there is a peculiar spli tt ing of the two, where we see the 
gap between them ; but there is a relati onship too. Now, I want to argue that the separat ion 
is produced by, trave ls through, and is managed as part of, thi s relationship. And it is here 
that we have a chance - surely a unique occasion - of engaging the term as something 
more substanti ve, more signifi cant and more logical, without it crum bling when we pick 
it up. Maybe we can get some lasting pu rchase, and uncover some of thi s dark matter. 
This is what we have in front of us: one pole mov ing towards the other. We should not 
think of self-help books and se lf-help groups as one repell ing the other, like magnets, but 
rather as one gesturing to the other, pointing to the same destination. Now, in so doing, 
the polari zati on no longer holds. But thi s does not settl e things. There is still di vergence. 
Let us tackl e thi s in terms of the significance of the difference between se l f~ h e lp 
books and self-help groups. The sel f-help book points away from itself; as a strategy to 
complete the quest for self-help; it ad mits of its own insuffi ciency. In contrast, the self-
he lp group po in ts towards itself, and the richness we fi nd here is firm ly preserved. It is 
suffic ient enough. This accounts for the one-way arrows in my crude diagram. Wi th the 
self-help book, something is promised but not de li vered, and wi th the se lf-help gro up, 
th at promise is firml y sati s fi ed. But what is being de li vered, seen in one site but not the 
other? What is it that is sought? The critics of sel f-help books were on the ri ght track. 
And so were the promoters of se lf-help groups, the soc iologists who fleshed out the basic 
argument. We reca ll Borkman, the leading self-help group scholar, and the di ssociation 
of self-help books from her di scussion of self-he lp groups, whi ch she formu lates around 
the notion of experi ent ial knowledge. 
It unfolds like thi s. Self-help book authors do not know what is go ing on, not with 
each and everyone of their readers. There is noth ing that binds readers together, prior to 
reading - no common problem. It is just a co llection of widely distributed and unrelated 
individuals. Readers are banded together because they are given the same generic 
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so lution to all manner of particular, individual circumstances. evertheless, readers keep 
returning to the self-help book, no matter how vague its prescription; reading is at least 
some effort at add ress ing whatever they see as not right in their li ves. Such is the 
popularity of the se lf-help book. Impersonal. Disembodied. False. Self- help groups are 
different. They form around the deeply embod ied experiences of li vi ng with a rea l 
problem - members share a common problem, whi ch emerged prior to membership in a 
se lf-help group. They can legilinwlely engage their problem because they are 
experientia ll y linked. People understand what it is like; they have all been there, literall y 
and practicall y. Specifics can be dea lt with , real instances: managing pain on walking 
with arthritic joints, or techniques to minimi ze the in vo luntary Parkinson· s tremor when 
drinking coffee . People share thi s knowledge. The whole process is different. This is 
genuine se lf-he lp. 
The se lf-help group is a site of se lt~h e lp that is presenting itse lf as hi ghl y 
authenti c. It all rests on the presence of a common problem. With the se lf-help book, and 
even with the li fe-coaching wo rkshop, we did not see a common problem . There was 
nothing to unite people, bring them together at a pract ica l and embodied leve l. These first 
two sites of self-help were operating in the absence of the ·'help" side of se lf- help -
fa il ing to li ve up to the promise of the term. In a selt~he lp gro up , we move from self to 
help, from the individual to the co ll ecti ve. However, we may have met with a genuine 
site of the topic, but something is still unresolved. I have unfolded my or iginal paradox, 
and am findin g some purchase, onl y to begin slipping aga in . The ground is giving way; 
one paradox is revea ling another. Look. We have attained proximity with what the term 
self-help might signify and embody, but now the help side has disappeared. The common 
problem in a self-help group - the reason tor being in a room with a group of other 
people - has vani shed. But: people still come along to these groups. They do not miss a 
single meetin g. It has not lost its authenticity, even in the absence of the common 
problem. Why? Because members are engaging in the mutual production of another kind 
of co ll ecti ve act ivity: they are busy doing ord inary things, together, as if the common 
problem had never ex isted. And no one has batted an eyelid. The help s ide of se lf-help 
has been reconfi gured. 
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6.2 Ma pping self-help 
I have not lost the phenomenon of se lf-he lp. In fact , a new kind of stab ili ty has been 
established aro und the term. But it does require us to mod ify our approach to it, and not 
get di soriented by this poin t in its metamorp hosis. This is what we see, as a mass ive ly 
stable feature in se lf-help gro ups: people doing ordinary things. They want to do the same 
th ings together. Members turn to, and embrace, the common things that are shared 
between them. These things are heavily unremarkab le, mundane - qu ite definitely banal. 
They are so common. And now what we see is not confined to the context of a se lf-he lp 
group, but spill s out. It trave ls to other places . It looks like all kinds of possible things; it 
could be pmctica"y anything, anywhere. I f so, then , what is se lf-help a phenomenon of? 
Could it be something so substanti ve, so mass ive ly entrenched and of such general 
signifi cance, that we simply do not see it for what it is? Is se lt~he l p even more prevalent 
than the self-helps books we so read il y di scount ror their popularity? 
I want to take yo u to another place. I wa nt to show yo u what goes on in a di rrerent 
site of cultural practice. Look at the photograph : 
Do you see them? They are sat there, busy talking. And they are of little significance, to 
us anyway; it is just a picture. St ill , we know what is go ing on. They are there for a 
re freshing drink - perh aps it is a hot ou tside. Perhaps; but that is not why I al11 look ing at 
the photograph. Look again. Not much is hap pening: just a quiet dri nk. Not much at a ll . 
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Pubs are funny places, and what happens in them, where people drink together, is just as 
funn y. We have a setting, a context. There is the bar where peo ple go when they arri ve, to 
order drin ks. And maybe there is a roaring fire, which glows and keeps you wa rm in the 
winter. Signed photographs of personali ties from yesteryear, nest led among the quaint 
crockery, deco ratin g the wa ll s - they are there too. Then there is the fr iendly old dog, 
wh ich suddenly appears, ri ght under your feet. Thi s is one context, the material space. It 
is where th ings happen. But it does not say what hap pens. We see lots of people drinking, 
a room full of ··strangers". Who are they? What brings them together, sharing thi s 
company? They are a ll different. Some have come from a business meeting, or have 
stopped by onl y briefly, while out wa lking thei r dog; when they leave, some will return to 
work, or go home, or go shopping, or go to the betting shop. Some are builders, or 
ramblers, or touri sts, or retired, or just locals. T hus: there is no prior ex istence of any 
particular or obvious connection that brings eve ryone together, here in a pub. We cannot 
say, not just by look ing, and not even by askin g. But: folks are not here just to drink ; th at 
could eas il y be done elsewhere, at home. 
A pub is a specia l place for doing site-speci fi c act ivities. Let us go to the bar, 
where most things happen. The anth ropologist Kate Fox 125 (2004: 89) argues that here we 
see a ·'cultura l remission", an acti ve deferra l of normative socia l controls. We do th ings 
differentl y, at the bar. There is a new kind of appropriateness of behaviour; we see it 
when fo lks start goss iping. It is ca lled pub-talk . We routinely initiate conversat ions with 
absolute strangers, at the bar. We just talk, and keep talk ing. Someone mentions the 
weather; that is enough to get everyone started. But they do not reall y wa nt to know if the 
sun is out today; they are engaging in "grooming ta lk" (p. 26). It is soc ial bonding: there 
is no need for it, but it se rves as a social facilitator. Reciprocity, and not the content of the 
talk, is what matters. There are plenty of barstools at the bar, where people tell stori es. 
We have heard it all before, but enjoy listening, and taki ng part. People just keep tal king, 
but it is a particular kind of tal k - not too serious. So many topics get ment ioned, one 
thing moving onto another, just as quickly as the landlord is pulling the pints. To remain 
on one topic, especia lly topics on wh ich people hold strongly held convictions - science 
125 I draw on Fox's anth ropologically informed insights into pub life for much of my di sclIssion here. 
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and religion are good ones - for more than a few minutes, means normati ve activ ities get 
di srupted. It breaks up what is wanted, and what is shared. So topics COl11e, and topics go. 
One thing, say the ups and downs of the week, leads onto another, say the difficulty of 
separating recyclable from non-recyclable household ru bbish. But that spills into 
problems with trying to watch our cholesterol whil st still hav ing the "enjoyable" foods, 
and then to the new housemate in the Big Brother house, the Slovakian cross-dresser who 
can play the banjo with hi s testi cles, while not forgetting that obscure lump on our neck, 
the one the doctor looked at thi s 111 0rning. So many topics: all ofthel11 interesting, and all 
of them relevant. 
Sociabi lity is omnipresent. It is the same when we order more drinks. The 
landl ord does not j ust serve drinks, but is in vited to drink with the peo ple at the ba r, the 
regu lars: "Two pints of bitter, and one for yo urse lf, landlord". Not l11 erely a tip, or 
recognition of the service, it is a we lco l11in g into the group, the clan. The landl ord will 
raise a g lass, showing appreciat ion. Things are fri endly. This bond is also performed by 
the regul ar use of personal names, ni cknal11es, sOl11 et imes specific to the pub and its web 
of relati ons. Peop le bund le together, as parti cul ar kinds of people, fo r this setting, on the 
basis of these nal11es. We may know ve ry little about the person sittin g next to us, apart 
ti'om their nal11 e - "thrifty", or "spanner", or whatever peop le keep ca lling him . We do 
not know who they are, outside of the pub. But then , that is not req uired, and that is not 
how re lations are organi zed. In here, inside the pub, that person is known for their 
membershi p in pub-talk. This setting is where that person gets their re levance. All the 
other thi ngs, outside, along with the usual soc ial conventions, get de te rred. 
This is not rea ll y about pubs. Or drink ing. That is just a device to display the 
kinds of th ings that take place in a setting when people come together. It is a way of 
mapping the top ic of th is thesis. A pub is a pl ace where we routinely undertake what 
appears to be se lf-help . It disp lays just th ose kinds of communal practices we saw in the 
se lf- he lp groups, ear li er. Look closer. We are l11utuall y engaged in a process whereby 
particulariti es disappear. The individua l, the unique and the singular I, gives way to the 
co ll ective, the common and the plural we. Various soc ial di stinctions can eas il y be 
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identified, among the folk at the bar: social class, occupation, marital statu s, and wea lth . 
But these things get bur ied. They are acti ve ly made to di sappear. What is pu t in their 
place is pub-talk. It takes on a most primordial quality. And it seems to be serving 
profoundly important functions - meeting bas ic needs, wants and desires. So: we may 
consider what takes place in a pub to be a rituali sti c di splay of stro ngl y ega li tarian values. 
Of folk in pubs, then: 
It also emphasizes and reinforces the sense of equality among them. In a pub, 
your pos ition in the ' mainstream' social hierarchy is irre levant: acceptance and 
popularity in thi s liminal world are based on quite differe nt criteria, to do with 
personal qualities, quirks and habits. 'Meat-and-two-veg' could be a bank 
manager or an unemployed brick layer. His affec tionately teased nickname is a 
reference to hi s middle-of- the-road tastes, hi s rather conservati ve outlook on li fe. 
In the pub, he is liked, and mocked, for these idiosyncrati c foibles; hi s social class 
and occupational status are immateria l. ' Harry' mi ght be an absent-minded 
professor, or an absent-minded plum ber. If he were a professor, he might be 
nicknamed ' Doc' , and I heard a plum ber whose unfortunate pub-nickname was 
'Leaky', but Harry's absent-mindedness, not hi s professional ran k, is the qua lity 
for which he is known, li ked and teased at the Rose and Crown (Fox, 2004: 10 1 
original ital ics) . 
Fox has hit the na il ri ght on the head. The ev ident social differences in a pub are 
explicitly ignored. They get left behind - transcended. So : up at the bar, differences are 
temporari ly irrelevant. Besides, th ey do not form the bas is of the kind of sociality in a 
pub; or better, such socia lity is properly perfo rmed with in an ega litarian space. We go to 
pu bs because we want to be like everyone else. Part icul arities mark our distinctiveness, 
our separation from others. Thus there is a concerted production of sameness. We just 
want to fi t in with a co llectivity, our clan. Someth ing important: it is not that the jokes, 
the ni cknames, the rapid topic shi fts, the banality, the unremarkab leness, in short, the 
pub-talk, is avo iding the serious issues in our li ves . To the contrary, it is where we fee l 
most comfortable. Sometimes we agree; other times we di sagree. But we parti cipate. We 
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have a position, and \\le find and locale ourselves here, in the vast extent of fa mil ia rity 
with our fe llow pub-goers. " It occurs to me that perhaps our offic ial, snooty, we ll-bred 
contempt for such familiarity masks a secret need for it, expressed onl y in liminal spaces" 
(p. 107). So: pubs serve a deeply felt social need, but one which no longer gets served 
after clos ing time, when we are thrown back in to the world of ma instream social 
conventions. This is why Fox is describing pubs as liminal spaces. They are places where 
we see embod ied social connection, based not on duty (or convention, or requirement, or 
control), but des ire. Here is a very primordial communality. Authenticity is certainl y 
imp lied, or can be inferred: go ing back to our roots, back to bas ics, like they did in the 
olden days, during the emergence of the earliest fo rms of civi I ization. 
6.3 A ncwfoun d significance of the hyphen 
It looks li ke there is something to th is romanticized version of se lf-help that the se lf-help 
group scholars were so carefully endorsing. Doing things together, comradeship , liv ing 
alongs ide our fe ll ows, identifi cation in our clan: all of these things seem to be a part of a 
cultural phenomenon I am mapping, beyond se lf-help groups. But hold on. While we 
have acqu ired an unprecedented proximi ty to the topic, we have also seen the total 
disappearance of the two poles that make up its contents. Both se lf and help have 
vani shed into thin air. We see no indi vidual se l f, and no common problem, which is to 
say, the prio r reason for the copresence of mu ltiple se lves. There is j ust a bunch of fo lk, 
intimate ly connected by what they share as fe llow human beings. How to deal with thi s? 
Reca ll the OED definit ion of se lf-help - "the acti on or faculty of providing for oneself 
without ass istance from others". This does /l ot add up. We have seen the term self- help 
under more or less constant tension. It has been like opening Pandora' s box; I have 
peeked under the lid, out of curios ity, hoping to find something so li d, onl y to reveal the 
source of so many untoreseen troub les. Could th is be another paradox, aga in appearing at 
the centre of the phenomenon? Look. We provide fo r ourse lves through membership in a 
co ll ectivity, and at the same time los ing what we had set out to preserve, that is, our 
individuali ty. Is th is the loss of se lf? Has self-help become an archetype of all that 
sociology stands for? Could the term, and its offi cial definiti on with its heav il y 
individuali stic pretensions, simply be incorrect? Maybe I have been chas ing a silly li ttle 
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hyphen which was entirely redundant, and which was never supposed to hold anything 
together, after a ll ? Should we dust ourse lves off, and go home, admitting that the topic 
has defeated us? It is not all bad: at least you have been entertained, if you have been, and 
I have managed to stay out of mischief for a whi le. 
Nobody li kes a defeati st. And besides, there is too much riding on thi s to discard 
it now, at thi s late stage. Thankful ly, there is another version of se lf-help. I have simpl y 
been thrown off the scent of the topic somehow, chasing a red herring. Sel f- help is a far 
more complex beast. It does hold together. The hyphen in sel f-help is certain ly needed 
here; it now forms the most im portant part of the whole phenomenon. But what the 
hyphen is doing needs to be specifi ed wit h greater precision . We must restrain our earlier 
tendency, to see the hyphen as bringing together two separate phenomena , self and help. 
Not to do so would mean dea ling with tensions indefinitely, and trying, without success, 
to sati sfy the imbalance. Sometimes self would be adequatel y engaged, but help would 
get concea led; other times, help would become significant at the expense of self. That 
wo uld be un wise, "the result of tryin g to pictu re a trajectory, a movement, by using 
oppositions between two notions, micro and macro, individual and structure, which have 
nothing to do with it" (Latour, I 999a: 17). We need to formu late something critica l: the 
phenomenon of self-help is neither sel f nor help . And this is the purpose of the hyphen -
not to act as a bridging dev ice, but to ind icate an assemblage, something in the middle 
th at does not turn the top ic in to a duali sm as its mode of engagement. But th is does not 
mean the definit ion of se lf-he lp, which embodies individuality but whose loyalties belong 
to coll ectivism, requires consoli dation. We must reject any discuss ion of se lf-help that 
separates the indi vidual and the social. 
The ph ilosopher John Dewey can help us engage this cleavage more sati sfactoril y. 
I shall not forage deeply into hi s philosophy, but draw briefl y on its most important and 
relevant parts. In many ways, it is as if he were writing, not in the 1920s, but in current 
times - today. Dewey, like me now, was concerned with splitting effects, with tensions 
and th ings that do not fit together. "A nthropologica ll y speaking, we are living in a money 
culture", writes Dewey ( 1999: 5), on th e opening page of Individualism Old and New. 
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This culture supports onl y the economically fittest. Things depend on whether one gets 
ahead of the crowd. Culture loses its value as an assoc iation of c iti zens, and becomes an 
unconnected collect ion of econom ic competitors. Any interaction is purely economica ll y 
moti vated, initiated for the purposes of achiev ing private gai n. The selfi sh gene has 
spawned a whole generat ion of hyper- indi viduali sts. And thi s a ll turns the cogs of the 
huge industria lized, socioeconomic machine that enab les life to move fo rward, without 
gri nding to a halt. And yet: 
Our whole theory is that man plans and uses machines for his own hu mane and 
more purposes, instead of being borne wherever the machine carri es him . We 
praise even our most successful men, not for their ruthless and self-centered 
energy in gett ing ahead, but because of their love of nowers, children, and dogs, 
of the ir ki ndness to aged relatives. Anyone who fra nkl y urges a se lti sh creed of 
li fe is everywhere to be frowned upon (p. 7). 
This is the contradiction, that thing that j ust does not add up. We are part of a society 
driven by private pecuniary gai n, and yet we di splay a clear des ire for sociality. Hi story 
has shown a profound transforma ti on from an earli er individua li sm to what Dewey calls 
the current ··corporization" across all phases of li fe. Here. everyth ing has been combined, 
brought in to associat ion. There is a common market. We work together in factori es and 
offi ces, rather than culti vating land, on our own. We li ve in neighborh oods and cities, and 
go to supermarkets to buy groceries; most of us are no longer isolated out in the 
countryside, milking cows and li ving off the land . Then there is entertainment and 
leisure: we dri ve ca rs, enjoy movies at the cinema and go to the gym as often as we can. 
Others things too, like the theater, the arts and li ve music; we all partake of these. So: 
ind iv iduals have become thoroughly co llecti vized; it is membership in these pockets of 
social practice that now defines our opportuni ties, choices and actions. However, the 
earlier ideology of individualism has been inherited as a way of moving us all along. An 
impersonal, individuali st language circulates: buying and se lling. Everything has an 
economic va lue. oc ial conditions are merely opportunities for private ga in . Money 
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enables people to ex ist together in the best way possib le, that is to say economica ll y, by 
separat ing them into private individuals. 
Thi s old individuali sm is supposed to satisfy our need for indi viduality. We 
become li berated, and achieve our quest for indi vidual ti'eedom, by adopting this 
ant iquated ideology. Dewey was baffled. Rather than a ll owing indi vidual freedom , the 
corporateness of our cu lture actuall y limits it, restri cts it and submerges it. Indi viduali ty 
has been sacrificed by the powers of industria li zation and techno logy. Thi s is Ford ism: 
mass product ion can onl y offer things that have been made from a predefined mould , 
someth ing that is known to trave l efficiently and smoothl y in the market, withou t gelling 
stuck, or stopping. Everything is standard ized, made to be uniform. Differences are 
ignored, while agreement is the regul ati ve norm. The world becomes internalized. We 
have to understand ourselves, as an economic va lue, in terms of market principles. We 
are given the same things to aspire to, and forced to relate ourse lves to the worl d 
according to a normative pattern . There is onl y, as Dewey ca ll s it, "homogeneity of 
thought" (p. 12). But it just does not align with the wo rl d in whi ch we li ve; there is 
widespread bewilderment. We are ato mized, detached from acknowledged social va lues; 
there is nothing to wh ich we can secure our indi vidua lity. There is a prevalent so lution : 
wi th the advent of post-Fo rdism, and the rise of ni che marketing, goods are now ta ilored 
to ind ividual tastes; we see individuality arti cul ated through the pursuit of more of the 
activ ities that increase private gain , satisfy individua l need. But we are still lost - we do 
not know who we are. Each indi vidual is confli cted, between the material culture of 
socia lity, and the moral culture of individuali sm. " It is div ided within itse lf and must 
remain so as long as the results of industry as the determining fo rce in life are corporate 
and co llecti ve wh il e its animat ing moti ves and compensat ions are so unmitigatedl y 
private" (p. 29). 
Dewey argued for a diffe rent philosoph y of life - a new individuali sml26 The 
carrying over of the old indi viduali sm in to a corporate age has treated the ind ividual 
independently of the social, as a kind of "problem" to reconci le, or "gap" to bridge 
126 Some have called this a non- indi vidualistic indi vidualism (e.g., Zeman \998). 
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(Dewey, 1989). The damage is plain to see; the individual is opposed to the social. The 
material world does not cohere and refl ect with the thoughts and theories of the people in 
it ; social conditions are not part of their morali ty. Dewey wanted to see the indi vidual 
embedded within a social whole, but not uniting the two by recommending even greater 
leve ls of conformity. That is sim pl y a way to describe the artiti cially induced uniformity 
of thought, by adherence to old patterns of thinking. We know the sort of thing: 
··preserving" our individuality through the resources availab le to us under the auspices of 
an indi vidualis ti c ideology. Dewey insisted that we abandon the idea of there being t1\l0 
entiti es: the individual and the socia l. Character, j udgment, des ire and fee ling; our 
personal intimac ies are not produced outside of the social context. Indi viduals, at a 
fundamental, ontologica l level, change in tandem wi th the changes that occur in society. 
But then, society is not a piece of matter, or an object - a thing. For "an institu tion that is 
other than the structure of human contact and intercourse is a foss il of some past society; 
organisati on, as in any li ving orga ni sm, is the cooperati ve consensus of multitudes of 
ce ll s, each li ving in exchange with others" (Dewey, 1999: 43). Thi s has happened : the 
distinction between man [sic] and nature, the indi vidual and the social, has va ni shed. The 
two, now one, are fo und in the ·'spontaneous and large ly unconscious manifestati on of 
the agreements that spring from genuine communal li fe" (Ib id.). 
Dewey has given us what we needed. Maybe he has offered a simple point of 
clarifi cation, or perhaps some major philosophical reshuffling; whichever, it has cleared 
the way for us to complete our journey. Now we can return to self-help, as we confront it 
in pract ices, without dea ling with contradiction - a bundle of loose parts. Let us go back 
to the pub again. Or even perhaps to one of the se lf"~he lp groups, any one of them. What 
we saw there was not a disappearance of se lf, a sacrifice of indi viduality as everyone 
conformed to a single version of rea lity - a heterogeneity of thought. Instead, we saw the 
thriv ing of self. Indiv iduality was everywhere to be seen. We saw it at the bar, when fo lks 
were chatting about the weather, and telling good-natured jokes. But we also saw it when 
they were drinking, playing darts, sitting on the bm·stoo ls, read ing the newspaper, and 
using the toilets. It was not just a social setting, a structure or an institution; it was a site 
instanti ated out of the performance of se l f. 
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Whether in a se lf-help group or in a pub, fo lks share one thing; they want to be 
indiv iduals. They share a desire for individuality. Two things: the first is important, and 
the second is absolutely critical. It is because they share thi s des ire that individuality is 
even poss ible; this is important. And it is because all of thi s is pursued out of the shared 
resources of the co ll ecti vity in which it gets pursued, that individuality gets off the 
ground; and thi s is criti ca l. But we need to go further. It is not only that the resources out 
of which we make ourselves are shared , but also that our selves are shared. Look. Meat-
and-two-veg, one of the pub regulars Kate Fox told us about, wants to know abo ut 
Harry's recent holiday, the other regular. They get talking. Then the landlord tell s about 
hi s sister's birthday; others join in . There: now there is more talk. Fo lks do not just tell 
their individual stories; they contribute to the authoring of each other's tellings. Bits in 
one story become bits in another. The singular "1" loses its fo rce in structuring li ves, and 
the plural "we" is more important - not what I do alone, but what we do together. Each 
person can fl oat around , and be in di fferent places from other persons, and tell stori es 
from different experi ences, but that person becomes an instance of a co llecti ve we. Now 
everyone can share the stories, thei r li ves, as they all take part in them. The " 1" is 
communall y embedded, in here in the pub, te lling sto ries, and out there in the world, 
li vi ng the stori es to ld. It always connects to the community in which it is told, and out of 
which it is made. So: the individual and the social become harmonized. This is self-help -
the mani festation of soc ial va lues in communal life. 
Recall the terrain on which we have trave ll ed, fo r many miles now: the failure of 
the project of self-help through reading self-help books, and the burial of the common 
prob lem in self-help groups. Here is a parti cular connection between these sites of self-
help. The self-help book has its li fe in money culture. Readers seek refuge from the loss 
of self and bewilderment from li ving in a culture where indi viduality is submerged, but 
reading simply th rows them back into the sinking wreckage. They are told to remove 
themselves from the very source of indi vidual freedom: embodied connection with other 
people. Reading is an answer; but it is superfi cial, merely a di version, not a solut ion. 
Readers buy self-help books because they are desperate to rega in a sense of self, not 
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because they embrace what the books seem to offer'27 The se lf-help group, in contrast, is 
a genuine response to a culture dri ven by pri vate gain . It brings people together. The 
common problem has to be buried, so that members can be closer to each oth er. So long 
as arthriti s is present, members cannot be themse lves. They cannot unite, because illness 
marks their diffe rences. A greater commonality is being sub verted: being like everybody 
else. Members want to tell stori es and undertake acti vities in which they a ll participate, 
and in which they a ll li ve their li ves. We just see bonding, the sharing and mutual 
producti on of li ves- in-common. There is coherence. The indi vidual and the socia l 
interfe re, until they can no longer be separated. One speaks of the other. 
This links with our definiti on: "the action or faculty of providing for onese lf 
,vithollt assistance ./i·OIll athel:f". This needs to be taken figuratively. It means: without 
assistance from particular others. Se lf- help book authors are exc luded; they al'e as bad as 
profess ionals, who wo rk with offi cia l regulations and protocols. They do not reach where 
self is enacted, where it has its li fe , and where it acquires its anchorage. We see self in 
liminal spaces, as Fox ex plained; se lf-help groups and pubs are good places to look. But I 
still have a prob lem wi th only seei ng self-help in li mina l spaces - and lim inality more 
generall y. A liminal space: that is where normal conventions are suspended , rul es. 
However, despite this, there are still formali ties, in pu bs and in self-he lp groups. We 
would have problems getting served in a pub, if we did not observe the absurd rul es that 
operate at the ba r. So, we might see th is differently, as what is desired or sought in these 
sites: informality, where formalities get pushed to one side. Here, informality is 
preserved, or the mundane, as I have been ca lling it. Of course, thin gs get reversed In 
fo rmal, or formall y driven spaces, where what is sought is formality. There, we see 
protocols, guide lines, instructi ons and offi cial plans of action. Nevertheless we still see 
127 The popularity of sel f-help books is testament 10 thi s despera tion. And this is how deeply embedded the 
need for self is: a continued cycle of reading, despite every additional self·help book bought pointing to the 
fa ilure of every prior purchase. And yet, readers convi nce themselves that, when success is not 
forthcomi ng, and the world does not change after reading, more adjustment is required, and any " fa ilu re" 
becomes a fai lure of sel f. The cycl e of reading is once again repeated. Some have labelled th is compulsive 
behaviour as the "f.:1 Ise hope syndrome" (Poli vy & Hermall, 1999). 
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informality, even in the most formal spaces l28; formali ty may be sought, but it is onl y 
done through informality. 
Maybe to ta lk of se l f-help is not to lament the world we once had , but which is 
now lost and gone forever. Perhaps it is sti ll alive, everywhere. And perhaps it is 
imposs ible to confine to place , space or contex t. There are minimal criteri a for 
membership in the places where the mundane gets done, where we see socia lity and 
where we mi ght see se lf-help . It could be operati ng all the time. Of course now we are no 
longer look ing at small things, the local sites, or the big things, the forces and the 
institutions. Instead : it is how the micro and the macro, the indi vidual and the social, form 
a trajectory, a movement, where both (are there only two?) trave l as a "circlIialing entity" 
(Latour, 1999a: 17 origi nal italics). We follow thi s in practices. Perhaps we had better 
forget about se l f- help books, and even se l f:help groups. They were just places where we 
had to go; they taught us a few empirica l lessons. But extending our reach, to see the 
world-building acti vities in the domain of the in formal, might be difficult for a soc ial 
sc ience that privi leges formali sm, or what Brekhus ( 1998) ca ll s the "marked" 129 The 
problem for socia l science is its complete lack of interest in mess, things that do not 
unfold rationally. This is matched to the lack of self-consciousness or self-interest 
displayed by the actors in the informal and the mundane as a topic. This strange character 
of the topic itself, then, and the study of it, passes under the radar. 
So the mundane remains invisible to social sc ience, except, that is, through the 
programme of ethnomethodology. It sees the wo rld as a mundane accomplishment; there 
128 Timmermans & Berg (2003) provide an exemplary case in point. In med ical settings. the introducti on of 
clini cal practice guidelines and medical prolacols is supposed to bring clarity and disambiguate thi ngs - get 
ri d of mess and uncertainty. But it often , too often, does not; (0 the contrary. Ihis actually increases the 
ambigu ity of practice. Th ings only move through informal practices, situated act ivit ies that do not reflect 
the rules that are supposed to delcmline them. 
129 Brekhus is outlining a relationship between the formal and the informal, the marked and the unmarked: 
"I) the marked is heavi ly articulated while the unmarked remains unarticulated; 2) as a consequence, the 
marking process exaggerates the importance and distincti veness of the marked; 3) the marked receives 
disproportionate attention relative to its size or frequency, while the unmarked is rarely attended to even 
though it is usually greater; 4) distinctions with in the marked tend to be ignored, making it appear more 
homogeneous th an the unmarked; and 5) characteristics of a marked member are generalized to all 
members of the marked category but never beyond the category, wh ile attributes of an unmarked member 
are either perceived as idiosyncratic to the individual or universal to the human condition" ( 1998: 36). 
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is nothing but mundanity. But thi s raises another set of problems. We are unab le to do 
adequate ethnomethodology of particular practical scenes with which we are not already 
embedded . This is the we ll known "unique adequacy requirement" - the analyst's 
competence in the use of the methods by which a phenomenon is produced. So 
ethnomethodology is about doing act ivities that are indistingui shable fro m the topic it 
cla ims to be studying. It faith full y reproduces its topic, so that "ana lysis" and "stud y" 
become inappropriate terms. Let us turn this around: ethnomethodology is not a form of 
study if that study is outs ide of the practice it wishes to exp licate. And if it is not 
spec ifi ca ll y a study, then it is nothing; it loses its socia l science credentials. More: it 
becomes merely one of the myriad pract ices of the mundane. However, thi s does not 
happen; it is onl y ethnomethodologists that do ethnomethodology. The scenic contexts 
th at ethnomethodo logy claims to stud y - the pract ices of everyday actors - have not 
heard ot; and do not engage in , "ethnomethodogica l" ta lk. On the cont rary, 
ethnomethodology, when it performs ethnomethodo logy, departs from members' li ved 
sense of thei r acti vities, where analys is is disrupti ve of mundanity, as "it loses its 
phenomenon through the very technica l skill s it uses For thi s task" (A rminen, 2008: 170; 
see also Dennis, 2003). Ethnomethodology appears to be an imposs ible task: in order to 
do it, one must abandon what delines it, at least as social science investi gation 1)0 . And 
yet, it is itse lF a piece of mundane reasoni ng, re lying on the resources that it claims as its 
topic. It is onl y that, at some point, somethi ng ge ts lost - that piece of the world we wa nt 
to find out about. We just have ethnomethodologists doing ethnomethodology, and not 
members do ing some world-building activity, out-there, beyond socia l sc ience. 
Maybe I can invite you to my local pub, The Punch Bowl. It is not Far li'om here. 
While we are there, what is it that we will be engag ing in? Will we be doing social 
science, while we interact with the other regulars, or merely chatt ing? Wi ll it be selF-help, 
or will we still be at wo rk, engag ing in shoptalk? Is thi s the future of social science, here 
in the pub, doing selF-help? Anyway, be that as it may, I am thirsty. How about a drink? 
130 Ethnomethodology speaks about its topic by adopting a metadiscourse. This strategy, of moving to 
"higher" levels of di scourse (inquiry) in order to say something, is what, paradoxicall y, is moving 
ethnomethodology further away from its topic (see esp. Ashmore, 1989). 
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Appendix I. 
Selection of se lf-help books for analysis 
Selected from Butler-Bowdon's 50 Self-help Classics: 
Carl son, R. ( 1997). Don't sweat the small stuff . . and it '05 all small stuff London: 
Hodder & Stoughton 
Carnegie, D. ( 1936). How to winfi"iends and il?/luence people. New Yo rk : Pocket Books. 
McGraw, P. ( 1999). Life strategies: Doing what works, doing what malleI's. London: 
Vermilion. 
Peale, . V. (1952). The power 0/ positive thinking. New York: Fawcett Cresl. 
Peck, S. M. (2006/1978). The road less travelled. London: Arrow Books. 
Smiles, S. ( 1859). Selrhelp: With illustrations of character and perseverance. London: 
Institute of Economic Affai rs. 
Selected from The Ca rdiff Book Prescription Scheme list: 
Gilbert, P. (2000). Overcoming depression: A selrhelp guide using cognitive behavioral 
techniques. London: Robinson. 
Lindenfield, G. (2000). Self-esleem: Simple steps to develop self-worlh and heal 
emotional wounds. London: Thorsons. 
Si love, D. & Manicavasagar, V. ( 1997). Overcoming panic: A self-help guide using 
cognitive behavioural techniques. London: Robinson. 
Tall is, F. (1990). How to slop wOl"lying. London: Sheldon Press. 
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Appendix 2. 
Consent form for life coaching workshop 
PhD Ca ndidate Project 
Working title: 
An Ethnograph ic Study into Self-He lp Pract ices 
Resea rcher: Scott Cherry Cs. cherry c Iboro.ac.uk) 
To: Fiona Harro ld 
Research Outline: 
The aim of my research is to spell out in deta il the relationships between self-help groups 
and self-help groups. Your workshop might be characteri zed as a hybrid of se lf-help 
books and se l f~ help groups. This needs to be documented to give a ri cher picture of se lf-
help. 
I wou ld be grateful if you wo uld give me permiss ion to record the interac ti on in the 
workshop and for thi s material to be used in my research project, any subsequent 
publications and presentations. 
Any personal in format ion conveyed during these meetings wi ll remain anonymous and 
pseudonyms will be used as to protect everybody's confidences. 
PERMISSIO N FORM: RECORD ING 
I give my permiss ion for you to record my workshop, and for th is material to be used in 
your research project, any subsequent publicat ions and presentations. 
Name Signature 
Fiona Harrold 
26 1 
Date 
Saturday 10th 
December 2005 
o 0 
= 
(.) 
.hhh 
.hh 
() 
LOOK 
<> 
I(h)ook 
hehh hahh 
Appendix 3. 
Glossary of basic Jeffcrsonian transcription notation 
Degree s igns enclose speech deli vered at a noticeably soner pitch than 
surrounding talk 
A len bracket indi cates the point of over lapp ing talk 
A right bracket indicates the point at which the overl ap stops 
Indicates no break or gap between one speaker's turn and another 
Indicates a micropause o f less than a tenth o f a second within o r between 
utterances; longer pauses shown to the nearest tenth of a second e.g., (0.3) 
Underscoring indicates some form of stress, via pitch and or amplitude 
Indicates prolongation of th e immediately prior sound . Multiple co lons 
indicate a more prolonged sound 
Indicates ri sing and l'alling intonation respecti ve ly 
Ind icates an out-breath 
Indicates an in-breath 
Empty brackets indicate that the transcriber was unable to identify what 
was said; the length o f the space indicates the length o f the untranscribed 
talk 
Upper case indicates espec ially loud sounds relative to the surrounding 
talk 
Ri ght/left carets bracketing an utterance or utterance-part indicate 
speeding up talk from surrounding speech; reversed carets indicate slowed 
down talk 
A s ingle h within a word ind icates breath iness e.g., laughter 
Ind icates laughter 
These notation symbol s preserve the detail s of talk as they are spoken, and reflect a 
requirement for considering such detail s, and talk more generall y, as s ituated act ivity and 
performati ve of the contexts in which these phenomena are found . 
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Appendix 4. 
Consent form for self-help groups 
PhD Ca ndidate Project 
Working title: 
An Ethnographic Stud y of Self~H e lp Practices 
Researcher: Scot! Cherry (s.cherry@lboro.ac.uk) 
To: 
Research Outline : 
The aim of my research is to spe ll out in detai l the ways in which self-help groups form a 
set of practices that give meaning to those withi n them. I also want to look at how se lf-
help groups provide some sense to their members of the various issues directly re lated to 
these practices. 
I would be grateful iF you wou ld give me permiss ion to attend some of the meetings, take 
some photographs, and interview the group as a whole. I wou ld like yo ur perm iss ion to 
be ab le to use thi s material in my research project, as we ll as in any subsequent 
publ ications and presentations. 
Any personal informat ion conveyed during these meetings wil l remain anonymous and 
pseudonyms will be used as to protect everybody's contidences. 
I understand what is being out lined here and agree for yo u to take part in the term s. 
ame I S'g"""" Date 
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Appendix S. 
Interview sched ule for self-help groups 
Self-help or support group: 
Di fferent catego ri sations 
Differences and simi larities between them 
What is support/self-help? 
Attendance/Membership in thi s group: 
Wh y are yo u here? 
What it is doing? 
Are you able to do this support/self-help on your own? 
Self-help relates to other things: 
Simi lariti es between self-help books and self-h elp groups 
Do members read sel f-help books? 
What is that experience like? 
Does reading help? 
Are these things different from being in the group? 
Drive rs of group: 
What keeps the group alive? 
What keeps people returning to meetings? 
How does it cause you to see yo ur caring ro le? 
How do you see your selfas a member of th is group? 
Do you only have contact with each other within the group? 
Requ irements for membership 
How does group appeal to new members? 
How does membership fit into your life? 
Is life inside the gro up the same as li fe outs ide of the group? 
Membership to the group: 
Expectations of membership 
What were you looking to address? 
How has the group fi gured in terms of your initial expectations? 
What are you expressing in the group? 
Are these messages and feel ings able to be conveyed anywhere else? 
How do other people respond to yo ur being in a group? 
Experience: 
Persona l experience seems to bind the group. 
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Exactl y what is thi s experience? Direct? Actual? 
What counts as experience? 
Can others have it (profess ional s? Doctors?)? 
How is that conveyed to other people? Listening? Looking? 
Psychological: 
How has being involved in the group affected you emotionall y? 
Has the gro up enabled any ofyoll to see yourselves differently from life outside of the 
group? How7 In what ways? 
Are yo u a di ffere nt person now? 
How? 
How has the group impacted upon yo ur beliefin yo ur se lf? 
How have others in the group enab led this to happen? 
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